Questo è il testo dell’intervento che ho tenuto ieri presso la Fondazione Magna Carta in occasione della pre­sentazione del libro “Scritti italiani” di David A. Harris, il direttore esecutivo dell’American Jewish Commitee.

Cari amici,

ho sentito parlare di pace, uguaglianza, libertà. Belle parole. Peccato che poi suonino i cannoni. Ho sentito molte certezze negli interventi pre­cedenti. Beati voi. Io invece nutro un sacco di dubbi e oltre al testo vorrei ricordare a tutti noi che c’è il contesto.  Quale? Ecco, osservate la prima pagina del settimanale Time: Obama e l’Orso Russo. Ora osservate la cover di questo bel mensile, è un prodotto editoriale dell’Eni, si chiama Oil: il titolo è “la scelta”, la mappa visualizzata è quella dell’Iran. L’Italia, bisogna ricordarlo, è uno dei principali partner commerciali dell’Iran. Su questo foglio invece ci sono le news d’agenzia del summit tra Rus­sia e Stati Uniti, il titolo è sull’accordo sul disarmo nucleare, ma la notizia è un’altra: c’è dis­senso totale sul sistema anti­mis­sile che gli Stati Uniti vogliono piazzare in Polonia. Il casus belli sul quale è ripartita una nuova Guerra Fredda non ha trovato una soluzione, la tensione su questo punto resta. Inoltre, la pur nobile idea del pre­sidente americano di ridurre le armi nucleari, in realtà avvantaggia la Rus­sia che ha un arsenale vecchio, con una scarsa manutenzione, e riduce il potere di deterrenza degli Stati Uniti proprio nel momento in cui sta ripartendo la proliferazione atomica. Tutto questo ha molto a che fare con Israele, è la scacchiera del gioco. E’ il contesto che in realtà produce il testo e questo nostro incontro si svolge alla vigilia del G8 dell’Aquila, mentre a  Mosca Barack Obama e Dmitri Medvevdev cercano un nuovo difficile equilibrio: la Rus­sia deve spuntare l’obiettivo di farsi accettare come potere egemone nella regione (Caucaso, Bielorus­sia, Ucraina, Georgia, tutta l’Asia centrale).  Gli Stati Uniti cercano al contrario di non perdere lo status di potenza egemone globale in un periodo di crisi economica e di taglio del bilancio della Difesa. Il problema è tutto qui nella sua brutale semplicità. Ho preso le mosse da Obama e Medvedev (e l’ombra gigantesca di Vladimir Putin) per ché è dalla convenienza storica di Rus­sia e Stati Uniti che 60 anni fa nasceva Israele. Entrambi cercavano di trarre un vantaggio geopolitico dalla nascita in Medio Oriente di uno Stato che occupava lo spazio geografico che un tempo era dell’impero britannico. Ecco perché gli esiti del vertice di Mosca e quelli del G8 saranno molto importanti per il futuro di Israele. In pas­sato Rus­sia e Stati Uniti hanno giocato il ruolo di pivot in Medio Oriente grazie a Israele. Si apprestano a farlo ancora. Per Israele si pone, ancora una volta, la questione del suo Essere nel Mondo, o meglio, della sua esistenza e permanenza nella regione del Medio Oriente e in quella zona geopolitica e letteraria che si chiama Levante e che da qui si dispiega in tutta l’Eurasia, l’area del Grande Gioco magistralmente raccontata dal romanziere Ryduard Kipling.

Tre modelli, uno Stato
Tremila anni di storia ci dicono che Israele è giunto fino a noi attraverso tre modelli:
1.    Il modello David. Israele è completamente indipendente e questo avviene in assenza di poteri imperiali nella regione.
2.    Il modello persiano. Israele mantiene la sua autonomia e identità ma non ha più capacità di manovra nella politica estera perché fa parte di un sistema di potere imperiale.
3.    Il modello babilonese. Israele perde completamente identità, autonomia, status giuridico e subisce la deportazione del suo popolo.

