Nov

3

America 2008. Finale di partita

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La sabbia nella clessidra è quasi finita, la campagna presidenziale è all’ultima curva, poi c’è il rettilineo che conduce alla Casa Bianca. Diciamo subito che è stata una campagna elettorale bellissima. David S. Broder, uno dei decani del giornalismo politico americano, sul Washington Post l’ha dipinta come The Amazing Race, la più bella dopo quella tra John Fitzgerald Kennedy e Richard Nixon nel 1960.

Per un gioco del destino, il 1960 fu il primo anno che Alaska e Hawaii parteciparono alle elezioni e oggi, quarantotto anni dopo, un candidato nato alle Hawaii (Barack Obama) e un governatore venuto dall’Alaska (Sarah Palin) sono stati il segno del “change ” nel Partito democratico e nel Grand Old Party. Una rivoluzione che è anche il segno della crisi dei due partiti: i democratici hanno trovato in Obama una speranza chiudendo la porta al clan Clinton; i repubblicani chiudono i battenti al clan Bush con un grande punto interrogativo sul futuro in caso di sconfitta come di vittoria.

Barack Obama e John McCain hanno davvero dato tutto quello che potevano. Uno ha solcato le onde con il vento in poppa (Obama), l’altro superando una serie di uragani (McCain). E ora stanno per arrivare in porto. Uno vincente, l’altro sconfitto.

Obama è stato un eccezionale candidato, è riuscito a battere Hillary Clinton sul campo interno e a conquistare al voto una generazione di giovani che il Gop ha colpevolmente trascurato. La sua campagna elettorale ha segnato la fine della polverosa retorica democratica contro il potere dei soldi, Obama infatti ha superato i repubblicani nella raccolta di fondi, ha combattuto l’avversario con le stesse armi usate dai repubblicani. Ha fatto incetta di spot, utilizzato sapientemente la televisione, usato la piazza come elemento mediatico persistente della campagna elettorale. Nei faccia a faccia con John McCain ha mostrato tutti i suoi limiti, ma la sua capacità retorica ha riempito di “speranza” uno slogan “change” che attende ancora di essere riempito di contenuti. Sarà sufficiente a convincere la right nation?

McCain è arrivato a fine corsa con tenacia e onore. Si tratta di un miracolo. Due guerre (Afghanistan e Iraq), i postumi dolorosi di Katrina, un uragano durante la convention repubblicana, la crisi finanziaria… chiunque avrebbe gettato la spugna. Non John McCain, senatore dell’Arizona che ha avuto il coraggio di scegliere Sarah Palin, un outsider, una donna, come running mate nella corsa alla Casa Bianca. Un perfetto commander in chief, uno dei candidati meglio preparati per affrontare i marosi della politica estera, si è ritrovato nel finale di partita a fare i conti con il crollo di Wall Street e la recessione. Uno scenario da ‘29 che ha reso la sfida ancor più difficile e la scalata impervia, quasi impossibile.”Dite a Obama che non sono Bush e che non siamo nel 2004″ ha spiegato McCain agli elettori americani. E’ vero, ma Bush ha governato per due mandati e quando l’economia va male, diventa il primo punto dell’agenda elettorale. Quando tutto sembrava perduto, ha trovato Joe the plumber e l’ha trasformato in una metafora della middle class americana e delle piccole e medie imprese. McCain ha ritrovato nel fisco di reaganiana memoria la linfa per rianimare la sua campagna depressa dal caos finanziario. Basterà a riconquistare la fiducia della right nation?

Obama a 24 ore dal voto è favorito al punto che gran parte dei media considerano la corsa chiusa. I sondaggi non lasciano grandi speranze a McCain. Più volte abbiamo detto e scritto che i voti veri sono un’altra cosa e la battaglia negli Stati un’altra storia. E lo ribadiamo alla vigilia di un voto storico. Lo spread tra i sondaggi (oltre 700, un record assoluto) è troppo alto, passiamo dal 2.1 di vantaggio per Obama registrato da Tipp (best pollster nel 2004), ai 6 punti certificati da Pew, ai 13 punti segnati a favore del candidato dell’Illinois dalla Cbs. Chi ha ragione? La serie storica forse aiuta di più: dal 25 settembre quasi duecentocinquanta sondaggi danno vincente Obama, ma nel 1980 Ronald Reagan fece il colpaccio spedendo a casa Jimmy Carter nonostante fosse in testa senza se e senza ma. Karl Rove, di gran lunga il miglior analista politico americano, ha rimesso la questione in carreggiata parlando dei margini: con un margine del 3% McCain può farcela, ma al di sopra di questo valore il recupero è un’araba fenice.

