Ritiro. La parola che nel centrodestra nes­suno aveva il coraggio di pronunciare, alla fine l’ha detta Umberto Bossi. Ora si dirà che siamo di fronte alle singolari visioni di politica estera del Senatur, ma il leader della Lega in realtà quando parla di «mis­sione esaurita» e «fallimento» ha ragione perché o la campagna militare cambia strategia oppure è destinata a finire. Male. Quando una nazione decide di inviare i suoi soldati al fronte, la sua classe politica deve specchiarsi e chiedersi: abbiamo sufficiente forza e coraggio? abbiamo calcolato i rischi, i costi e i benefici? c’è armonia tra gli alleati? conosciamo il nostro nemico? è una mis­sione di pace o di guerra? Tutte queste domande pesano sulla nostra mis­sione a Kabul, sul destino dei soldati, sul nostro rapporto con gli Stati Uniti e la Nato oggi più che mai. Bisogna ricordare subito che la mis­sione in Afghanistan (e l’invasione dell’Iraq) non nasce per il capriccio di un pre­sidente americano, ma è la risposta della Nato alla tragedia dell’11 settembre 2001. Fu l’attentato di Al Qaeda a New York a far scattare per la prima volta dal dopoguerra l’articolo 5 del Trattato del Nord Atlantico che pre­vede l’impegno di tutti in favore di un alleato colpito in casa. E il nemico Bin Laden era in Afghanistan. La nostra partecipazione alla mis­sione rientra tra gli obblighi pre­visti dai trattati internazionali e si svolge sotto l’ombrello delle Nazioni Unite. Sotto il profilo del diritto internazionale non c’è niente da dire. Quella in Afghanistan era una guerra giusta e andava combattuta. I problemi sono arrivati subito dopo la conquista di Kabul, nel dopoguerra. Si è pensato di poter controllare il paese senza sufficienti truppe di terra, si è sottovalutata l’abilità dei guerriglieri talebani che in pas­sato avevano fatto a pezzi l’Armata Rossa, si è pensato di pre­sidiare montagne, gole e altipiani con pochi soldati. Come andare a mani nude nella tana del lupo. Gli errori degli americani si sono sommati a quelli di un’Europa in disaccordo su tutto e il patatrac è arrivato puntuale. Siamo di fronte a un para­dosso che le frasi semplici di Bossi hanno scoperto: la guerra giusta in Afghanistan rischia di essere una sconfitta, quella considerata (a torto o a ragione) ingiusta in Iraq è stata vinta. La mis­sione a Kabul così è da buttare, bisogna reinventarla e in fretta, prima che il tricolore si macchi ancora di sangue. Questa tragedia fa parte del mestiere delle armi e la risposta della moglie di uno dei caduti («sono orgogliosa di mio marito») è quella giusta che spazza via corvi e sciacalli. Le domande e le risposte del governo invece devono essere altre: la mis­sione può continuare su questo binario morto? i nostri soldati hanno tutto quello che serve per fronteggiare il nemico? stiamo facendo tutto il pos­sibile per vincere? sono certo che queste domande se le pone anche il lettore di Libero che, a differenza della classe politica, non ha paura di chiamare le cose con il loro nome: quella in Afghanistan non è una mis­sione di pace, ma una guerra. Il primo atto di forza e coraggio che dovrebbe fare una volta per tutte questo governo è quello di spazzar via l’ipocrisia che avvolge la mis­sione, sgombrare il campo da questo equivoco suicida, abbattere il muro che vorrebbe nascondere una realtà che gli italiani immaginano benis­simo perché non sono fessi e se vedono i nostri soldati con il mitra e l’elmetto non pensano stiano andando a fare un pic nic nei dintorni di Kabul. Una volta fatta quest’opera di pulizia del vocabolario della politica, messa al giusto posto la parola guerra, si potrà difendere la pace.

© Libero

Sarà pure un tipo inaffidabile da suk, un beduino che non si accontenta di piantare la tenda nel deserto ma ovunque gli capiti di andare, sarà un colonnello poco marziale e per niente pre­sentabile, sarà quel che sarà, ma Silvio Berlusconi ha molte buone ragioni per andare in Libia da Gheddafi.

Il pre­sidente del Consiglio non può farsi guidare nelle sue scelte da un pur nobile idealismo, la sua bus­sola deve essere una sola: gli interessi del Paese. E la visita in Libia serve a difendere e allargare questi interessi.

Sarebbe molto bello poter ignorare alcuni dati di fatto, ma la politica resta il regno delle cose terrene e non ultraterrene. Il governo libico è pre­sente in Italia con investimenti finanziari mas­sicci. La Libyan Investment Authority (Lia), il fondo sovrano di Gheddafi (65 miliardi di dollari di dotazione), ha un joint fund da 500 milioni di dollari con Mediobanca, ha il 4,9 per cento dell’Unicredit, l’1 per cento dell’Eni, il 45 per cento della Tamoil Italia; nel settore delle telecomunicazioni ha il 14,79 per cento della Retelit, ha chiuso una joint venture con la Sirti, manifestato interesse per l’acquisto del 10 per cento della Telecom, ha siglato il 30 luglio scorso un memorandum di cooperazione strategica con Finmeccanica e guarda a partecipazioni future in Terna e Impregilo. Storica è la pre­senza nella Fiat. Il fondo sovrano libico è un polmone finanziario che l’Italia non può ignorare, altrimenti ci saranno altri Paesi pronti a usarlo per far respirare la propria economia. È la dura legge della globalizzazione a imporre al nostro Paese — e al governo, di qualsiasi colore esso sia — un dialogo con il colonnello.

