Oct

17

Il numero due di al Qaeda in Irak era cittadino svedese

Filed Under Europa, Medio Oriente, War on Terror | Leave a Comment

Cronache di una guerra che gli Stati Uniti stanno vincendo: il numero due di Al Qaeda in Irak ucciso dalle forze speciali americane era un cittadino svedese. Grazie al prezioso lavoro degli amici di The Long War Journal e a Bill Roggio, ecco la storia di Abu Qaswarah, naturalizzato come svedese dal 1990, frequentatore della moschea di Brandbergen a Stoccolma, già segnalata come link di altri sospetti terroristi addestrati alla guerriglia in campi afghani.

Oct

13

Cintura di sicurezza sui mercati

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di Mario Sechi e Roberto Seghetti

Un occhio all’economia reale, una mano pronta ad aprire il portafoglio e la mente concentrata a mettere in carreggiata il sistema finanziario: Fondo monetario internazionale e G8 (in seguito divenuto G7, ndr) si giocano in questi giorni il destino del mondo. Sanno bene che il tempo è scaduto e non possono più permettersi di partorire un topolino diplomatico-burocratico. La crisi è andata troppo avanti coinvolgendo tutti i paesi, anche quelli come l’Italia che hanno un sistema bancario meno sofisticato ma considerato più solido.
Sarebbe un errore ripetere quanto è accaduto in Europa. Il governo Berlusconi aveva cercato di giocare la carta del fondo unico europeo insieme con la Francia di Nicolas Sarkozy. L’unità di intenti avrebbe dato una iniezione di fiducia. Ma l’opposizione tedesca del cancelliere Angela Merkel ha impedito una soluzione comune, indebolendo così la risposta alla crisi e obbligando tutti a prendere decisioni a livello nazionale. Nel momento della verità la Germania ha mostrato ancora una volta una profonda diffidenza nei partner europei.
È in questo contesto che il governo italiano si è mosso dando la garanzia di ultima istanza ai conti correnti (che in Italia avevano già la copertura più ampia del Continente, grazie al Fondo interbancario dei depositi costituito dagli istituti di credito) e creando una cintura di sicurezza: un fondo a beneficio delle istituzioni finanziarie. Lo Stato per ora è e vuol restare solo un sostegno. A lungo termine poi si vedrà e molto dipenderà dalla capacità delle stesse banche di onorare l’aiuto.
Sono mosse ponderate e di dimensioni più contenute rispetto alle manovre monstre messe in campo dalla stessa Merkel, da Sarkozy e dal primo ministro britannico Gordon Brown, costretto in un colpo solo a sbattere sul tavolo 50 miliardi di sterline; altri 200 li ha messi a disposizione, da utilizzare secondo le necessità, e ha già avviato un programma di nazionalizzazioni del credito, novità storica. Numeri e cifre testimoniano la dimensione della crisi e anche la differenza della situazione italiana, fino a oggi, rispetto agli altri paesi del G8 (G7).
Interventi, separati e di dimensione variabile, impensabili fino a qualche mese fa. Anche in Europa l’imperativo è salvare le banche a qualsiasi costo pur di evitare un effetto sul sistema complessivo dell’economia. Ma intanto si è cominciato già a prendere atto che il secondo semestre 2008 e probabilmente l’intero 2009 saranno segnati negli Usa e in Europa dalla parola recessione. Inevitabile secondo il Fondo monetario internazionale.
Per questo, accanto alla cintura di sicurezza che in tutti i paesi è stata allacciata attorno alle banche, si è cominciato a pensare a una bretella per garantire che le imprese grandi e piccole possano continuare ad avere il credito e che le stesse famiglie non si trovino in condizioni di maggiore sofferenza. Obbligatori dunque (sebbene in ritardo) il taglio dei tassi di interesse coordinato da tutte le banche centrali, mercoledì 8 ottobre, e la continua iniezione di liquidità nel sistema finanziario.
Basterà? Nessuno può esserne sicuro. Per questo motivo tutti i governi, compreso quello italiano, hanno cominciato a riflettere su misure di sostegno per imprese e famiglie. Ciò che occorre evitare infatti è l’avvitamento dell’economia reale e lo stritolamento da “credit crunch”. Su questo obiettivo c’è un sostegno bipartisan, anche in Italia. Si potrà discutere il come, ma il se non esiste.
Nel nostro Paese la via della garanzia al sistema del credito e del sostegno all’economia deve tener conto, però, di un problema di dimensioni diverse rispetto ad altre nazioni. Come ha sintetizzato il ministro dell’Economia, Giulio Tremonti, “l’Italia ha il terzo debito pubblico del mondo e non ha la terza economia del mondo”. Il costo del debito pubblico e delle pensioni rappresenta il 20 per cento del prodotto interno lordo. Anche con una pressione fiscale che è già elevata non ci sono molte risorse da impegnare per scopi diversi dalla normale amministrazione dello Stato. Ci vuole realismo.
Ogni euro da usare nel vortice della difesa della finanza viene da risparmi difficili. Inutile pensare all’uso delle riserve auree di Bankitalia. Era difficile farlo prima, impossibile farlo ora. In questo momento sono munizioni preziose contro la speculazione per il governatore Mario Draghi,ma anche per Jean-Claude Trichet, presidente della Bce.
La cooperazione tra governo e Banca d’Italia è fondamentale. In Parlamento, nonostante le contrapposizioni, di fronte all’emergenza l’opposizione si è dichiarata disponibile al confronto. Il premier Silvio Berlusconi ha più volte ripetuto che bisogna evitare il panico. Un clima bipartisan, almeno su questo tema, sarebbe un’iniezione di fiducia. Esattamente ciò che ancora manca sui mercati.
A maggior ragione, il superamento delle divisioni tra i grandi paesi industrializzati su nuove regole, un’altra Bretton Woods, e su come ricostruire un ambiente economico sano, si trasformerebbe in uno scudo a questo punto ben più efficace dei miliardi bruciati nella ricerca di un argine alla crisi.