Tre dimensioni che giungono ai nostri giorni con gli esiti della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, il declino della Gran Bretagna del suo Impero, l’ascesa di Stati Uniti e Rus­sia che creano le condizioni per la nascita di Israele nella forma del modello David, o meglio un “quasi-David”, perché non dobbiamo dimenticare il ruolo chiave giocato dagli Stati Uniti fin dagli anni Sessanta.

La minaccia esterna
E’ sempre la storia ad offrirci lezioni a piene mani e a dimostrarci che la minaccia vitale per Israele non giunge dai paesi confinanti, ma da poteri lontani che puntano a giocare un ruolo imperiale e per questo guardano all’espansione a Levante e nel Mediterraneo Orientale come una tes­sera chiave del mosaico di potenza. Ecco perché il problema centrale per l’esistenza di Israele, la sua pre­senza nella carta geografica, non è il Libano storicamente instabile, non è Gaza né la West Bank con i suoi palestinesi male armati, non è l’Egitto stabile, non è la Siria incapace di manovra autonoma, non è la Giordania, ma è l’Iran, l’antico e mai domato spirito del Persian Power, potere rivoluzionario e non conservatore.

In questo scenario la nascita di Israele non è un fatto religioso, il sionismo non è il punto centrale del nostro discorso, siamo di fronte un fatto geopolitico: il declino del Regno Unito, la comparsa di Stati Uniti e Rus­sia nel Grande Gioco e il loro interesse contrapposto a manovrare nel Mediterraneo Orientale influenzando i destini di Grecia, Turchia e Israele. La Rus­sia con l’ideologia, le radici russe di molti ebrei (e la prima fornitura di armi attraverso la Cecoslovacchia nel 1948), gli Stati Uniti con la politica di difesa (e quando serviva attacco). L’obiettivo è sempre il Levante.

E’ dal 1967 che Israele diventa un alleato chiave degli Stati Uniti. Quando Washington controlla il Bosforo per bloccare l’ingresso delle navi sovietiche nel Mediterraneo e quindi ha bisogno della Turchia e Israele per pres­sare la Siria a Sud e calmare le sue mire espansionistiche a Nord.
Così le mosse di Israele sono sempre tra gli spazi di manovra delle due potenze e il suo modello David sempre limitato da Stati Uniti e Rus­sia. Limitato ma relativamente sicuro. Fino a oggi. Fino a quando l’Iran di Ahmadinejad non si mette di nuovo in marcia per tornare ad essere un potere imperiale, il leader della regione, e comincia a costruire la Bomba.

A questo punto della storia, dopo il cambio di rotta alla Casa Bianca, scopriamo che il modello David appoggiato solamente agli Stati Uniti non basta più. Per questo è fondamentale capire il gioco della Rus­sia. Per questo occorre essere molto più intelligenti e astuti – sì, astuti è la parola giusta – che in pas­sato. I mis­sili di Ahmadinejad verranno puntati a Levante e a Nord, su Israele, sui vicini e sull’Europa.

E qui torniamo al contesto. Ai fatti, alle notizie di oggi. Il vicepresidente degli Stati Uniti Joe Biden di fronte a questo movimento d’arsenali dice che “Israele può colpire” e che ha la sovranità per decidere. Interes­sante, soprattutto se dal contesto guardiamo al testo che ci tramanda la storia. E qui qualcosa non torna. Obama e Biden forse giocano a fare la parte del poliziotto buono e del poliziotto cattivo, ma potremmo anche leggere le frasi del vicepresidente in un’altra chiave: la certificazione che Israele è tornato nel modello David in full power, senza limitazioni e dunque pre­senta ora, qui, adesso, Israele come uno Stato libero di arrangiarsi perché non più a sovranità limitata (in politica estera) e di fronte alla sua responsabilità di agire con un pre­emptive strike.