Il «pazzo di Tripoli», come lo chiama qui a fianco Gennaro Malgieri ricordando una frase del «saggio Sadat» (che tanto saggio non era, visto che nel 1973 guidò l’Egitto insieme alla Siria contro Israele nella guerra del Kippur) ha un pas­sato terribile, un pre­sente discutibile e un futuro ancora temibile, ma è il leader di uno Stato che prima faceva esplodere aerei in volo sul cielo della Scozia, accumulava armi di distruzione di massa e oggi ha lasciato da parte l’idea di essere una potenza militare per diventare un giocatore fondamentale nel mercato dell’energia. Un «pazzo di Tripoli» con il petrolio è meno letale di un dittatore che fino a pochi anni fa collaborava con la Corea del Nord per lo sviluppo di mis­sili balistici e lavorava intensamente allo sviluppo di armi nucleari, chimiche e bio­logiche. Quando nel 2003 la Libia firmò l’accordo per lo smantellamento dell’arsenale, gli americani che lo braccavano da sempre scoprirono che «era più avanti di quanto pensas­simo». Gheddafi non è diventato improvvisamente un santo, non è un tipo raccomandabile, governa con il pugno di ferro, non conosce la democrazia e neppure il galateo istituzionale. È nato nel deserto, in una tenda, figlio di due beduini anal­fabeti, è un uomo duro e spietato, agita le masse con proclami e discorsi inaccettabili per le democrazie, ma quelle masse sarebbero molto più pericolose se non ci fosse lui. La para­bola di quest’uomo è magistralmente raccontata dal nostro Maurizio Stefanini in un libro intitolato “I nomi del male”. Gheddafi è in buona compagnia e in quella galleria di personaggi poco raccomandabili ci sono Castro, Ahmadinejad e Chavez, pazzi di Cuba, Iran e Venezuela con i quali mezzo Occidente — Italia compresa — fa affari e intrattiene relazioni diplomatiche senza badare troppi ai diritti umani. Stendiamo un velo pietoso infine sulla Cina, potenza globale del pre­sente e dell’avvenire. Con l’idealismo non si va lontano, semmai si scatenano guerre inutili (qualcuno ricorda il Vietnam dei democratici?), mentre con la diplomazia si pos­sono raggiungere risultati inaspettati. Berlusconi deve usare il suo straordinario senso delle relazioni e l’arma della diplomazia ha diversi livelli di azione per evitare al pre­sidente del Consiglio di cascare nelle botole che si sono aperte dopo il rilascio trionfale del terrorista che ha ideato l’attentato di Lockerbie. Il Cavaliere vada in Libia, faccia gli interessi dell’Italia, firmi accordi commerciali, sorrida, dica le sue battute e se ne ha voglia salga perfino sul cammello. Ma non faccia decollare le Frecce Tricolori, quelle potranno sorvolare il cielo di Tripoli quando la Libia diventerà una democrazia.

© Libero

By George Friedman

At Friday prayers July 17 at Tehran University, the influential cleric and former Iranian Pre­sident Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani gave his first sermon since Iran’s disputed pre­sidential election and the subsequent demonstrations. The crowd listening to Rafsanjani inside the mosque was filled with Ahmadinejad supporters who chanted, among other things, “Death to America” and “Death to China.” Outside the university common grounds, anti-Ahmadinejad elements — many of whom were blocked by Basij militiamen and police from entering the mosque — persistently chanted “Death to Russia.”

Death to America is an old staple in Iran. Death to China had to do with the demonstrations in Xinjiang and the death of Uighurs at the hands of the Chinese. Death to Rus­sia, however, stood out. Clearly, its use was planned before the protesters took to the streets. The meaning of this must be uncovered. To begin to do that, we must consider the political configuration in Iran at the moment.

The Iranian Political Configuration

There are two factions claiming to speak for the people. Rafsanjani represents the first faction. During his sermon, he spoke for the tradition of the founder of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who took power during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Rafjsanjani argued that Khomeini wanted an Islamic republic faithful to the will of the people, albeit within the confines of Islamic law. Rafsanjani argued that he was the true heir to the Islamic revolution. He added that Khomeini’s succes­sor — the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — had violated the principles of the revolution when he accepted that Rafsanjani’s archenemy, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had won Iran’s recent pre­sidential election. (There is enormous irony in foreigners describing Rafsanjani as a moderate reformer who supports greater liberalization. Though he has long cultivated this image in the West, in 30 years of public political life it is hard to see a time when has supported Western-style liberal democracy.)

The other faction is led by Ahmadinejad, who takes the position that Rafsanjani in particular — along with the generation of leaders who ascended to power during the first phase of the Islamic republic — has betrayed the Iranian people. Rather than serving the people, Ahmadinejad claims they have used their positions to become so wealthy that they dominate the Iranian economy and have made the reforms needed to revitalize the Iranian economy impos­sible. According to Ahmadinejad’s charges, these elements now blame Ahmadinejad for Iran’s economic failings when the root of these failings is their own corruption. Ahmadinejad claims that the recent pre­sidential election represents a national rejection of the status quo. He adds that claims of fraud represent attempts by Rafsanjani — who he portrays as defeated pre­sidential candidate Mir Hos­sein Mousavi’s sponsor — and his ilk to protect their positions from Ahmadinejad.

Iran is therefore experiencing a generational dispute, with each side claiming to speak both for the people and for the Khomeini tradition. There is the older generation — symbolized by Rafsanjani — that has prospered during the last 30 years. Having worked with Khomeini, this generation sees itself as his true heir. Then, there is the younger generation. Known as “students” during the revolution, this group did the demonstrating and bore the brunt of the shah’s security force counterattacks. It argues that Khomeini would be appalled at what Rafsanjani and his generation have done to Iran.

This debate is, of course, more complex than this. Khamenei, a key associate of Khomeini, appears to support Ahmadinejad’s position. And Ahmadinejad hardly speaks for all of the poor as he would like to claim. The lines of political disputes are never drawn as neatly as we would like. Ultimately, Rafsanjani’s opposition to the recent election did not have as much to do with concerns (valid or not) over voter fraud. It had everything to do with the fact that the outcome threatened his personal position. Which brings us back to the question of why Rafsanjani’s followers were chanting “Death to Russia”?

Examining the Anomalous Chant

For months prior to the election, Ahmadinejad’s allies warned that the United States was planning a “color” revolution. Color revolutions, like the one in Ukraine, occurred widely in the former Soviet Union after its collapse, and these revolutions followed certain steps. An opposition political party was organized to mount an electoral challenge the establishment. Then, an election occurred that was either fraudulent or claimed by the opposition as having been fraudulent. Next, widespread peaceful protests against the regime (all using a national color as the symbol of the revolution) took place, followed by the collapse of the government through a variety of paths. Ultimately, the opposition — which was invariably pro-Western and particularly pro-American — took power.

Moscow openly claimed that Western intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, organized and funded the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These agencies allegedly used nongovernmental organizations (human rights groups, pro-democracy groups, etc.) to delegitimize the existing regime, repudiate the outcome of the election regardless of its validity and impose what the Rus­sians regarded as a pro-American puppet regime. The Rus­sians saw Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as the break point in their relationship with the West, with the creation of a pro-American, pro-NATO regime in Ukraine representing a direct attack on Rus­sian national security. The Americans argued that to the contrary, they had done nothing but facilitate a democratic movement that opposed the existing regime for its own reasons, demanding that rigged elections be repudiated.

In warning that the United States was planning a color revolution in Iran, Ahmadinejad took the Rus­sian position. Namely, he was arguing that behind the cover of national self-determination, human rights and commitment to democratic institutions, the United States was funding an Iranian opposition movement on the order of those active in the former Soviet Union. Regardless of whether the opposition actually had more votes, this opposition movement would immediately regard an Ahmadinejad win as the result of fraud. Large demonstrations would ensue, and if they were left unopposed the Islamic republic would come under threat.