© Panorama

Sep

28

A common vision between Europe and United States

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Ecco l’intervento del ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini al convegno su “LE NUOVE RELAZIONI TRANSATLANTICHE” che si è tenuto a Washington il 22 settembre 2008.

• The recently published “Transatlantic Trends” report states that “in the last year of George W. Bush’s presidency, American and European policymakers have maintained a pragmatic tone, setting aside past differences over Iraq to highlight cooperation on common challenges in Afghanistan, Iran and the global economy”. In other words, despite recurring criticism and doubts, cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic is still “alive and well” and the bonds of mutual friendship run very strong and deep. The Transatlantic Relationship remains today, more than ever, at the core of international relations.

• In the last two decades the world has changed. Thankfully we no longer have a bipolar order dominated by confrontation between two superpowers with Europe as the fault-line. Cooperation has replaced confrontation. However we are living, indeed, difficult times, which bring extraordinary dangers, as well as extraordinary opportunities.

• The world is changing under the influence of supranational, transnational and sub national powers, such as those of regional organizations, multinational corporations but also organised crime, and separatist movements. There are new global threats (global warming, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism). And regional threats (in Middle East, Caucasus, Africa and elsewhere). There are also new international players: China, India, Brasil, to name a few.

• These developments and challenges require a new kind of global governance that Europe and US must shape together.

• Although it sometimes seems inevitable, unilateralism is an inappropriate and insufficient answer to the interconnected threats and challenges we all have to face. A common vision, a single purpose and joint actions between Europe and US are indispensable. As allies and partners, US and Europe are irreplaceable to each other. What makes the transatlantic bond really unique, oriented to the future as much as anchored to the past, is the magnitude of the ideals – and of the interests – that we share.

• We share the belief in liberty and the dignity of the individual as universal values, on which no compromise is admissible. We share the belief in democracy as the best possible model to provide the ideals of freedom and justice with their accomplished political expression. And we are both aware that the practical implementation of this ideal has to adjust in its form and timing, in order to take account of different situations, traditions and cultures. The interests we share are a direct consequence of the principles we believe in, as liberal democracies and free-market economies.

• The year 2003 was the year of the divisions between America and Europe, and within Europe itself, over the course of action to take in Iraq. It was a dramatic but instructive chapter. We Europeans have learnt that a strong relationship with the US is vitally instrumental to strengthen the unity of Europe; and, conversely, that tensions in our relationship with the US are a source of divisions and a factor of weakness for Europe. And it goes without saying that a weak and divided Europe will not be in a position to cope with the global threats and challenges as effectively as it should.

• But the US learnt lessons too. It learnt that to be successful in tackling those threats and challenges – threats and challenges nobody can face alone - America needs to rely on all the help it can gather from its friends and allies. And the US knows that a united Europe, which is willing and able to be actively involved as a global player, is the most trusted and credible ally and partner on which it can rely, as President Bush himself has often acknowledged.

• On both sides of the Atlantic we are now approaching a season of important changes. The way we will manage them will greatly influence the way we will be able to shape our alliance in the immediate future.

• In the US, the election of a new President represents a very important change which will have great influence worldwide. The interest and enthusiasm with which the world is following the campaign are the most tangible and reassuring pieces of evidence that the global appeal of the US is far from declining. The next US Administration’s foreign policy could partially differ from that of the Bush Administration. In any case, the Transatlantic Relationship will continue to be a priority for Washington, as both presidential candidates, Senator McCain and Senator Obama, have stated several times.

• In Europe we are also on the eve of important innovations, as well as challenges of great significance. As you know the 27 member States of the EU have signed a Treaty introducing substantial improvements in the institutional architecture and the decision-making procedures of the Union. I very much hope that in 2009 such innovations will enter into force despite the blow suffered with the recent referendum in Ireland rejecting the Treaty of Lisbon. Europe cannot afford to spend any more time paralyzed in the quicksand of the never-ending institutional negotiations which have been conducted for the last seven years. Globalisation is, indeed, progressing much quicker than our discussions on the reform of European Union institutions.