Curioso ribaltamento no? Siamo forse di fronte al disimpegno dell’agenda militare – e sottolineo militare – degli Stati Uniti nei confronti del problema iraniano? Signori, io mi chiedo e vi chiedo: cosa sta succedendo tra Washington e Gerusalemme? La Casa Bianca riconsegna a Israele il modello David, ma in pre­senza di un potere imperiale in piena fase di politica di potenza, l’Iran. Quanto può durare l’autonomia e l’indipendenza di una nazione sotto potenziale minaccia nucleare? Ho letto stamattina che i top official dell’amministrazione israeliana sono molto scettici sulla riuscita dei colloqui con l’Iran. E già prospettano un “piano B”, un carico di sanzioni talmente grande da para­lizzare l’economia iraniana. Ho anche letto che dalla Casa Bianca rispondono picche, che non è il momento e non si può lavorare in parallelo a un draft di sanzioni con i colloqui in corso. E’ uno scenario molto istruttivo, perché l’intelligence israeliana considera la pos­sibilità di successo del round diplomatico vicina allo zero, mentre Washington va avanti con la mitologica strategia del soft power e nel frattempo a Teheran vedono che la loro tattica di talk and build (la bomba) ha un successo enorme. Prendono tempo. E l’Occidente gli consegna la clessidra.

Nel frattempo in Iran è successo qualcosa: le elezioni sono state vinte ancora dal pre­sidente Ahmadinejad. Certo, ci mancherebbe, so che ci sono state le proteste dell’opposizione e qualcuno in Europa si è strappato persino le vesti perché il regime ha bloccato Twitter e Facebook! Mentre a Busher si arricchisce l’uranio, qualcuno si meraviglia che dei satrapi censurino la rete, arrestino persone, uccidano manifestanti. Il fondamentalismo, che orrore per gli occhi dei colti europei e dell’establishment. Siamo al delirio e navighiamo in un oceano d’ipocrisia.

L’arte (perduta) della guerra
Torniamo alle frasi cripto-illuminanti del vicepresidente Biden e poniamoci la domanda: Israele può agire da solo? Può farlo, certo, ma sono pronto a scommettere che ne conseguirebbe un agghiacciante isolamento internazionale. E inoltre c’è da considerare che la qualità degli interventi militari israeliani – e della sua azione pre­ventiva e succes­siva di intelligence – è in pesante discus­sione fin dal 2006.

Dalla campagna militare in Libano e dall’invasione nella striscia di Gaza giungono segnali e lezioni pre­occupanti. Israele non è più invincibile. Chi ha letto i report sulle due campagne militari sa di cosa parlo. Hezbollah si è dimostrato un nemico temibile e organizzato in grado di rispondere al fuoco e fronteggiare i tank con mis­sili anti­carro, evento imprevisto per l’intelligence israeliana. Hamas un avversario capace di rigirare a suo favore una (semi)sconfitta militare attraverso un uso spregiudicato della percezione della guerra. In entrambi i casi, inoltre, non solo la tattica e la strategia del conflitto sono state sbagliate, sul Libano si è arrivati a costituire una commis­sione d’inchiesta per capire dove stava l’errore e su Gaza abbiamo assistito a un imbarazzante stop and go dell’operazione Cast Lead, a un assedio incompiuto.

L’obiettivo politico delle due campagne militari è inoltre mancato clamorosamente. Hezbollah è ancora una minaccia, Hamas nel frattempo ha approfittato del caos durante e dopo l’operazione Piombo Fuso per regolare i conti con al Fatah. Non è un bel risultato e non mi pare il caso, in queste condizioni, di lasciare che Israele sia travolto dalla sua crisi di leadership politica e militare, dai suoi errori, dalla cronica mancanza di coraggio dell’Europa e dalla finora contraddittoria risposta della nuova amministrazione americana, incapaci di vedere lo sguardo dei nemici della democrazia, ancora una volta, partire da Levante per mirare a Occidente.