Il presidente degli Stati Uniti sarà scelto dalla crisi finanziaria e non dalla guerra in Iraq, dall’Afghanistan, dal confronto con l’Iran atomico, dalla politica estera. E anche questa è una sorpresa. McCain era un perfetto commander in chief, di gran lunga il miglior candidato per una nazione che - Obama dixit - “vuole cambiare il mondo”. La scomparsa della politica estera dal tavolo delle discussione è il dato più preoccupante della campagna elettorale. Il 2009 sarà ancora un anno di crisi e recessione, ma mentre gli indici di borsa e i dati economici spingono Obama verso la Casa Bianca, il mondo intorno si muove alla velocità del suono. Come ha spiegato Frederick Kagan (l’uomo che con il generale Petraeus ha inventato la surge in Iraq) presto questi temi aggrediranno il futuro presidente degli Stati Uniti. Nel pieno della Grande Depressione con i governi alle prese con la crisi economica, negli anni Trenta, il Giappone invase la Manciuria (1931) e cominciò la sua escalation militare, Hitler prese il potere in Germania (1933), il ping pong strategico di Berlino e Tokyo si trasformò nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale.

Oggi come ieri, gli Stati Uniti non possono distrarsi, non c’è spazio per pensare che la pace sia dietro l’angolo. In Afghanistan e in Iraq 180 mila uomini combattono ancora, il terrorismo costituisce una minaccia permanente, il Pakistan è una polveriera, l’Iran vuole e costruisce la Bomba. E’ uno scenario terribile da immaginare, ma reale. Uno scenario che è completamente sparito dalla campagna elettorale e fa crescere l’illusione che i problemi siano solo quelli della Borsa e delle imprese e non quelli della sicurezza.

Ieri notte rileggevo alcuni passi della storia della presidenza di John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Anche lui era osannato dai media, descritto addirittura come “Superman”. Anche lui passava direttamente dal Senato alla Casa Bianca. Anche lui chiamò dei repubblicani nell’esecutivo, Robert McNamara alla Difesa fu una felice intuizione, al Pentagono Kennedy mise un uomo capace di programmare la pace e la guerra. Anche lui era portatore di un messaggio di pace, di speranza, di cambiamento, era il nuovo sogno americano. Divenne meritatamente Presidente e sul suo tavolo arrivò subito il dossier dell’invasione di Cuba. L’operazione alla Baia dei Porci fu un disastro che ammaccò la sua immagine di Presidente. Per fortuna del mondo, Jfk si dimostrò invece grande con la crisi dei missili a Cuba: furono trenta giorni sull’orlo della guerra termonucleare e Kennedy seppe tener duro. Ieri come oggi, agli Stati Uniti, serve un presidente pronto a combattere.

Oct

28

Frontline. The war briefing

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Frontline sulla guerra in Afghanistan, da oggi online.

Oct

17

Il numero due di al Qaeda in Irak era cittadino svedese

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Cronache di una guerra che gli Stati Uniti stanno vincendo: il numero due di Al Qaeda in Irak ucciso dalle forze speciali americane era un cittadino svedese. Grazie al prezioso lavoro degli amici di The Long War Journal e a Bill Roggio, ecco la storia di Abu Qaswarah, naturalizzato come svedese dal 1990, frequentatore della moschea di Brandbergen a Stoccolma, già segnalata come link di altri sospetti terroristi addestrati alla guerriglia in campi afghani.

Oct

16

Vincenti e crisi americana

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McCain vince l’ultimo dibattito (senza knock-out).

Obama vincerà le elezioni (se l’effetto Bradley non esiste).

Il vincitore morale della campagna presidenziale è Joe the plumber.

Il terzo e ultimo dibattito presidenziale prima del rush finale per la Casa Bianca si è risolto con un’affermazione di John McCain. Chiara vittoria ai punti, senza il knock out, con la sensazione perenne - è stato così in tutti i dibattiti -che al senatore dell’Arizona manchino quel pizzico di cattiveria e machiavellismo che in politica fanno la differenza tra un buon politico e un leader.