• Europe must get its act together. We need a stronger Europe, a global player which can be a serious and reliable partner to the US. A partner which does not avoid its responsibilities, especially in the sensitive field of defence and security policy, but is also willing and able to take them on in an appropriate manner. An ally who is finally capable of producing security, instead of being a net consumer at America’s expense. The leading European statesmen and the heads of key European institutions now all agree that building stronger ties with the US is an essential precondition of strengthening Europe’s cohesiveness and our ability to achieve the goal of being a stronger global player.

• A strong Europe needs a strong US. Washington is and will remain “the” crucial international player. Not everyone agrees. Some analysts have pointed out a trend of a progressive erosion or decline in the global standing of the US. This is not my view. In my opinion, the recurring prophecies of a declining power of the US will not be fulfilled.

• True, the emergence of new/old global players is a reality. This new fact does not imply, however, that the US is going to lose its world-wide pre-eminence anytime soon. The influence America is able to exert world-wide is also immaterial, something which is more difficult to measure objectively but is nonetheless extremely powerful.

• Without a strong and determined global leadership from the US, there is very little hope of success for the international community in tackling the complex challenges we face. And I believe that Europe, which rightly aims at being recognized the role, the status and the responsibilities of a global player, has a clear mission to pursue in this respect. The mission to help the US exercise its leadership as effectively and successfully as possible. More Europe, not less America: this should be our motto when we talk about transatlantic ties.

• In the global agenda there is no shortage of issues where such a joint leadership could and should be exercised: Afghanistan (where our common values and credibility are at stake); Middle East (where I would like to see a more political role of the European Union); Iran (where we have to implement a delicate “double track” policy – sanctions and dialogue); a reshaping of the international governance (in favour of an effective multilateralism); climate change (one of the main preoccupation of the American and European public opinion); international security (rising energy prices and economic turbulence seem to have shifted the political agenda away from terrorism in both US and Europe); promotion of democracy and human rights (which is a crucial element of the transatlantic identity).

• As for the instruments of our cooperation, we need, in particular, to broaden the NATO-EU relationship. This is not something that you can radically do overnight. But with a healty dose of flexibility, pragmatism and, above all, political will we could achieve this goal, as the EU develops its new security strategy and NATO considers a revision of its own Strategic Concept. I believe it is important to remind that what unites NATO and EU nations is, by far, more and stronger that what may divide them. In the near future no other group of nations will cooperate more closely among each other. Nor will there be another group that can generate a similar kind of “magnetism” in terms of promoting political and security cooperation.

The Atlantic Alliance remains the keystone of both the US and European foreign and security policies. NATO has already proved capable of transforming itself, adjusting to new contexts and threats. Now we have to make every effort to ensure that NATO succeeds in the crucial missions in which its forces are currently engaged, from Afghanistan to the Balkans, and where one of the most precious assets of the Alliance, its credibility, is at stake. The added value which NATO can provide goes beyond the merely military dimension. We should strive to deepen and improve the political dimension of the Alliance, in order to continue to provide a permanent forum for consultations between allies.

• For Italy, for may country a strong and vital transatlantic relationship is of paramount importance. The Italian Government, this Government, is willing and ready to contribute to the attainment of this goal. For Italy Atlanticism is a founding element, a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

• The Italian challenge is to provide constructive contributions to the building of a more efficient and effectively functioning multilateral system, which is the most appropriate answer to the complex challenges and threats that the international community has to address. We have a real opportunity to do so also within the G8, of which Italy will have the Presidency next year and which has a specific responsibility to deal with some of these pressing and crucial global issues.

• One of the overarching principles of the Italian Presidency of G8 will be the strengthening of outreach activities. We strongly believe in the need of engaging a growing number of actors in finding viable and sustainable solutions to the major global challenges. Therefore, our aim is to involve not only the G8 and the five major emerging economies (Brasil, Mexico, China, South Africa, India), according to a “variable geometry” scheme; we intend to include in our dialogue all the countries that can give a useful contribution to the efforts of coordination and cooperation in the regions that, due to their instability and exposure to radicalization, are more directly threatened by the spreading of terrorist groups.

• Nowadays the transatlantic relationship has to overcome a new test: the crisis between Russia and Georgia. While showing different sensitivities on the approach to choose especially vis-à- vis Moscow, up to now US and Europe have been able to take and keep a common line. We have deplored Russia’s excessive use of military force in Georgia and condemned its unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have called unanimously on the Russian government to withdraw its forces behind the pre-conflict lines. We have expressed our full support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. We have supplied emergency aid to Georgia and decided to convene an international conference to assist its reconstruction.

• The European Union under the French presidency has played a crucial role to stop the conflict and to develop a policy for a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis. In particular, EU has decided to send an independent civilian observer mission to Georgia and has expressed its readiness to prepare and participate in the future international discussion on the resolution of the crisis. We supported the idea of an independent international inquiry into the conflict. In other words, the EU has shown to be capable to make the difference also in such a delicate situations.

• Italy have kept a politically balanced approach throughout the crisis. On the one hand, it has fostered a firm position and solidarity with its European and American allies. On the other hand, we have not renounced to develop an open and positive dialogue with Moscow. Without such a dialogue, we would reverse to a confrontational atmosphere between Russia and the West which would be of no use to anyone.