Cosa è una superpotenza? L’intreccio di molti fattori: geografici, demografici, economici, sociali, culturali, militari. Gli Stati Uniti hanno dominato gran parte del Novecento grazie all’organizzazione e alla crescita di industria, ricerca, difesa, risorse naturali e popolazione. La Grande Crisi del 2008 sta ridisegnando gli equilibri mondiali. A breve termine vediamo solo gli effetti della reces­sione (crollo della domanda e della produzione, perdita di posti di lavoro, etc.), ma nel lungo periodo i rapporti tra le potenze cambieranno. I cicli durano venti, trent’anni: nel 1970 chi avrebbe scommesso sul crollo del Muro di Berlino? Nel 1989 quando i sovietici abbandonarono l’Afghanistan qualcuno vide l’ascesa di al Qaeda e Bin Laden? Chi poteva immaginare la tra­iettoria della Cina quando Deng Xiaoping nel 1978 intraprese il cammino verso il capitalismo autoritario? Le rivoluzioni sono sempre in corso, ma gli esiti finali diventano visibili spesso all’improvviso.

In questo scenario di incertezza e trasformazione, osservare la strategia di espansione della Fiat è molto più che un semplice esercizio di analisi. E’ il tentativo di guardare al di là della polvere sollevata dal crash, immaginare una dimensione nuova per l’industria italiana. Guardare i movimenti del pre­datore di Torino con una lente riduzionista è davvero un peccato, perchè non siamo di fronte alla soluzione di un puzzle industriale, ma alla costruzione di un’opportunità unica per la diplomazia (economica e politica) del nostro Paese.

Cerchiamo di chiamare le cose con il loro nome, senza imbellettarle troppo e puntando alla sostanza: la Fiat in questo momento veste i panni del salvatore di giganti industrali in crisi che hanno il nome di Chrysler (accordo chiuso) e Opel (trattativa in corso).

Cosa fa un salvatore? E’ come il mitico personaggio inventato da Quentin Tarantino e interpretato da Harvey Keitel in Pulp Fiction. La Fiat bussa alla porta di Chrysler e Opel e si pre­senta con la faccia di Sergio Marchionne: “Sono Mr. Wolf, risolvo problemi”.

E i problemi sul tavolo di Mr. Wolf-Marchionne sono grandi. Riguardano un intero modello di sviluppo economico (quello fondato sull’automobile) e il destino di centinaia di migliaia di lavoratori e relative famiglie. Dietro le quinte di una strategia di sviluppo industriale, c’è una questione sociale di portata storica che coinvolge due Paesi e due leader: Stati Uniti e Germania, Barack Obama e Angela Merkel. Per un para­dosso della storia, l’industria di un Paese considerato debole e senza futuro si pre­senta in casa della prima potenza mondiale e del cuore pulsante dell’Europa continentale con una proposta chiavi in mano.

Obama e Merkel sono due campioni della politica che, per ragioni diverse, vivono una stagione particolare della loro avventura politica. Il pre­sidente degli Stati Uniti è all’inizio del suo mandato, ha appena spento le candeline dei cento giorni alla Casa Bianca e sta cercando di far uscire il Paese da una spaventosa crisi finanziaria che si è trasformata in reces­sione. La cancelliera tedesca è l’emblema della politica conservatrice che in questo momento governa l’Europa, alla sua azione politica sono legati i destini del Vecchio Continente, la sua tenuta in Germania è di fronte a una prova che dal punto di vista dell’impatto sociale è seconda soltanto alla riunificazione, Opel infatti è un gigante che fa parte di General Motors Europe e offre lavoro a 50 mila persone (25 mila in Germania) e un suo collasso — solo in termini di ammortizzatori sociali — costerebbe nell’immediato una cifra vicina ai 5 miliardi di euro, ma l’impatto sul futuro del Paese è sconosciuto, tutto da calcolare non solo dal punto di vista economico ma soprattutto politico. Fiat è la soluzione pronta consegna per Obama, potrebbe esserlo anche per la Merkel.