Obama e McCain hanno mostrato le loro profonde differenze sui temi già noti: tasse, energia, ambiente e aborto. McCain stavolta ci ha messo più grinta e ha battuto il chiodo sulla storia di Barack Obama e le sue idee da far left piuttosto che da democratico moderato. Una buona tattica che avrà anche un riscontro positivo finale, ma limitata rispetto all’obiettivo di rovesciare le sorti di una campagna presidenziale che nei sondaggi appare segnata.

Obama ha da tempo cambiato la sua strategia: niente attacchi, meno change e più “sono io quello che può far sparire le paure del popolo americano”. E’ in vantaggio e lo amministra. Questo però potrebbe anche costargli caro. Gli elettori americani non apprezzano i candidati che all’ultimo miglio tirano i remi in barca e alzano le braccia. Karl Rove - uno che di campagne elettorali se ne intende - ha messo in guardia Obama: se si rilassa, può perdere. Il problema è che McCain non può vincere. Almeno a guardare i sondaggi. Alla fine delle elezioni vedremo quanto gli istituti demoscopici sono stati precisi nel misurare un’elezione singolare come poche: per la prima volta da decenni non c’è un incumbent, entrambi i candidati sono outsider rispetto all’apparato e ai circoli di potere dei due partiti e in mezzo c’è una crisi finanziaria che fa impallidire - per dimensioni spaziali e magnitudo - quella del ‘29. Il financial meltdown non è stato assorbito, le borse continuano a sembrare le cascate del Niagara, questo continua a dare benzina alla campagna finale di Barack Obama.

Quali sono le reali speranze di John McCain? Poche. Potrebbe rivelarsi l’effetto Bradley, cioè i bianchi americani che pur dichiarando nei sondaggi di voler votare per Obama, alla fine, nel segreto dell’urna, cambiano idea e preferiscono non votare il nero. E’ una realtà assai poco esplorata durante questa elezione e il voto del 4 novembre sarà un eccezionale banco di prova per misurarla. L’altro vero tema, il punto debole di tutta la campagna obamiana - insieme alla politica estera, che però la crisi finanziaria ha logicamente retrocesso nell’interesse degli americani - è costituito dalle misure fiscali. Quella di Obama è una tipica piattaforma democratica da tax and spend. Dove il tax va letto come small business. Non a caso in queste ore il vero protagonista, il vincitore morale, della campagna elettorale è diventato Joe the plumber, l’idraulico dell’Ohio (stato in bilico e quasi sempre decisivo). Durante un incontro con Obama, Joe Wurzelbacher ha scambiato una serie di battute con il candidato democratico accusandolo di avere un piano fiscale che gli impedisce di acquistare l’azienda per cui lavora. Troppe tasse. Agli strateghi della campagna di McCain non è sembrato vero poter trasformare Joe the plumber in un’icona della ribellione fiscale. Tanto che il senatore dell’Arizona l’ha citato la bellezza di diciotto volte durante il dibattito con Obama.

La storia di Joe the plumber ci insegna, in fondo, che le campagne elettorali partono dai bisogni della gente e devono trovare dei simboli per diventare efficaci. Ma questa non è un’elezione presidenziali come tutte le altre. A Obama è bastato presentare se stesso e una parola “change”, a McCain non è bastato essere un eroe del Vietnam, non è bastata Sarah Palin (scelta felicissima perchè senza di lei la campagna del Gop sarebbe già morta) e probabilmente non basterà neppure l’idraulico dell’Ohio. E’ il segno dei tempi, dettati da qualcosa di più grande e profondo della crisi finanziaria: la crisi americana.

Letture consigliate: Karl Rove oggi sul Wall Street Journal. Molto interessante sulla proiezione dei prossimi 19 giorni di campagna elettorale e le possibilità di recupero (poche ma reali) da parte di John McCain. Su Pajamas Media da leggere “And the winner is….Joe the plumber”.