In doing this, Ahmadinejad’s faction positioned itself against the actuality that such a rising would occur. If it did, Ahmadinejad could claim that the demonstrators were — wittingly or not — operating on behalf of the United States, thus delegitimizing the demonstrators. In so doing, he could discredit supporters of the demonstrators as not tough enough on the United States, a useful charge against Rafsanjani, whom the West long has held up as an Iranian moderate.

Interestingly, while demonstrations were at their height, Ahmadinejad chose to attend — albeit a day late — a multinational Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference in Moscow on the Tuesday after the election. It was very odd that he would leave Iran during the greatest postelection unrest; we assumed he had decided to demonstrate to Iranians that he didn’t take the demonstrations seriously.

The charge that seems to be emerging on the Rafsanjani side is that Ahmadinejad’s fears of a color revolution were not simply political, but were encouraged by the Rus­sians. It was the Rus­sians who had been talking to Ahmadinejad and his lieutenants on a host of issues, who warned him about the pos­sibility of a color revolution. More important, the Rus­sians helped pre­pare Ahmadinejad for the unrest that would come — and given the Rus­sian experience, how to manage it. Though we speculate here, if this theory is correct, it could explain some of the efficiency with which Ahmadinejad shut down cell phone and other communications during the postelection unrest, as he may have had Rus­sian advisers.

Rafsanjani’s followers were not shouting “Death to Rus­sia” without a reason, at least in their own minds. They are certainly charging that Ahmadinejad took advice from the Rus­sians, and went to Rus­sia in the midst of political unrest for consultations. Rafsanjani’s charge may or may not be true. Either way, there is no question that Ahmadinejad did claim that the United States was planning a color revolution in Iran. If he believed that charge, it would have been irrational not to reach out to the Rus­sians. But whether or not the CIA was involved, the Rus­sians might well have provided Ahmadinejad with intelligence of such a plot and helped shape his response, and thereby may have created a closer relationship with him.

How Iran’s internal struggle will work itself out remains unclear. But one dimension is shaping up: Ahmadinejad is try­ing to position Rafsanjani as leading a pro-American faction intent on a color revolution, while Rafsanjani is try­ing to position Ahmadinejad as part of a pro-Russian faction. In this argument, the claim that Ahmadinejad had some degree of advice or collaboration with the Rus­sians is credible, just as the claim that Rafsanjani maintained some channels with the Americans is credible. And this makes an internal dispute geopolitically significant.

The Iranian Struggle in a Geopolitical Context

At the moment, Ahmadinejad appears to have the upper hand. Khamenei has certified his re-election. The crowds have dis­sipated; nothing even close to the numbers of the first few days has since materialized. For Ahmadinejad to lose, Rafsanjani would have to mobilize much of the clergy — many of whom are seemingly content to let Rafsanjani be the brunt of Ahmadinejad’s attacks — in return for leaving their own interests and fortunes intact. There are things that could bring Ahmadinejad down and put Rafsanjani in control, but all of them would require Khamenei to endorse social and political instability, which he will not do.

If the Rus­sians have in fact intervened in Iran to the extent of providing intelligence to Ahmadinejad and advice to him during his visit on how to handle the postelection unrest (as the chants suggest), then Rus­sian influence in Iran is not surging — it has surged. In some measure, Ahmadinejad would owe his position to Rus­sian warnings and advice. There is little gratitude in the world of international affairs, but Ahmadinejad has enemies, and the Rus­sians would have proved their utility in helping contain those enemies.

From the Rus­sian point of view, Ahmadinejad would be a superb asset — even if not truly under their control. His very existence focuses American attention on Iran, not on Rus­sia. It follows, then, that Rus­sia would have made a strategic decision to involve itself in the postelection unrest, and that for the purposes of its own negotiations with Washington, Moscow will follow through to protect the Iranian state to the extent pos­sible. The Rus­sians have already denied U.S. requests for assistance on Iran. But if Moscow has intervened in Iran to help safeguard Ahmadinejad’s position, then the potential increases for Rus­sia to provide Iran with the S-300 strategic air defense systems that it has been dangling in front of Tehran for more than a decade.

If the United States perceives an entente between Moscow and Tehran emerging, then the entire dynamic of the region shifts and the United States must change its game. The threat to Washington’s interests becomes more intense as the potential of a Rus­sian S-300 sale to Iran increases, and the need to disrupt the Russian-Iranian entente would become all the more important. U.S. influence in Iran already has declined substantially, and Ahmadinejad is more distrustful and hostile than ever of the United States after having to deal with the postelection unrest. If a Russian-Iranian entente emerges out of all this — which at the moment is merely a pos­sibility, not an imminent reality — then the United States would have some serious strategic problems on its hands.

Revisiting Assumptions on Iran

For the past few years, STRATFOR has assumed that a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran was unlikely. Iran was not as advanced in its nuclear program as some claimed, and the complexities of any attack were greater than assumed. The threat of an attack was thus a U.S. bargaining chip, much as Iran’s nuclear program itself was an Iranian bargaining chip for use in achieving Tehran’s objectives in Iraq and the wider region. To this point, our net assess­ment has been accurate.

At this point, however, we need to stop and reconsider. If Iran and Rus­sia begin serious cooperation, Washington’s existing dilemma with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its ongoing standoff with the Rus­sians would fuse to become a single, integrated problem. This is something the United States would find difficult to manage. Washington’s primary goal would become pre­venting this from happening.

Ahmadinejad has long argued that the United States was never about to attack Iran, and that charges by Rafsanjani and others that he has pursued a reckless foreign policy were groundless. But with the “Death to Rus­sia” chants and signaling of increased Rus­sian support for Iran, the United States may begin to reconsider its approach to the region.

Iran’s clerical elite does not want to go to war. They therefore can only view with alarm the recent ostentatious transiting of the Suez Canal into the Red Sea by Israeli submarines and corvettes. This transiting did not happen without U.S. approval. Moreover, in spite of U.S. opposition to expanded Israeli settlements and Israeli refusals to comply with this opposition, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will be visiting Israel in two weeks. The Israelis have said that there must be a deadline on negotiations with Iran over the nuclear program when the next G-8 meeting takes place in September; a deadline that the G-8 has already approved. The consequences if Iran ignores the deadline were left open-ended.

All of this can fit into our old model of psychological warfare, as representing a bid to manipulate Iranian politics by making Ahmadinejad’s leadership look too risky. It could also be the United States signaling the Rus­sians that stakes in the region are rising. It is not clear that the United States has reconsidered its strategy on Iran in the wake of the postelection demonstrations. But if Rafsanjani’s claim of Rus­sian support for Ahmadinejad is true, a mas­sive re-evaluation of U.S. policy could ensue, assuming one hasn’t already started — prompting a reconsideration of the military option.

All of this assumes that there is substance behind a mob chanting “Death to Rus­sia.” There appears to be, but of course, Ahmadinejad’s enemies would want to magnify that substance to its limits and beyond. This is why we are not ready to simply abandon our pre­vious net assess­ment of Iran, even though it is definitely time to rethink it.