Questo scenario è un colpo duris­simo sul palazzo grigio costruito dalla letteratura declinista sul nostro Paese, ma incredibilmente la classe dirigente italiana non sembra essersi resa pienamente conto di cosa sta accadendo. Un manager e un intero gruppo di comando di un’azienda italiana stanno immaginando un Gorilla Game declinato sull’auto e non sull’hi-tech, ma quando la politica non muove i pezzi — in questo caso le mani sulla scacchiera sono solo e soltanto quelle di Marchionne — non riesce a catturare la strategia, a immaginare le mosse, a pensare ai benefici di questo gioco condotto dalla casa automobilistica torinese. I vantaggi per Roma e il governo in carica sono grandi, ma la fatica di comprendere una trama che si svolge fuori dal Palazzo è evidente: l’Italia da sempre dipinta come preda diventa pre­datore, un Paese immaginato come un esempio di inefficienza, superburocrazia (e corruzione) potrebbe uscire dalla crisi con un sistema industriale rafforzato e finalmente con un campione non più nazionale ma internazionale. Come notato dai fini analisti di Stratfor, Barack Obama grazie all’accordo di Chrysler e Fiat dà un senso alla bancarotta pilotata del gruppo e riempie di fatti l’immaginifico (ai tempi della campagna pre­sidenziale) disegno di trasformare l’industria automobilistica americana da produttore di veicoli pesanti e inquinanti nell’avanguardia della mobilità leggera, efficiente e verde su quattro ruote. La Merkel, a cinque mesi dalle elezioni, salverebbe migliaia di posti di lavoro in nome di un’alleanza continentale tra privati e non di una improduttiva nazionalizzazione.

L’Italia così avrà negli Stati Uniti finalmente lo status non solo di partner militare ma di alleato industriale e una straordinaria portaerei in Nord America per far decollare le sue iniziative di diplomazia economica. E se al Lingotto riescono nell’impresa di chiudere l’accordo su Opel finalmente il nostro Paese lascerà la Francia con il cerino in mano (dopo esserci bruciati noi varie volte con il capitalismo di Stato di Parigi) per una più fruttuosa e concreta relazione con la Germania, vera potenza dell’Europa. Avremo qualche Legion d’onore in meno, ma vista la posta in palio — la costruzione di un supergruppo mondiale dell’auto –  ne pos­siamo fare tranquillamente a meno.

Tutto questo accade mentre il capitalismo dopo la sbornia dell’iperfinanza sta cercando di riscoprire il valore della buona manifattura, accade mentre la Grande Crisi segna sul tabellone vincitori e vinti, accade mentre emergono le nuove potenze globali e continentali. Accade mentre l’Italia ha la pre­sidenza del G8: ce ne vogliamo ricordare?

Summary

Georgian opposition movements have planned mass protests for April 9, mostly in Tbilisi but also around the country. These protests could spell trouble for Pre­sident Mikhail Saakashvili. The Western-leaning pre­sident has faced protests before, but this time the opposition is more consolidated than in the past. Furthermore, some members of the government are expected to join in the protests, and Rus­sia has stepped up its efforts to oust Saakashvili.

Analysis

Opposition parties inside Georgia are planning mass protests for April 9, mainly in the capital city of Tbilisi but also across the country. The protests are against Pre­sident Mikhail Saakashvili and are expected to demand his resignation. This is not the first set of rallies against Saakashvili, who has had a rocky pre­sidency since taking power in the pro-Western “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Anti-government protests have been held constantly over the past six years. But the upcoming rally is different: This is the first time all 17 opposition parties have consolidated enough to organize a mass movement in the country. Furthermore, many members of the government are joining the cause, and foreign powers — namely Rus­sia — are known to be encouraging plans to oust Saakashvili.

The planned protests in Georgia have been scheduled to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Soviet crackdown on independence demonstrators in Tbilisi. The opposition movement claims that more than 100,000 people will take to the streets — an ambitious number, as the protests of the past six years have not drawn more than 15,000 people. But this time around, the Georgian people’s discontent is greatly intensified because of the blame placed on Saakashvili after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Most Georgians believe Saakashvili pushed the country into a war, knowing the repercus­sions, and into a serious financial crisis in which unemployment has reached nearly 9 percent.