• Russia has a long tradition of being a European and world power, a regional, but also a kurd power. To regain its status as major power has been the first priority of Russian foreign policy during the Presidency of Putin. In many respects, this objective has been achieved. Russia is back. This is a fact we have to take into account. A constructive cooperation with Moscow – both in the NATO and EU context - is indispensable to face successfully all the most important international problems: Afghanistan, Iran, terrorism, just to name a few.

• Our american friends understand that when Italy, one of its closest ally, can also speak to Russia easily, that fact is an added value, and it’s part of the solution, not a problem.

• On this point, how to deal with Russia, Europe and US must make all the efforts to find a common ground. Disagreement and disunity on issues of vital interest is a luxury that neither of us cannot afford in the ever more independent global environment we live in.

Sep

25

Victory and Defeat in the Pipeline Era

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Fondazione Magna Carta - American Enterprise Institute

New Transatlantic Relations 2008

Washington D.C., Finmeccanica Auditorium - September 22nd 2008
First session - The state of Transatlantic Relations
The emergence of center-right governments in Berlin, Paris, and Rome has improved the prospects for cooperation between the United States and Europe. Given these developments, what is the state of transatlantic relations? How will relations be affected by a new American president? And How should the alliance deal with a newly assertive Russia.
Keynote Speech by Mario Sechi

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

This dissertation’s topic is the state of the art of “Transatlantic relationships”.

I am but a simple journalist. I am no essayist, nor a scholar or a government advisor: my whole time is devoted to making newspapers, and along with Magna Carta, I work hard to improve the level of my Country’s political and cultural debate.

I will spare you “common” knowledge on this issue, since it really is “uncommon”. Indeed, today’s meeting comes at a historical turn point in the global agenda.

In my view, two specific and recent events have marked a break in the international order:

A. The Wealth’s Ruin - Lehman Brothers, the fourth bank of the U.S.A., goes bankrupt after 158 years of operations on September 15th. So far, this is the highest peak of the financial turmoil started on August 2007. An “American crisis” whose end is still not in sight.

B. The Russian Bear is back - Old, but still efficient Mt-80 Russian tanks invade Georgia on last August 8th. The Russian President Medvedev sets out his doctrine on “spheres of influence”, and points to “symmetrical retaliation” in case of international sanctions against Russia. Oil and gas, not cannons or missiles, are his true weapons..

The world, sure, has witnessed a number of other terrific events. But personally, I do prefer to spot those events which have - or are likely to have - systemic effects. And, in the global power play, “breaks” matter even more than the game itself!

Also, a quick recall of the Italian experience could be useful.

Actually, my Country is quite small and quixotic. Yet, one should not forget it was home to Niccolò Machiavelli. As such, it also is an original political lab where “to govern is to make others believe”, and where “people rather forget about their father’s death than about the ruin of their own wealth”.

Let us now dig deeper into these concepts.


THE “RUIN OF WEALTH”

Let us take this very sentence by Machiavelli. Dear Friends, these are hard days for the global financial system. The American crisis has spread across the other markets: contagion is complete!

I don’t want to list the crisis’ causes: you all know them for sure. I prefer to stress that this crisis could become a chance to enhance our “Transatlantic Relationships”.

Never in history has been the chance to finally integrate US and EU accounting standards and financial rules so close!

The Italian Minister of Finance, Giulio Tremonti, was among the first thinkers to predict the current financial tsunami. His latest book, a must-read, is entitled “Of Fear and Hope”.

His analysis spans across Europe, Italy, focusing on the transition from the “Time of Gold” to the “Time of Iron”. On last September 8th, so goes Tremonti, “it was not just a bank that went bankrupt: it was the whole system, and this is not the beginning of the end, but the end of a principle. The whole sandcastle collapsed: bankers and their monstrous wages, controllers teaching us severe lessons while the poor remained the underdogs”.

The Italian turning G-8 presidency will strongly state the need for new rules, since this crisis has affected not only the markets, but the very confidence in the markets!

Without confidence, there will never be true economic recovery. Also, rules are not issued by regulators, but by governments.

The Italian scenario, by the way, is pretty peculiar, because quite paradoxically my Country now has a chance.

The housing bubble bursted quite belatedly, but Italy still has a banking system which is more solid that other countries have. The same remark applies to our insurance and pension system as well.

Bank do not go bust in Italy! They are maybe less sophisticated in their financial engineering, but they are more solid.

After this collapse, many experts think that there will be a return to the manufacturing industry - our area of expertise.

I think this could partly apply to the U.S. too. Uncontrolled off-shoring has been an error, and the West-East shift of production plants is not necessarily positive.

This is the right time to boost rules convergence in the U.S. and EU financial markets. The SEC and the EU Commission are working towards this goal, and the US presidential candidates, particularly John McCain, should recognize this chance.

The coming US elections, and the European elections (June 2009) should not represent an obstacle, but a spur towards this goal.

The facts: almost 75% of the world financial services are concentrated in the USA and in Europe.