Post scriptum: quando diamo la valutazione sulla prova dei candidati, cerchiamo di farlo senza farci influenzare dal “rumore di fondo” della campagna elettorale. Questo sottile rumore (un lontano suono di vittoria per Obama), purtroppo, ha impedito alla maggioranza dei giornalisti e analisti politici di offrire una valutazione senza pregiudizio. Ora che i tre dibattiti presidenziali si sono svolti, possiamo dire che complessivamente John McCain li ha condotti bene, al di là della sua capacità dialettica (inferiore a Obama, non ci sono dubbi) ma con il grandissimo e probabilmente decisivo limite di non riuscire mai a dare un colpo politicamente mortale all’avversario. Eppure, nonostante il vantaggio sul piano dell’ars oratoria e le condizioni di contesto elettorale superfavorevoli, Obama nei confronti one to one ha mostrato limiti di preparazione politica molto grandi. Una cosa è parlare di fronte alla folla senza interlocutorio, un’altra è un dibattito sul podio a due o in pieno stile town hall, rispondendo alle domande del pubblico. Qui è venuto fuori un Obama assai meno spettacolare, ma tranne pochi casi riguardanti alcuni coraggiosi e onesti osservatori, si è arrivati a sostenere il grottesco risultato del pareggio laddove era evidente che Obama non aveva nè conquistato nè affascinato.

Sep

11

9/11/2001 - We remember

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Appuntamento oggi alla Scuola di formazione politica di Forza Italia a Gubbio, alle ore 18.

“11 settembre, nuovi scenari globali, la politica estera dell’Italia”

con Margherita Boniver, Antonio Martino, Fiamma Nirenstein.

Modera: Mario Sechi, vicedirettore di Panorama.

May

8

Hezbollah al Libano: “Ci ha dichiarato guerra”

Filed Under Energia e Ambiente, Medio Oriente, War on Terror | 1 Comment

“Il Libano ha dichiarato guerra a Hezbollah”. Parole di Hassan Nasrallah, leader del movimento sciita che reagisce alla decisione del governo di Siniora di tagliare la rete di telecomunicazioni parallela di Hezbollah.

Beirut è di nuovo in fiamme, blocchi e scontri tra sciiti e sunniti sono sempre più numerosi. Hezbollah ha bloccato l’aeroporto e le principali arterie della città. La guerra civile incombe.

Hezbollah considera la rete di telecomunicazione parte integrante del suo arsenale e non ci sono dubbi che sia così. Aiutato dall’Iran, il movimento di Nasrallah ha costruito una struttura di tlc clandestina capace di coprire quasi tutto il Libano.

Nasrallah ha anche parlato della missione Unifil e citato il presidente del Consiglio Silvio Berlusconi che aveva auspicato il cambio delle regole di ingaggio in Libano: «Abbiamo accettato una missione ben definita» e non un tipo di forza che «ora dice di voler cambiare le regole di ingaggio».

Apr

9

Ecco cosa ha detto Petraeus al Congresso

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Ecco la relazione integrale del generale David H. Petraeus al Congresso degli Stati Uniti. Sono sette pagine che contengono un’analisi molto interessante sulla situazione in Iraq. I giornali hanno presentato il report di Petraeus come uno stop al ritiro delle truppe americane in Iraq. In realtà, il documento non dice tout court che bisogna fermare il ritiro, ma suggerisce un approccio flessibile al problema della sicurezza irachena per non vanificare in un lampo i progressi compiuti nell’ultimo anno.

Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq
8-9 April 2008

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently
provided to my chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been
significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian
deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements
have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and
there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the
situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as
events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress
made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when
Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it
was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy
additional US forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made. First, of course, has
been the impact of increased numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Forces. You are well aware of the
U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000
additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its
capability to deploy and employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of Coalition and Iraqi Forces in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people,
to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local
reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi
population. Since the first Sunni “Awakening” in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq
increasingly have rejected AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These
communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate
in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis—some,
former insurgents—to contribute to local security as so-called “Sons of Iraq.” With their
assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI—while still
lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly.
The recent flare-up in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the
ceasefire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in
violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr standdown
order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role
Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and
generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the
Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress
achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this
while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.

The Nature of the Conflict

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition continues,
influenced heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term
stability in Iraq.
Various elements push Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists,
insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda’s senior
leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction,
and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria
has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to
shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly
damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient Iraqi
governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq’s problems.
These challenges and recent weeks’ violence notwithstanding, Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition
in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the
recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with temporarily, at least,
by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street
fighting.