Georgia’s opposition has always been fractured and so has only managed to pull together sporadic rallies rather than a real movement. But the growing discontent in Georgia is allowing the opposition groups to finally overcome their differences and agree that Saakashvili should be removed. Even Saakashvili loyalists like former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Georgian Ambas­sador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania have joined the opposition’s cause, targeting Saakashvili personally. The problem now is that opposition members still do not agree on how to remove the pre­sident; some are calling for referendums on new elections, and some want to install a replacement government to make sure Saakashvili does not have a chance to return to power. But all 17 parties agreed to start with large-scale demonstrations in the streets and go from there.

If the movement does inspire such a large turnout, it would be equivalent to the number of protesters that hit the streets at the height of the Rose Revolution, which toppled the pre­vious government and brought Saakashvili into power in the first place.

Saakashvili and the remainder of his supporters are pre­pared, however, with the military on standby outside of Tbilisi in order to counter a large movement. During a demonstration in 2007, Saakashvili deployed the military and succes­sfully — though violently — crushed the protests. But that demonstration consisted of 15,000 protesters; it is unclear if Saakashvili and the military could withstand numbers seven times that.

There is also concern that protests are planned in the Georgian seces­sionist region of Adjara, which rose up against and rejected Saakashvili’s government in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. This region was suppres­sed by Saakashvili once and has held a grudge ever since, looking for the perfect time to rise up again. Tbilisi especially wants to keep Adjara under its control because it is home to the large port of Batumi, and many of Georgia’s trans­port routes to Turkey run through it. If Adjara rises up, there are rumors in the region that its neighboring seces­sionist region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, will join in to help destabilize Saakashvili and the government. Georgia already officially lost its two northern seces­sionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Rus­sian occupation during the August 2008 war and is highly concerned with its southern regions try­ing to break away.

These southern regions, like the northern ones, have strong support from Rus­sia; thus, Moscow is square in the middle of tomorrow’s activities. Rus­sia has long backed all of Georgia’s seces­sionist regions, but has had difficulty penetrating the Georgian opposition groups in order to organize them against Saakashvili. Though none of the 17 opposition groups are pro-Russian, STRATFOR sources in Georgia say Rus­sian money has been flowing into the groups in order to nudge them along in organizing the impending protests.

Rus­sia has a vested interest in breaking the Georgian government. Rus­sia and the West have been locked in a struggle over the small Caucasus state. That struggle led to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, after which Moscow felt secure in its control over Georgia. Since Rus­sian Pre­sident Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. Pre­sident Barack Obama met April 1 and disagreed over a slew of issues, including U.S. ballistic mis­sile defense installations in Poland and NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, Rus­sia is not as secure and is seeking to consolidate its power in Georgia. This means first breaking the still vehemently pro-Western Saakashvili. This does not mean Rus­sia thinks it can get a pro-Russian leader in power in Georgia; it just wants one who is not so outspoken against Moscow and so determined to invite Western influence.

The April 9 protests are the point at which all sides will try to gain — and maintain — momentum. The 2003 Rose Revolution took months to build up to, but the upcoming protests are the starting point for both the opposition and Rus­sia — and opposition movements in Georgia have not seen this much support and organization since the 2003 revolution. April 9 will reveal whether or not things are about to get shaken up, if not completely transformed, in Georgia.

Stratfor

By George Friedman

Three major meetings will take place in Europe over the next nine days: a meeting of the G-20, a NATO summit and a meeting of the European Union with U.S. Pre­sident Barack Obama. The week will define the relationship between the United States and Europe and reveal some intra-European relationships. If not a defining moment, the week will certainly be a critical moment in dealing with economic, political and military questions. To be more pre­cise, the meeting will be about U.S.-German relations. Not only is Germany the engine of continental Europe, its policies diverge the most sharply from those of the United States. In some ways, U.S.-German relations have been the core of the U.S.-European relationship, so this marathon of summits will focus on the United States and Germany.