This is a massive, but still deceptive figure: stiff competition from abroad lies ahead of us: 3 out of the 5 largest banks are Chinese, Dubai is becoming more and more attractive as time goes by…

The USA and Europe can win this challenge only by joining their forces.

The election debate in the USA must therefore be coped with carefully: it should be no time for sabre-rattling protectionist speeches, but should favour cost-saving and advantageous alliances.

Some very simple instances:

(i). A recent paper by Deutsche Bank Research concludes that cost savings on transaction in the sole sector of financial trading, would account for 48 bln $ per year.

(ii). Efficiency, transparency, common rules would allow the USA and Europe to smartly control harmful sovereign wealth funds.

This is a long way, we all know, but times have been consistently reduced by the crisis.

“Transatlantic Relationships”, in a nutshell, is the quest for a common Atlantic interest. As such, my vision may be somehow narrow-minded, but I see no better or faster solution at all!

THE RUSSIAN BEAR IS BACK

The Russian Bear’s awake was somehow expected, but almost no one expected such a rapid and strong raid on Georgia.

You all know the hard facts, and I am not going to recall them. But why do the Russians feel so strong and militarily/economically invulnerable?

First of all, the US army has no chance to effectively deter Russia until its overseas missions will last (Iraq and Afghanistan).

From an economic standpoint, the scenario is even worse: energy. To date, Europe is almost completely dependent of Russian gas and oil, which makes it very liable to Vladimir Putin’s diktat. If Gazprom closes its pipelines, that would be devastating for Europe: the winter can be very cold also in Europe, not only in Alaska!

Italy, too, has a word to say in this game…

THE ITALIAN JOB

A few weeks ago, the Financial Times stated that, at the State Department they regard “Italy as Russia’s Trojan horse in Europe”.

How wrong it is!

Italy is Russia’s main commercial partner.

But this is no news at all, since our relationship dates back to the Fifties, when Enrico Mattei (CEO of ENI) signed the first oil procurement contract with the former Soviet Union.

During the Sixties, then, ENI heavily contributed to build the Soviet Union’s energy infrastructures. And in 1969 a major gas procurement cooperation agreement was entered into.

In the Seventies and Eighties, ENI built several pipelines and gas compression facilities on Russian ground; in the Nineties it developed onto an “entrepreneurial partner”, and in 2000 it finally ventured into the new Blue Stream Pipeline Company.

The oil companies used to be seven (the “seven sisters”), but ENI went for Sister No. 8: Gazprom!

There is no need for Ivy League geopolitical studies to grasp Silvio Berlusconi’s “grand strategy”.

He definitely is a friend and ally of the United States of America: a loyal ally who sided with the US during the Iraq war, regardless of what was called “Jacques Chiroeder” (the anti-American France/Germany axis).

But Mr. Berlusconi, who indisputably is a friend of the US, publicly asked for no sanctions on Russia to avoid a confrontation between Europe and Russia. This stance was not appreciated at the Pentagon - Mr. Cheney’s recent visit in Rome was actually a clear failure - and this applies to the State Department, too.

But his move is very simply to understand if one considers the following facts:

  • Within a single decade, Russia has seized nearly all of Europe’s energy sources (look at the map hereabove) through Gazprom, a state-owned enterprise;
  • one of Gazprom’s most important partners in this sector is ENI, and ENI happens to be the leading Italian energy player, covering more than 70 countries, employing 76.000 people, 2007 net earnings swirling at around 9,5billion euro;
  • ENI is Gazprom’s largest client on a global scale;
  • ENI holds a 50 percent stake in the Green Stream project, tunnelling gas from North Africa to Europe; ENI owns 33.3 % of the Elephant oil cave. Even more interestingly, it has just committed itself to invest in Libya for another 25-years time span. Gazprom is planning to invest $300 milion in exploration and development licenses in Lybia. Eni holds a 50 percent in the Blue Stream pipeline built by Gazprom under the Black Sea.
  • Eni and Gazprom has signed a deal for the realization of the the South Stream Project, a new gas pipeline which will link Russia to EU across the Black Sea.
  • energy pipelines from the East and the South are bearing Kremlin labels, not White House labels!

ENEL TO LIGHT RUSSIA.

Italy’s other major energy player, ENEL (22 countries coverage, 50 million clients, 43,7 billion euro 2007 turnover, and 2007 net earning 4 billion euro) has managed San Petersburg’s power plant from June 2004 to September 2007.

Furthermore, ENEL has bought a 49,5% stake in RusEnergoSbyt from the ESN Group. RusEnergoSbyt is a company providing electricity to all of Russia’s major companies. On April 4th 2007, SeverEnergia (a consortium in which Enel owns a 40% stake and Eni a 60% stake, previously known as Enineftegaz) has acquired some interesting natural gas assets.

Today, ENEL owns 55,8% of the share capital of Genco (Generation Company) No. 5, “OGK-5″. ENEL is the first investor in Russia using a “top-end” integration across its operations.

A step back in history: during the Sixties, FIAT, the Italian car maker, built an industrial town named “Togliattigrad”, after Palmiro Togliatti, the famous party leader of the Italian Communist party.