© Stratfor

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton

On June 23, 2009, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta learned of a highly compartmentalized program to assas­sinate al Qaeda operatives that was launched by the CIA in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. When Panetta found out that the covert program had not been disclosed to Congress, he canceled it and then called an emergency meeting June 24 to brief congres­sional oversight committees on the program. Over the past week, many details of the program have been leaked to the press and the issue has received extensive media coverage.

That a program existed to assas­sinate al Qaeda leaders should certainly come as no surprise to anyone. It has been well-publicized that the Clinton administration had launched military operations and attempted to use covert programs to strike the al Qaeda leadership in the wake of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. In fact, the Clinton administration has come under strong criticism for not doing more to decapitate al Qaeda prior to 2001. Furthermore, since 2002, the CIA has conducted scores of strikes against al Qaeda targets in Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-1 Pre­dator and the larger MQ-9 Reaper.

These strikes have dramatically increased over the past two years and the pace did not slacken when the Obama administration came to power in January. So far in 2009 there have been more than two dozen UAV strikes in Pakistan alone. In November 2002, the CIA also employed a UAV to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi, a senior al Qaeda leader suspected of planning the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole. The U.S. government has also attacked al Qaeda leaders at other times and in other places, such as the May 1, 2008, attack against al Qaeda-linked figures in Somalia using an AC-130 gunship.

As early as Oct. 28, 2001, The Washington Post ran a story discus­sing the Clinton-era pre­sidential finding authorizing operations to capture or kill al Qaeda targets. The Oct. 28 Washington Post story also provided details of a finding signed by Pre­sident George W. Bush following the 9/11 attacks that reportedly provided authorization to strike a larger cross section of al Qaeda targets, including those who are not in the Afghan theater of operations. Such pre­sidential findings are used to authorize covert actions, but in this case the finding would also provide permis­sion to contravene Executive Order 12333, which prohibits assassinations.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bush and the members of his administration were very clear that they sought to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and the members of the al Qaeda organization. During the 2004 and 2008 pre­sidential elections in the United States, every major candidate, including Barack Obama, stated that they would seek to kill bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda. Indeed, on the campaign trail, Obama was quite vocal in his criticism of the Bush administration for not doing more to go after al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan. This means that, regardless of who is in the White House, it is U.S. policy to go after individual al Qaeda members as well as the al Qaeda organization.

In light of these facts, it would appear that there was nothing particularly contro­versial about the covert assas­sination program itself, and the contro­versy that has arisen over it has more to do with the failure to report covert activities to Congress. The political uproar and the manner in which the program was canceled, however, will likely have a negative impact on CIA morale and U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Program Details

As noted above, that the U.S. government has attempted to locate and kill al Qaeda members is not shocking. Bush’s signing of a clas­sified finding authorizing the assas­sination of al Qaeda members has been a poorly kept secret for many years now, and the U.S. government has succeeded in killing al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

While Hell­fire mis­siles are quite effective at hitting trucks in Yemen and AC-130 gunships are great for striking walled compounds in the Somali badlands, there are many places in the world where it is simply not pos­sible to use such tools against militants. One cannot launch a hell­fire from a UAV at a target in Milan or use an AC-130 to attack a target in Doha. Furthermore, there are certain parts of the world — including some countries considered to be U.S. allies — where it is very difficult for the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations at all. These difficulties have been seen in past cases where the governments have refused U.S. requests to detain terrorist suspects or have alerted the suspects to the U.S. interest in them, compromising U.S. intelligence efforts and allowing the suspects to flee.

A prime example of this occurred in 1996, when the United States asked the government of Qatar for assistance in capturing al Qaeda operational mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was living openly in Qatar and even working for the Qatari government as a project engineer. Mohammed was tipped off to American intentions by the Qatari authorities and fled to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 commis­sion report, Mohammed was closely associated with Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani, who was then the Qatari minister of religious affairs. After fleeing Doha, Mohammed went on to plan several al Qaeda attacks against the United States, including the 9/11 operation.

Given these realities, it appears that the recently disclosed assas­sination program was intended to provide the United States with a far more subtle and surgical tool to use in attacks against al Qaeda leaders in locations where Hell­fire mis­siles are not appropriate and where host government assistance is unlikely to be provided. Some media reports indicate that the program was never fully developed and deployed; others indicate that it may have conducted a limited number of operations.

Unlike UAV strikes, where pilots fly the vehicles by satellite link and can actually be located a half a world away, or the very tough and resilient airframe of an AC-130, which can fly thousands of feet above a target, a surgical assas­sination capability means that the CIA would have to put boots on the ground in hostile territory where operatives, by their very pre­sence, would be violating the laws of the sovereign country in which they were operating. Such operatives, under nonofficial cover by neces­sity, would be at risk of arrest if they were detected.

Also, because of the nature of such a program, a higher level of operational security is required than in the program to strike al Qaeda targets using UAVs. It is far more complex to move officers and weapons into hostile territory in a stealthy manner to strike a target without warning and with plausible deniability. Once a target is struck with a barrage of Hell­fire mis­siles, it is fairly hard to deny what happened. There is ample physical evidence tying the attack to American UAVs. When a person is struck by a sniper’s bullet or a small IED, the perpetrator and sponsor have far more deniability. By its very nature, and by operational neces­sity, such a program must be extremely covert.

Even with the cooperation of the host government, conducting an extraordinary rendition in a friendly country like Italy has proved to be politically contro­versial and personally risky for CIA officers, who can be threatened with arrest and trial. Conducting assas­sination operations in a country that is not so friendly is a far riskier undertaking. As seen by the Rus­sian officers arrested in Doha after the February 2004 assas­sination of former Chechen Pre­sident Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, such operations can generate blowback. The Rus­sian officers responsible for the Yandarbiyev hit were arrested, tortured, tried and sentenced to life in prison (though after several months they were released into Rus­sian custody to serve the remainder of their sentences).

Because of the physical risk to the officers involved in such operations, and the political blowback such operations can cause, it is not surprising that the details of such a program would be strictly compartmentalized inside the CIA and not widely dis­seminated beyond the gates of Langley. In fact, it is highly doubtful that the details of such a program were even widely known inside the CIA’s counterterrorism center (CTC) — though almost certainly some of the CTC staff suspected that such a covert program existed somewhere. The details regarding such a program were undoubtedly guarded carefully within the clandestine service, with the officer in charge most likely reporting directly to the deputy director of operations, who reports personally to the director of the CIA.