Although the meetings deal with a range of issues — the economy and Afghanistan chief among them — the core question on the table will be the relationship between Europe and the United States following the departure of George W. Bush and the arrival of Barack Obama. This is not a trivial question. The European Union and the United States together account for more than half of global gross domestic product. How the two interact and cooperate is thus a matter of global significance. Of particular importance will be the U.S. relationship with Germany, since the German economy drives the Continental dynamic. This will be the first significant opportunity to measure the state of that relationship along the entire range of issues requiring cooperation.

Relations under Bush between the United States and the two major European countries, Germany and France, were unpleasant to say the least. There was tremendous enthusiasm throughout most of Europe surrounding Obama’s election. Obama ran a campaign partly based on the assertion that one of Bush’s greatest mistakes was his failure to align the United States more closely with its European allies, and he said he would change the dynamic of that relationship.

There is no question that Obama and the major European powers want to have a closer relationship. But there is a serious question about expectations. From the European point of view, the problem with Bush was that he did not consult them enough and demanded too much from them. They are looking forward to a relationship with Obama that contains more consultation and fewer demands. But while Obama wants more consultation with the Europeans, this does not mean he will demand less. In fact, one of his campaign themes was that with greater consultation with Europe, the Europeans would be pre­pared to provide more assistance to the United States. Europe and Obama loved each other, but for very different reasons. The Europeans thought that the United States under Obama would ask less, while Obama thought the Europeans would give more.

The G-20 and Divergent Economic Expectations

Begin with the G-20 summit of 20 of the world’s largest economies, which, along with the Americans and Europeans, include the Rus­sians, Chinese and Japanese. The issue is, of course, the handling of the international financial crisis. In contrast to the G-20 meetings held in November 2008, the economic situation has clarified itself substantially — itself an improvement — and there are the first faint signs in the United States of what might be the beginning of recovery. There is still tremendous economic pain, but not nearly the panic seen in October.

There is, however, still discord. The most important disagreement is between the United States and United Kingdom on one side and France and Germany on the other. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have selected a strategy that calls for strong economic stimulus at home. The Anglo-American side wants Europe to match it (though the United Kingdom has begun tempering its demands). It fears that the heavily export-oriented Germans in particular will use the demand created by U.S. and British stimulus on their economies to surge German exports into these countries as demand rises. Germany and France would thus get the benefit of the stimulus without footing the bill, enjoy­ing a free ride as the United States builds domestic debt. We must focus here on Germany and the United States because Germany is the center of gravity of the European economy just as the United States is of the Anglo-American bloc. Others are involved, but in the end this comes down to a U.S.-German showdown.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that Germany could not afford the kind of stimulus promoted by the Anglo-Americans because German demographic problems are such that the proposed stimulus would impose long-term debt on a shrinking population, an untenable situation. Germany and France’s position makes perfect sense, whether it is viewed as Merkel has framed it, or more cynically, as Germany taking advantage of actions Obama already has taken. Either way, the fact remains that German and U.S. national interest are not at all the same. As Merkel put it in an interview with The New York Times, “International policy is, for all the friendship and commonality, always also about representing the interests of one’s own country.”

Paralleling this is the issue of how to deal with the Central European financial crisis. Toxic U.S. assets did not create this problem, internal European practices did. Western European banks took dominant positions in Eastern Europe in the past decade. They began to offer mortgages and other loans at low interest rates denominated in euros, Swiss francs and yen. This was an outstanding deal unless the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint were to plunge in value, which they have over the past six months. Loan payments soared, mas­sive defaults happened, and Italian, Austrian and Swedish banks were left holding the bag.

The United States viewed this as an internal EU matter, leaving it to European countries to save their own banks. Meanwhile, the Germans — who had somewhat less exposure than other countries — helped block a European bailout, arguing that the Central European countries should be dealt with through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was being configured to solve such problems in second-tier countries. From the German point of view, the IMF was simply going to be used for the purpose for which it was created. But Washington saw this as the Germans try­ing to secure U.S. (and Chinese and Japanese) money to deal with a European problem.