Current Situation and Trends

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in
the security arena.
As this chart [Slide 1] illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level
not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the
violence in Basrah and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again,
though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi
civilians killed due to violence. As this chart [Slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased
over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set
off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early
2007. This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line
reflecting Coalition and Iraqi data and the bottom line reflecting Coalition-confirmed data only.
No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly,
though more work clearly needs to be done.
Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread
if left unchecked. As the box on the bottom left of this chart [Slide 3] shows, the number of
deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor
has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown
in the boxes depicting Iraq’s capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to
sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods; however, that is only a partial
explanation as countless sectarian fault lines and numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in
Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have focused along the fault lines to
reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in
their local communities.
As this next chart [Slide 4] shows, even though the number of high profile attacks increased in
March as AQI lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year
ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have
seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian
violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy’s inability to date to
re-ignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an
important development. As this chart [Slide 5] depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of
Iraq—Shia as well as Sunni—under contract to help Coalition and Iraqi Forces protect their
neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These volunteers have contributed
significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence—
not to mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the cost of their monthly
contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons
and explosives caches. As this next chart [Slide 6] shows, in fact, we have already found more
caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are
working closely with the Iraqi Government to transition them into the Iraqi Security Forces or
other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the Police or Army
or other government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will
continue to monitor it carefully.
Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements have targeted
them repeatedly. However, these attacks—in addition to AQI’s use of women, children, and the
handicapped as suicide bombers—have further alienated AQI from the Iraqi people. And the
tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI’s loss of local support in many areas, has
substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart [Slide 7]
displays the cumulative effect of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see,
we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, though
there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted that progress, AQI is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless
pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource
flows that sustain it. This chart [Slide 8] lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis,
and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you
can see, defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counter-terrorist forces,
but also major operations by Coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence
effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives,
diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and
many other actions. Related to this effort, I applaud Congress’ support for additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming Supplemental, as ISR is vital to the
success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of
instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda’s senior leaders view as a tool
to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri
have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved
in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-east region.
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These
elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese
Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of
government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring
Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their
desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian
leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods
Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We
should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the
kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian
involvement in Iraq.

Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred
responsibilities to Iraqi Forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have
permitted. Currently, as this chart [Slide 9] shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under
provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces—not just the successful provinces in the
Kurdish Regional Government area, but also a number of southern provinces—have done well.
Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process
will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah Provinces to transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi Forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve
in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in
operations, albeit with some Coalition support, has grown to well over 100 [Slide 10]. These
units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security
Force losses have recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after
action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and
leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a
result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their
footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security
institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to
grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding
training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special
Operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National
Police battalions. Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their
budgets. As this chart [Slide 11] shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq’s security ministries spent more
on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF).
We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year,
and this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund
request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security
throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basrah highlight improvements in the
ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and
replacements on very short notice; they certainly could not have deployed a division’s worth of
Army and Police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations
also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the areas of logistics, force enablers,
staff development, and command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March
2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of
American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the
organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to
support urgent wartime requirements. On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider
restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports
education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important
component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future.
Upcoming Challenges
While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of
the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a
resurgence of AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire order
and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions
by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.
Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities
for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial, and national
levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the
coming months, Iraq’s leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass
additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of
disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would
challenge any government, much less a still developing government tested by war.
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the State Department’s Quick Response
Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I
respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the
Supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the
Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced
security in local communities. Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300
million for us to manage as “Iraqi CERP” to perform projects for their people, while building
their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually
assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a Joint Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi government pledges to provide
more as they execute the budget passed two months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to
have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.

Recommendations

Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq.
During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security
gains while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized the
need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition
responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security
gains that have been made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations.
The operational considerations include recognition that:
• the military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible;
• Iraqi Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities but still must grow further;
• the provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to
resolve provincial boundary disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging;
• the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces or other pursuits will require
time and careful monitoring;
• withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year;
and
• performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces as well as
special operations forces and advisor teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that:
• the strain on the US military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable;
• a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and
global threats; and
• a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al
Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for
the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the
drawdown of the surge combat forces and that, upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade
combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end
of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the
ground and, over time, determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions.
This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as
conditions permit. This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable;
however, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile
security gains our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for
the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27
million citizens of Iraq; it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of
the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq
prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian
encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over

Iraq’s borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

Closing Comments


In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation in Iraq. We have asked a great
deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal
awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my
recommendations.
The Congress, the Executive Branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to
support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more
to those in harm’s way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and
those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our Nation in Iraq
and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day.
It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.

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