Asking Italy to back sanctions against Russian - you see - is a complete paradox! Have you ever seen anyone voting sanctions against himself?

YANKEE COME TO MY HOME!

Lenin would have asked himself: what now?

Before answering this question, it is wise to cast a glance at US FDI (foreign direct investments) in Italy.

A Congress report of last April 18th is very insightful on this issue: the US have invested in Italy - a historical ally - the very low figure of 28,936 billion. Dwarfish Luxembourg can boast 82,588, Belgium 52, Ireland 83, Spain 49, Sweden 35, the Netherlands 215, the UK 364… to make it very clear: Italy is ranked last among the 11 European countries surveyed in the report!

This problem was highlighted by the US envoy’s words during the recent Cheney/Berlusconi meeting: “Our government is working with the Italians to reinforce mutual economic relationships”.

Really, is it?

Ronald P. Spogli, the US Ambassador to Italy, has a clear view on the situation. Serving in his capacity, Mr. Spogli has endeavoured to get Americans into Italian business, but “the situation is not encouraging”.

There are quite a number of reasons for this divestment from Italy on the US side.

Some of the reasons are not attributable to the US: chaotic legislation, massive red tape, high level of taxation, problems with criminality in some regions, constant blackmailing by worker unions like in the Alitalia case.

Nonetheless, a serious foreign policy commitment cannot exist without sound economic investment.

Abandoning a country, leaving it to other players, means just one thing: dangerous alliances can come to life. Alliances in which yesterday’s enemy (Russia) becomes today’s best friend…

SOME GOOD NEWS, AT LAST…

Is there only bad news?

No, because on one hand there have been some notable developments in the US’s “transatlantic drive”.

On the other hand, Silvio Berlusconi succeeded over Romano Prodi, who unilaterally withdrew Italian troops from Iraq. In Germany US-friendly Angela Merkel got Gerhard Schroeder’s post as Chancellor. In France Sarkozy is behaving as a friend of the US, eventually. Josè Zapatero is facing a harsh crisis in Spain, and David Cameron has sporting chances to win the next national election in the UK. Which make Europe more US-friendly than in the past.

Defence cooperation is improving. In Afghanistan, Italian soldiers now have more flexible engagement rules, and they are now fighting! Also, combat episodes are called for what they really are (war), without the routine politically correct “peace keeping” statements. And - even more interestingly - the public opinion accepts and largely backs this position.

Finmeccanica - hosting this event - has very strict relationships with the Pentagon and the US defence players. The Drs Technlogies deal marks a milestone in this strong cooperation, and shows that there is room for a common foreign and strategic policy.

Italy’s position of the Middle-East debate is more credible than under the Prodi government. This means at least the following:

  • No minister will be spotted walking through Beirut with Hezbollah members!;
  • moreover, no Italian minister will stay silent when palestinians will bomb Sderot, shouting loud if Israeli react.
  • no Italian minister will try to “understand” Ahmadinejad calling for the cancellation of Israel from geographic maps.
  • finally, no Italian minister will assure the Iranians are working towards civil nuclear capacity.

Understanding Europe is a difficult task, that requires lot of patience, as it is no young country anymore.

There is an “old Europe”, no doubt. But this old lady is no more a block disengaging itself, fearsome of its economic and demographic growth.

Some days ago, I have met the former Italian defence Minister, Antonio Martino. In a very explicit public debate, he overtly said to the US: “American friends, you must be patient, we Europeans are sometimes irritating but we are the only European friends you have”.

Today Europeans need the US, and the US need Europe more than ever before.

Machiavelli, after all, used to say that “where there is a strong will, there cannot be big difficulties”.

Ecco l’intervento di Franco Frattini, ministro degli Esteri: “A common vision between Europe and United States”.

Sep

19

Le Nuove Relazioni Transatlantiche

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Due appuntamenti di politica estera: il primo sabato 20 settembre a Cortina. Intervisto il ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini nell’ambito del 7° convegno “Il Veneto per l’Italia, l’Italia per il Veneto”, organizzato dal Pdl.

Dopo Cortina, si vola a Washington per il convegno sulle Nuove Relazioni Transatlantiche organizzato dalla Fondazione Magna Carta e dall’American Enterprise Institute. Aprirò lunedì mattina alle 11 (ora di Washington DC) la prima sessione dell’incontro insieme a Victoria Nuland, già ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti presso la Nato, ecco il tema:

Lo stato delle Relazioni Transatlantiche

Con l’ascesa di governi di centro-destra a Berlino, Parigi e Roma le prospettive di cooperazione tra Europa e Stati Uniti sono notevolmente migliorate. Alla luce di questi sviluppi, qual è lo stato delle relazioni transatlantiche? Che ripercussioni avrà l’elezione di un nuovo presidente americano sui rapporti tra le due sponde dell’Atlantico? E come dovrà comportarsi l’Alleanza nei confronti del ritorno della Russia a una politica estera assertiva?

Keynote Speaker:
Mario Sechi
Victoria Nuland

Moderatore:
Steven Flanagan

Il programma dell’incontro di Washington è molto bello e cade in un momento delicatissimo dell’agenda internazionale.