Loose Lips Sink Ships

As trite as this old say­ing may sound, it is painfully true. In the counterterrorism realm, leaks destroy counterterrorism cases and often allow terrorist suspects to escape and kill again. There have been several leaks of “sources and methods” by congres­sional sources over the past decade that have disclosed details of sensitive U.S. government programs designed to do things such as intercept al Qaeda satellite phone signals and track al Qaeda financing. A clas­sified appendix to the report of the 2005 Robb-Silberman Commis­sion on Intelligence Capabilities (which incidentally was leaked to the press) discus­sed several such leaks, noted the costs they impose on the American taxpayers and highlighted the damage they do to intelligence programs.

The fear that details of a sensitive program designed to assas­sinate al Qaeda operatives in foreign countries could be leaked was probably the reason for the Bush administration’s decision to withhold knowledge of the program from the U.S. Congress, even though amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 mandate the reporting of most covert intelligence programs to Congress. Given the imaginative legal guidance provided by Bush administration law­yers regarding subjects such as enhanced interrogation, it would not be surprising to find that White House law­yers focused on loopholes in the National Security Act reporting requirements.

The validity of such legal opinions may soon be tested. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, recently said he was considering an investigation into the failure to report the program to Congress, and House Democrats have announced that they want to change the reporting requirements to make them even more inclusive.

Under the current version of the National Security Act, with very few exceptions, the administration is required to report the most sensitive covert activities to, at the very least, the so-called “gang of eight” that includes the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congres­sional intelligence committees, the speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. In the wake of the program’s disclosure, some Democrats would like to expand this minimum reporting requirement to include the entire membership of the congres­sional intelligence committees, which would increase the absolute minimum number of people to be briefed from eight to 40. Some congress­men argue that pre­sidents, prompted by the CIA, are too loose in their invocation of the “extraordinary circum­stances” that allow them to report only to the gang of eight and not the full committees. Yet ironically, the existence of the covert CIA program stayed secret for over seven and a half years, and yet here we are writing about it less than a month after the congres­sional committees were briefed.

The addition of that many additional lips to briefings pertaining to covert actions is not the only thing that will cause great consternation at the CIA. While legally mandated, disclosing covert programs to Congress has been very problematic. The angst felt at Langley over potential increases in the number of people to be briefed will be compounded by the recent reports that Attorney General Eric Holder may appoint a special prosecutor to investigate CIA interrogations and ethics reporting.

In April we discus­sed how some of the early actions of the Obama administration were having a chilling effect on U.S. counterterrorism programs and personnel. Expanding the minimum reporting requirements under the National Security Act will serve to turn the thermostat down several additional notches, as did Panetta’s overt killing of the covert program. It is one thing to quietly kill a contro­versial program; it is quite another to repudiate the CIA in public. In addition to damaging the already low morale at the agency, Panetta has announced in a very public manner that the United States has taken one important tool entirely out of the counterterrorism toolbox: Al Qaeda no longer has to fear the pos­sibility of clandestine American assas­sination teams.

© Stratfor

Questo è il testo dell’intervento che ho tenuto ieri presso la Fondazione Magna Carta in occasione della pre­sentazione del libro “Scritti italiani” di David A. Harris, il direttore esecutivo dell’American Jewish Commitee.

Cari amici,

ho sentito parlare di pace, uguaglianza, libertà. Belle parole. Peccato che poi suonino i cannoni. Ho sentito molte certezze negli interventi pre­cedenti. Beati voi. Io invece nutro un sacco di dubbi e oltre al testo vorrei ricordare a tutti noi che c’è il contesto.  Quale? Ecco, osservate la prima pagina del settimanale Time: Obama e l’Orso Russo. Ora osservate la cover di questo bel mensile, è un prodotto editoriale dell’Eni, si chiama Oil: il titolo è “la scelta”, la mappa visualizzata è quella dell’Iran. L’Italia, bisogna ricordarlo, è uno dei principali partner commerciali dell’Iran. Su questo foglio invece ci sono le news d’agenzia del summit tra Rus­sia e Stati Uniti, il titolo è sull’accordo sul disarmo nucleare, ma la notizia è un’altra: c’è dis­senso totale sul sistema anti­mis­sile che gli Stati Uniti vogliono piazzare in Polonia. Il casus belli sul quale è ripartita una nuova Guerra Fredda non ha trovato una soluzione, la tensione su questo punto resta. Inoltre, la pur nobile idea del pre­sidente americano di ridurre le armi nucleari, in realtà avvantaggia la Rus­sia che ha un arsenale vecchio, con una scarsa manutenzione, e riduce il potere di deterrenza degli Stati Uniti proprio nel momento in cui sta ripartendo la proliferazione atomica. Tutto questo ha molto a che fare con Israele, è la scacchiera del gioco. E’ il contesto che in realtà produce il testo e questo nostro incontro si svolge alla vigilia del G8 dell’Aquila, mentre a  Mosca Barack Obama e Dmitri Medvevdev cercano un nuovo difficile equilibrio: la Rus­sia deve spuntare l’obiettivo di farsi accettare come potere egemone nella regione (Caucaso, Bielorus­sia, Ucraina, Georgia, tutta l’Asia centrale).  Gli Stati Uniti cercano al contrario di non perdere lo status di potenza egemone globale in un periodo di crisi economica e di taglio del bilancio della Difesa. Il problema è tutto qui nella sua brutale semplicità. Ho preso le mosse da Obama e Medvedev (e l’ombra gigantesca di Vladimir Putin) per ché è dalla convenienza storica di Rus­sia e Stati Uniti che 60 anni fa nasceva Israele. Entrambi cercavano di trarre un vantaggio geopolitico dalla nascita in Medio Oriente di uno Stato che occupava lo spazio geografico che un tempo era dell’impero britannico. Ecco perché gli esiti del vertice di Mosca e quelli del G8 saranno molto importanti per il futuro di Israele. In pas­sato Rus­sia e Stati Uniti hanno giocato il ruolo di pivot in Medio Oriente grazie a Israele. Si apprestano a farlo ancora. Per Israele si pone, ancora una volta, la questione del suo Essere nel Mondo, o meglio, della sua esistenza e permanenza nella regione del Medio Oriente e in quella zona geopolitica e letteraria che si chiama Levante e che da qui si dispiega in tutta l’Eurasia, l’area del Grande Gioco magistralmente raccontata dal romanziere Ryduard Kipling.

Tre modelli, uno Stato
Tremila anni di storia ci dicono che Israele è giunto fino a noi attraverso tre modelli:
1.    Il modello David. Israele è completamente indipendente e questo avviene in assenza di poteri imperiali nella regione.
2.    Il modello persiano. Israele mantiene la sua autonomia e identità ma non ha più capacità di manovra nella politica estera perché fa parte di un sistema di potere imperiale.
3.    Il modello babilonese. Israele perde completamente identità, autonomia, status giuridico e subisce la deportazione del suo popolo.

Tre dimensioni che giungono ai nostri giorni con gli esiti della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, il declino della Gran Bretagna del suo Impero, l’ascesa di Stati Uniti e Rus­sia che creano le condizioni per la nascita di Israele nella forma del modello David, o meglio un “quasi-David”, perché non dobbiamo dimenticare il ruolo chiave giocato dagli Stati Uniti fin dagli anni Sessanta.

La minaccia esterna
E’ sempre la storia ad offrirci lezioni a piene mani e a dimostrarci che la minaccia vitale per Israele non giunge dai paesi confinanti, ma da poteri lontani che puntano a giocare un ruolo imperiale e per questo guardano all’espansione a Levante e nel Mediterraneo Orientale come una tes­sera chiave del mosaico di potenza. Ecco perché il problema centrale per l’esistenza di Israele, la sua pre­senza nella carta geografica, non è il Libano storicamente instabile, non è Gaza né la West Bank con i suoi palestinesi male armati, non è l’Egitto stabile, non è la Siria incapace di manovra autonoma, non è la Giordania, ma è l’Iran, l’antico e mai domato spirito del Persian Power, potere rivoluzionario e non conservatore.

In questo scenario la nascita di Israele non è un fatto religioso, il sionismo non è il punto centrale del nostro discorso, siamo di fronte un fatto geopolitico: il declino del Regno Unito, la comparsa di Stati Uniti e Rus­sia nel Grande Gioco e il loro interesse contrapposto a manovrare nel Mediterraneo Orientale influenzando i destini di Grecia, Turchia e Israele. La Rus­sia con l’ideologia, le radici russe di molti ebrei (e la prima fornitura di armi attraverso la Cecoslovacchia nel 1948), gli Stati Uniti con la politica di difesa (e quando serviva attacco). L’obiettivo è sempre il Levante.

E’ dal 1967 che Israele diventa un alleato chiave degli Stati Uniti. Quando Washington controlla il Bosforo per bloccare l’ingresso delle navi sovietiche nel Mediterraneo e quindi ha bisogno della Turchia e Israele per pres­sare la Siria a Sud e calmare le sue mire espansionistiche a Nord.
Così le mosse di Israele sono sempre tra gli spazi di manovra delle due potenze e il suo modello David sempre limitato da Stati Uniti e Rus­sia. Limitato ma relativamente sicuro. Fino a oggi. Fino a quando l’Iran di Ahmadinejad non si mette di nuovo in marcia per tornare ad essere un potere imperiale, il leader della regione, e comincia a costruire la Bomba.

A questo punto della storia, dopo il cambio di rotta alla Casa Bianca, scopriamo che il modello David appoggiato solamente agli Stati Uniti non basta più. Per questo è fondamentale capire il gioco della Rus­sia. Per questo occorre essere molto più intelligenti e astuti – sì, astuti è la parola giusta – che in pas­sato. I mis­sili di Ahmadinejad verranno puntati a Levante e a Nord, su Israele, sui vicini e sull’Europa.

E qui torniamo al contesto. Ai fatti, alle notizie di oggi. Il vicepresidente degli Stati Uniti Joe Biden di fronte a questo movimento d’arsenali dice che “Israele può colpire” e che ha la sovranità per decidere. Interes­sante, soprattutto se dal contesto guardiamo al testo che ci tramanda la storia. E qui qualcosa non torna. Obama e Biden forse giocano a fare la parte del poliziotto buono e del poliziotto cattivo, ma potremmo anche leggere le frasi del vicepresidente in un’altra chiave: la certificazione che Israele è tornato nel modello David in full power, senza limitazioni e dunque pre­senta ora, qui, adesso, Israele come uno Stato libero di arrangiarsi perché non più a sovranità limitata (in politica estera) e di fronte alla sua responsabilità di agire con un pre­emptive strike.

Curioso ribaltamento no? Siamo forse di fronte al disimpegno dell’agenda militare – e sottolineo militare – degli Stati Uniti nei confronti del problema iraniano? Signori, io mi chiedo e vi chiedo: cosa sta succedendo tra Washington e Gerusalemme? La Casa Bianca riconsegna a Israele il modello David, ma in pre­senza di un potere imperiale in piena fase di politica di potenza, l’Iran. Quanto può durare l’autonomia e l’indipendenza di una nazione sotto potenziale minaccia nucleare? Ho letto stamattina che i top official dell’amministrazione israeliana sono molto scettici sulla riuscita dei colloqui con l’Iran. E già prospettano un “piano B”, un carico di sanzioni talmente grande da para­lizzare l’economia iraniana. Ho anche letto che dalla Casa Bianca rispondono picche, che non è il momento e non si può lavorare in parallelo a un draft di sanzioni con i colloqui in corso. E’ uno scenario molto istruttivo, perché l’intelligence israeliana considera la pos­sibilità di successo del round diplomatico vicina allo zero, mentre Washington va avanti con la mitologica strategia del soft power e nel frattempo a Teheran vedono che la loro tattica di talk and build (la bomba) ha un successo enorme. Prendono tempo. E l’Occidente gli consegna la clessidra.

Nel frattempo in Iran è successo qualcosa: le elezioni sono state vinte ancora dal pre­sidente Ahmadinejad. Certo, ci mancherebbe, so che ci sono state le proteste dell’opposizione e qualcuno in Europa si è strappato persino le vesti perché il regime ha bloccato Twitter e Facebook! Mentre a Busher si arricchisce l’uranio, qualcuno si meraviglia che dei satrapi censurino la rete, arrestino persone, uccidano manifestanti. Il fondamentalismo, che orrore per gli occhi dei colti europei e dell’establishment. Siamo al delirio e navighiamo in un oceano d’ipocrisia.

L’arte (perduta) della guerra
Torniamo alle frasi cripto-illuminanti del vicepresidente Biden e poniamoci la domanda: Israele può agire da solo? Può farlo, certo, ma sono pronto a scommettere che ne conseguirebbe un agghiacciante isolamento internazionale. E inoltre c’è da considerare che la qualità degli interventi militari israeliani – e della sua azione pre­ventiva e succes­siva di intelligence – è in pesante discus­sione fin dal 2006.

Dalla campagna militare in Libano e dall’invasione nella striscia di Gaza giungono segnali e lezioni pre­occupanti. Israele non è più invincibile. Chi ha letto i report sulle due campagne militari sa di cosa parlo. Hezbollah si è dimostrato un nemico temibile e organizzato in grado di rispondere al fuoco e fronteggiare i tank con mis­sili anti­carro, evento imprevisto per l’intelligence israeliana. Hamas un avversario capace di rigirare a suo favore una (semi)sconfitta militare attraverso un uso spregiudicato della percezione della guerra. In entrambi i casi, inoltre, non solo la tattica e la strategia del conflitto sono state sbagliate, sul Libano si è arrivati a costituire una commis­sione d’inchiesta per capire dove stava l’errore e su Gaza abbiamo assistito a un imbarazzante stop and go dell’operazione Cast Lead, a un assedio incompiuto.