Aug

31

«La paura dà energia»

Filed Under Energia e Ambiente, Europa, Geopolitica, Russia | Leave a Comment

Energia, politica estera, sicurezza e ambiente: sono i temi di una doppia intervista di Panorama all’economista francese Jacques Attali e all’amministratore delegato dell’Enel Fulvio Conti. Un faccia a faccia che si svolge mentre si risveglia l’Orso russo, titano del gas e del petrolio.

L’Energia si è rivelata l’arma del XXI secolo. È questo il primo punto del nostro dibattito. Come garantire la sicurezza delle risorse energetiche ed evitare la dipendenza dei paesi europei da petrolio e gas?

Attali. Occorre una politica energetica europea globale che non esiste ancora. Tale politica dovrebbe essere mirata tanto al risparmio quanto alla creazione di reti sicure per la raffinazione e il trasporto del petrolio e la produzione di energia nucleare, come per altre forme d’energia.

Conti. Sono d’accordo con Attali. L’energia è uno dei parametri fondamentali di qualsiasi società, di qualsiasi economia, e l’Europa è ancora oggi priva di una politica comune. Troppi paesi perseguono politiche diverse per difendere interessi particolari con miopie nazionalistiche. L’Europa ha bisogno di più investimenti infrastrutturali intraeuropei che favoriscano alternative alle forniture esistenti.

Il primo punto di crisi nell’agenda internazionale ora è la Russia, di cui l’Enel è investitore e partner. Come saranno le relazioni dopo la guerra lampo in Georgia e l’accettazione dell’indipendenza di Abkhazia e Ossezia?

Conti. Stiamo investendo in Russia per poter beneficiare dell’apertura del loro mercato. Siamo in Russia per sfruttare le risorse energetiche a beneficio di quel paese e non per esportarle in altre parti del mondo. Agli occhi dei russi non siamo dunque una compagnia occidentale predatrice di risorse. Siamo investitori strategici che portano in dote quello che manca alla Russia oggi: capitali e tecnologie. Il nostro è un investimento molto proficuo ora e lo sarà sempre di più. La Russia per noi è un mercato locale e continuerà a esserlo, indipendentemente dalle politiche estere dei governi.

Attali, lei pensa sia possibile fare affari con questo regime?

Attali. Sì, naturalmente. Stiamo acquistando petrolio ed energia da un gran numero di paesi che non rispettano pienamente i diritti umani e non direi che i russi siano i soli né i peggiori. Se stilassimo una lista dei paesi da cui acquistiamo petrolio, avremmo più o meno gli stessi riscontri, per cui penso che possiamo in primo luogo conservare i rapporti con la Russia come avremmo dovuto fare con la Repubblica di Weimar in Germania, per coinvolgerla nell’assetto politico europeo, invece di isolarla, cosa che portò all’inizio della Seconda guerra mondiale. La stessa cosa vale per la Russia: è necessario agganciarla all’Europa e sperare che lo sviluppo della classe media russa porti la democrazia.

Il «Financial Times» sostiene che la speranza per la Russia sarà la nuova classe di capitalisti. È d’accordo?

Attali. Certamente. In Europa la democrazia è presente da alcuni secoli nel Regno Unito, ma da pochissimi anni in Francia, Germania e Italia. Così intendo dire che non siamo in grado di poter dare lezioni a nessuno. In Francia abbiamo concesso il diritto di voto alle donne solo cinquant’anni fa. Posso capire la concezione di governo vigente ora in Europa, ma so anche che ci sono voluti molti secoli per realizzarla. Voglio far rilevare che i paesi più vicini all’Europa sono più democratici e la storia spesso segue una logica di tipo geografico e anche la Russia la seguirà.

Come spiega, Attali, il successo dell’Europa come unità politica e il fallimento di un piano europeo per l’energia? Che ne è dell’idea dell’Euratom?

Attali. Prima di tutto, in Europa ora siamo in troppi per impostare un progetto globale. Sarebbe stato più facile quando eravamo sei, 12 o 15. In secondo luogo, per farlo occorre avere paura. Esiste una politica comune sull’immigrazione che è in fase di avviamento, perché vi è una sorta di grande paura per la cultura, ma non c’è una politica comune sull’energia perché non vi è una reale paura in merito. Eppure, dovremmo provare una gran paura per il futuro della nostra energia. Si tratta di una faccenda di coscienza politica da parte dell’opinione pubblica di tutti i paesi e dovrebbe ottenere la massima priorità. Non appena maturerà in noi tale paura avremo una politica comune.

L’Italia dipende da petrolio e gas. Conti, lei pensa sia scoccata l’ora per scegliere l’energia nucleare?