L’obiettivo politico delle due campagne militari è inoltre mancato clamorosamente. Hezbollah è ancora una minaccia, Hamas nel frattempo ha approfittato del caos durante e dopo l’operazione Piombo Fuso per regolare i conti con al Fatah. Non è un bel risultato e non mi pare il caso, in queste condizioni, di lasciare che Israele sia travolto dalla sua crisi di leadership politica e militare, dai suoi errori, dalla cronica mancanza di coraggio dell’Europa e dalla finora contraddittoria risposta della nuova amministrazione americana, incapaci di vedere lo sguardo dei nemici della democrazia, ancora una volta, partire da Levante per mirare a Occidente.

By Kamran Bokhari

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia historically has played a major role in the development of jihadism. Key pillars of the Saudi state — oil, Wahhabism (a conservative form of Sunni Islam) and the strength of tribal norms — were instrumental in facilitating the rise of Islamist extremism and terrorism around the world prior to 9/11. These same pillars allowed Riyadh to contain al Qaeda within Saudi Arabia in the wake of the insurgency that kicked off in the kingdom in 2003–2004. After this success on the home front, Riyadh is still using these pillars to play an international role in counterjihadist efforts — a role welcomed by the United States.

During a visit to the kingdom last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the Saudi rehabilitation program for former militants impres­sed him, prompting him to consider sending Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo Bay to Saudi Arabia as part of Washington’s efforts to close down the detention center. The Saudis probably have done “as good, if not a better, job of that than almost anybody,” Gates said of the Saudi program. In separate comments, Gates called on Riyadh to assist Pakistan in the latter’s efforts to combat its rapidly expanding Taliban insurgency — and Saudi Arabia in fact has been play­ing a role in efforts to contain the Taliban insurgency in both Pakistan and Afghanistan for some time.

Clearly, Saudi Arabia is taking a lead role in anti-extremism, counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts. Understanding what the Saudis are doing and how it has permitted them to succeed in this regard will shed light on Riyadh’s domestic succes­ses, and it will indicate what can be expected from its efforts abroad.

Saudi Domestic Counterjihadist Successes

The Saudis have had ample experience in dealing with religious extremists and militants since long before their struggle with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of 9/11. The kingdom’s founder, King Abdel-Aziz, faced a situation similar to that now faced by Pakistan before he defeated the Ikhwan in the 1920s. The Ikhwan (not to be confused with the Egyptian group Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, which is Arabic for “Muslim Brotherhood”) was a tribal religious militia of extremist Wahhabis. Whereas the Pakistanis have nurtured jihadist groups as tools of foreign policy in their dealings with India and Afghanistan, the Ikhwan helped Abdel-Aziz conquer most of present-day Saudi Arabia.

While Abdel-Aziz was not interested in conquering additional territories, the Ikhwan had larger regional ambitions. The group wanted to expand its jihad into places like Iraq, which the British then controlled. Just as Pakistan has found itself caught between its Islamist militant assets and the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, the nascent kingdom had to decide between the Ikhwan and its first Great Power ally, the United Kingdom. Exigencies forced Abdel-Aziz to choose the British, and he put down a subsequent Ikhwan rebellion.

Petrodollars

Notably, this all occurred before the discovery of oil and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent emergence as a petrodollar-rich monarchy (and for that matter, even before the state was known as the “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”). While the Saudis did not have their pre­sent financial resources, they did have one very important tool they wielded succes­sfully against the Ikhwan threat. That tool was religion, which had become a key part of the fabric of the Saudi state since its first incarnation in the mid-1700s. Religion mixed in with a culture based on strong elements of tribalism and familism provided for a strong social contract involving the Saudi royal family, the family of Muhammad bin Abdel-Wahhab (founder of the Wahhabi school of thought) and the masses.

This historic Saudi-Wahhabi alliance has long provided the state with religious legitimacy, which the royal family has used to put down religious dis­sent on a number of occasions since the Ikhwan uprising. Key among them were the 1979 incident in which a group of Wahhabi militants took over the Kaaba, the dis­sent within the religious establishment in the aftermath of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and the 2003–2004 al Qaeda insurgency. The use of religion to consolidate national power has led to a significant blowback, as evident from the global emergence of violent Islamism. But unlike other states, Saudi Arabia has been able to mobilize the tribal, religious, security and commercial spheres of the country against Islamist rebels.

Religion and Tribalism

The secret to the Saudis’ success was turning the rebels’ strongest weapon, religion, back against them. This was pos­sible because the state enjoyed a monopoly over religious discourse thanks to the vast religious establishment that Riyadh had cultivated over the years. Para­doxically, while this religious establishment has been the source of much radicalism in Saudi Arabia and worldwide, it also has served the Saudis well in terms of giving the state a powerful tool with which to quell dis­sent and pre­serve the regime.

The tribal nature of Saudi society, with its norms of obedience to those in authority, complemented the state’s religious tools. The Saudi ulema supported by the tribes have laid great emphasis on Quranic notions of obedience to rulers as long as the rulers do not clearly defy Islam. Another important tribal and religious concept is abhorrence of social chaos, which also helped the Saudis isolate the Islamist rebels from the rest of society by arguing that jihadist activity would lead to anarchy.

Tribal social structure imposes a hierarchy that forms a strong bulwark against rebellions by forcing conformity upon the tribes, clans and families. This limits the social space available for rebels to operate in. Tribes cooperate with the authorities in taking action against belligerents, and then they also take responsibility for the “good behavior” of repentant militants.

The power of the tribal norm is such that it is very unlikely that militants could influence enough tribes to mount a succes­sful uprising. The Saudis have had some two-and-a-half centuries’ worth of experience at skill­fully managing tribal politics. The rise and fall of the first (1744–1818) and second (1824–1891) Saudi states and the establishment of the modern kingdom in the early 1900s were to a great degree a function of the ruling al-Saud family’s ability to forge tribal alliances.

Prior to 9/11, one Saudi strategy for dealing with products of the Wahhabi establishment who exhibited levels of extremism deemed intolerable involved directing the radicals to fight in war zones like Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. This maintained order and security while the rebels were away (and in many cases the radicals died in the fighting). Even after 9/11 — and particularly in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq — the Saudis employed this approach to defuse domestic tensions and to try to contain increasing Iranian influence in Iraq and the rise of Tehran’s Iraqi Shiite allies.

But U.S.-Saudi tensions in the aftermath of 9/11 reached a point where Riyadh knew this was no longer an option. Consequently, under the guidance of King Abdullah, the kingdom embarked upon a strategy of permanently dealing with the issue through reforms at the governmental and societal levels, a process that is still very much a work in progress. The aim was to curb further extremism, as well as to address existing radicalism.

High oil prices, which lasted until July 2008, gave the country the financial wherewithal to invest in such a major anti-jihadist initiative. But without a powerful religious establishment at its side, the money alone would not have permitted the Saudis to succeed. This religious establishment has played a key role in the country’s rehabilitation program, which is designed to integrate militants who have surrendered or been captured back into society. While financial resources have played a critical role in efforts to bring pre­viously radicalized youths back into the mainstream, the scholars have provided the theological gravitas to counter the jihadist ideology and wean the youths from jihadism.

As mentioned, the process is still in its infancy, and incidents of recidivism have occurred. For example, Said Ali al-Shihri emerged in Yemen as a key leader of the jihadist node on the Arabian Peninsula after undergoing the rehab program. Still, the Saudis’ ability to put a major dent in the capabilities of jihadists in the kingdom and to avoid major backlash to the reform process highlights Riyadh’s succes­sful use of religion to curb extremism.

The jihadist threat within the kingdom remains, but a combination of unique circum­stances enabled Saudi Arabia to make considerable progress on the home front. Fears still exist that because of the ultraconservative religious nature of the state, the monarchy might fall and be replaced by a radical regime — especially as the kingdom enters an extended period of transition. But for now, the Saudi situation is stable to the point where the Saudis can look beyond their borders and offer help to other jihadist trouble spots.

Replicating Saudi Counterjihadist Successes

Saudi Arabia’s counterjihadist succes­ses and position as a religious and financial leader of the Islamic world have prompted the United States and countries like Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan to seek Riyadh’s help with jihadist problems.

Yemen

The first such place to do so is just south of the Saudi border. Yemen has become a jihadist hub where Saudi jihadists have regrouped along with their counterparts from Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere under new management. The country also faces other forms of unrest and insecurity that are weakening the state and raising fears of regional instability among Yemen’s wealthier Arab neighbors. For example, Yemen’s north-south divide is re-emerging, meaning that there are two competing nationalisms in the country. As a result, Sanaa and Riyadh have moved toward greater cooperation, especially on the issue of the jihadists; the Saudis can offer financial assistance and advice to the cash-strapped Yemenis regarding the Saudi rehabilitation program.

But unlike Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis have the upper hand in the relationship with the religious establishment, the Yemeni state is dependent upon its religious leaders and upon the Salafist-jihadists who dominate the country’s security establishment. Moreover, Yemen is not as religiously homogenous as Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, the religious establishment was strong enough to claim the mantle of Wahhabism and isolate the jihadists as “deviants,” Yemen would have to develop an alternative religious discourse to succes­sfully counter the theological challenge posed by the jihadists. Engendering a mainstream national religious identity takes a long time even for those states endowed with resources, which means there are serious limitations on how far Yemen can expect to succeed in anti-extremism and counterterrorism efforts.

Like Saudi Arabia, Yemeni society is also tribal, but it is much more fragmented than that of its richer, larger neighbor. Unlike Saudi Arabia, where the House of al-Saud sits at the top of the tribal hierarchy, Yemeni tribes are neither as strong nor as organized. Moreover, the Yemeni state is dependent upon the tribes for support — explaining why Saana’s bid to win tribal assistance in dealing with militants has not attained the desired results.

The huge differences in economic conditions, religious hierarchy and tribal structures between Saudi Arabia and Yemen accordingly will make it difficult for Riyadh to reproduce in its southern neighbor the succes­sful results it has enjoyed at home.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Saudi Arabia enjoys a disproportionate amount of influence over both Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin has recently been involved in efforts to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. Likewise, the Pakistani interior minister and the two most senior generals of the Pakistani military have made trips in recent months to the kingdom — most likely not just for monetary assistance, but also to benefit from the Saudi experience in dealing with the Taliban problem.

Ground realities in Afghanistan and Pakistan make these states much more difficult nuts to crack than even Yemen, which shares some basic social similarities with Saudi Arabia. The security situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in advanced stages of deterioration (though to different degrees). Both South Asian neighbors face full-blown insurgencies, making it difficult for the respective states to maintain their writ in the affected areas. This is quite different from anything Saudi Arabia has ever faced, and it also is different from Yemen, where the jihadists have not transformed themselves into a guerrilla movement.

On the religious front, Afghanistan and Pakistan lack religious establishments. Instead, they both have highly fragmented religious landscapes consisting of rival Islamist groups, competing Sunni sects and networks of madras­sas. Even the two countries’ more mainstream ulema are divided into various groups. Unlike in Saudi Arabia and (to a les­ser degree) Yemen, only a tiny minority adheres to Salafist/Wahhabi Islam in Southwest Asia. Even so, the Deobandis (the sect of the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups) are a growing movement, posing a challenge to the Shia and the majority Barelvis (a South Asian form of Sufi Islam).

On the social level, while tribes exist in both South Asian states, they are very weak compared to the Arab states in question. In Afghanistan, the tribal hierarchy is almost nonexistent in terms of being able to project power because of the rise of the mullahs and militia commanders. In Pakistan, the tribes are limited to Pashtun areas, and even there the mullahs and militiamen have significantly degraded the power of the tribal maliks.

These factors place significant limits on how much the Saudis can assist Islamabad or Kabul in their respective counterinsurgency efforts and anti-extremism drives.

For these reasons, the Saudis have focused on try­ing to broker talks between the Taliban and the Western-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Even on this issue, Riyadh is not having much luck, because the Taliban elements it has been dealing with thus far have been former leaders of the movement, while current Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar and his associates have rejected the idea of talks because they feel they have the upper hand in the insurgency and do not see the West as “stay­ing the course” in their country.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan the Saudis have been focused on efforts to create a consensus among various stakeholders on how to deal with the militancy. Riyadh maintains strong ties with Pakistan, especially with the military establishment and right-of-center forces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with several of the country’s Islamist political parties. As a result, the Saudis may be able to use their financial and energy clout to get the religiously and socially conservative forces in Pakistan to agree to support a major state initiative to contain the violence. But in sharp contrast to the way Riyadh took a focused approach to its own Islamist rebels, Islamabad lacks coherence.

Therefore, given the social fragmentation and complexities of the two South Asian states, the Saudis will not be able to help either Afghanistan or Pakistan much in terms of bringing down the violence those countries face. It can, however, assist in curbing religious extremism by undermining jihadists, given the ideological proximity of the Deobandis and the Wahhabis. But since the Saudis are still working on the ideological front through rehabilitation at home, it will be awhile before they can help others.

Saudi Arabia’s succes­ses in rolling back religious radicalism at home are the result of the confluence of certain unique circum­stances that simply do not exist in more troubling jihadist hot spots like Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Saudi example thus offers few les­sons for Sanaa, Kabul and Islamabad in dealing with their own situations. Ultimately, while the Saudis will be able to play an important role in providing financial assistance and some help in ideologically undermining Islamist extremism and radicalism, they will be able to do less on the physical battlefield.

Stratfor