Conti. Penso di sì, ma aggiungo che non esiste un’unica soluzione, c’è bisogno di una gamma diversificata di tecnologie che possano incrementare la capacità del nostro sistema di assicurare energia in abbondanza, sicura e sostenibile per l’ambiente. C’è dunque bisogno di nucleare, ma occorre anche promuovere nuove tecnologie, tra le quali le fonti rinnovabili, e sostenere l’utilizzo di combustibili fossili, garantendo maggiore efficienza possibile grazie alle nuove tecnologie, riducendo le emissioni di CO2, come nel caso della tecnologia a carbone pulito che Enel sta sviluppando. Inoltre stiamo mettendo a punto nuovi progetti nell’idrogeno, nel solare, nel geotermico, nello sfruttamento dell’energia eolica, realizzando contemporaneamente sistemi per il risparmio energetico sia sul lato della generazione sia su quello dei consumi di elettricità. L’insieme di questi progetti si abbina allo sviluppo della capacità nucleare che dovrebbe consentirci di contenere efficacemente la dipendenza da gas e petrolio nel rispetto dell’ambiente.

Come rendere ammissibile per ambientalisti ed ecologisti questo punto della programmazione politico-energetica?

Attali. In Francia siamo riusciti a ottenere un consenso globale da parte dei partiti per sviluppare grandi quantitativi d’energia nucleare. Abbiamo una politica di lungo periodo e siamo un esempio unico, perché abbiamo tanto la volontà di condurre una politica totalmente trasparente quanto di mettere in campo la capacità ingegneristica necessaria. Sono sicuro che ciò non è possibile in tantissimi altri paesi.

Il rapporto Attali propone città verdi e ad alta tecnologia: una visione del futuro o un progetto realistico?

Attali. Abbiamo proposto la creazione di Ecopolis e pensiamo che tale progetto sia abbastanza fattibile. Ne abbiamo in prima istanza proposte dieci in Francia e abbiamo ora più di 15 città candidate per questo tipo di progetti, che in effetti esistono già in altri paesi, quali la Corea e la California.

È un progetto valido per l’Italia?

Conti. In una certa misura, noi consideriamo l’Italia come un’unica Ecopolis. I programmi sull’efficienza energetica stanno facendo dell’Italia un unico villaggio e in fin dei conti il livello d’efficienza raggiunto dal nostro paese è già alto. Ciò lascia altresì spazio per specifiche applicazioni innovative in alcuni nuclei di comunità. È quanto fa l’Enel per esempio con l’installazione dei contatori digitali, lo sviluppo delle «smart grid», uno strumento innovativo per l’ottimizzazione del consumo e la generazione distribuita di energia elettrica.

L’Unione Europea è guidata ora per un semestre da Nicolas Sarkozy: potrà dare un impulso all’agenda sull’energia?

Attali. La presidenza francese si chiude presto e la nostra politica ha un respiro trentennale, per cui non dovremmo pensare al problema in termini troppo limitati. Nel mio rapporto l’unica proposta che abbiamo fatto in termini di programma europeo è quello di una politica energetica globale per l’Europa, giacché riteniamo sia impossibile avere una politica globale per un singolo paese. Questa è una faccenda che dovrebbe andare ben oltre la presidenza francese.

© Panorama

Aug

26

STRATFOR/Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

Filed Under America, Europa, Geopolitica, Russia | 3 Comments

By George Friedman

The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet — expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.

There is, however, another context within which to view this, the context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the Kosovo question.

Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on — found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as well.

One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians.

Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class called “crimes against humanity.” It is intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than war crimes.

At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was embedded in the Dayton Accords.

In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance.

There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out overstated what had happened.

The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather — and this is the vital point — they argued that NATO support legitimized the war.

This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations wouldn’t support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient.

Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options.

The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty.

As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force — as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as part of the peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision-making system over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by the peace arrangements.

The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception of the war directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see today. The installation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a military alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO’s new role was seen as a direct challenge to Russian interests.

Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or political issues required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime multinational peacekeeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to expand all around Russia.

Then came Kosovo’s independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn’t change. Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made to change Serbia’s borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a decision avidly supported by the Americans.

The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo’s status was the round of negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S. urging and closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari’s negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs.

In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the end result of negotiations must be “certain independence.” In July 2007, Daniel Fried said that independence was “inevitable” even if the talks failed. Finally, in September 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: “There’s going to be an independent Kosovo. We’re dedicated to that.” Europeans took cues from this line.

How and when independence was brought about was really a European problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were the British and the French. The British followed the American line while the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more cautiously supportive.

On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration.

On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: “In our statement, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework of international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems of that Serbian territory.”

The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been committed. The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone from Belgrade. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known that they would not accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to follow.

The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn’t hear the Russians. The problem was that they simply didn’t believe them — they didn’t take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say things for many years. They did not understand three things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian military capability was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that they were making political decisions that they could not support militarily.

For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can — at its option and in opposition to U.N. rulings — intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it intended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought that because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to reform and not just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was Russia’s worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do something about it.

At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that it could not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn’t everything, but it was the single most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008.

The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go but up) and the West didn’t notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans made political decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, they made political decisions without sufficient military force to stop a Russian response. Either they underestimated their adversary or — even more amazingly — they did not see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear statements the Russians had made. No matter what warning the Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the West couldn’t take the Russians seriously.

It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and the current and future crises.

© Stratfor

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