Add to this the complexity of Opel, a German carmaker owned by GM, which Germany wants the United States to bailout but which the United States wants nothing to do with, and the fundamental problem is clear: While both Germany and the United States have a common interest in moving past the crisis, Germany and the United States have very different approaches to the problem. Embedded in this is the hard fact that the United States is much larger than any other national economy, and it will be the U.S. recovery (when it comes) pulling the rest of the world — particularly the export-oriented economies — out of the ditch. Given that nothing can change this, the Germans see no reason to put themselves in a more difficult position than they are already in.

The Germans will not yield on the stimulus issue and Obama will not press, since this is not an issue that will resonate politically. But what could be perceived as a mas­sive U.S. donation to the IMF would resonate politically in the United States. The American political system has become increasingly sensitive to the size of the debt being incurred by the Obama administration. A loan at this time to bail out other countries would not sit well, especially when critics would point out that some of the money will be going to bail out European banks in Central Europe.

European Fragmentation

Obama will need something in return from the Europeans, and the two-day NATO summit will be the place to get it. The Obama administration laid out the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan last Friday in pre­paration for this trip. Having given on the economic issue, Obama might hope that the Europeans would be forthcoming in increasing their commitment to Afghanistan by sending troops.

But there is almost no chance of Germany or France sending more troops, as public opinion in those countries is set against it and they have vastly limited military resources. During the U.S. pre­sidential debates, Obama emphasized that he would be looking to the Europeans to increase aid in Afghanistan (the “good” war) while Iraq (the “bad” war) ends. The Germans will make some symbolic gestures — aid to Pakistan, reconstruction workers — but they will not be sending troops.

This will put Obama in a difficult position. If he donates money to the IMF, some of it earmarked for Europe, while the Europeans not only refuse to join the United States in a stimulus package but refuse to send troops to Afghanistan, the entire foundation of Obama’s foreign policy will start becoming a public issue. Obama argued that he would be more effective in building cooperation with European allies than Bush was or U.S. Sen. John McCain would have been. If he comes home empty-handed, which is likely, the status of that claim becomes uncertain.

Which brings us to the third meeting: the Obama-EU summit. We have been speaking of Germany as if it were Europe. In one sense, it is, as its economic weight drives the system. But politically and militarily, Europe is highly fragmented. Indeed, one of the consequences of German nationalism in dealing with Europe’s economy is that Europe’s economy is fragmented as well. Many smaller EU members, which had great expectations of what EU membership would mean, are disappointed and alienated from Germany and even the European Union itself largely due to the lack of German willing­ness to help them in their time of need.

More Fertile Ground for Obama

These are the waters Obama can go fishing in. Clearly, NATO is no longer functioning as it was a generation ago. Reality has shifted, and so have national interests. The international economic crisis has heightened — not reduced — nationalism as each nation looks out for itself. The weaker nations, particularly in Central Europe, have been left to fend for themselves.

The Central European countries have an additional concern: Rus­sia. As Rus­sia gets bolder, and as Germany remains unwilling to stand in Moscow’s way due to its energy dependence on Rus­sia, countries on the EU periphery will be shopping for new relationships, particularly with the United States.

Obama’s strategy of coming closer to the Franco-German bloc appears to be ending in the same kind of train wreck in which Bush’s attempts ended. That is reasonable since these are not questions of atmospherics but of national interest on all sides. It therefore follows that the United States must consider new strategic relationships. The countries bordering Rus­sia and Ukraine are certainly of interest to the United States, and share less interests with Germany and France than they thought they did. New bilateral relations — or even multilateral relations excluding some former partners like Germany — might be a topic to think about at the EU summit, even if it is too early to talk about it.

But let’s remember that Obama’s trip doesn’t end in Europe, it ends in Turkey. Turkey is a NATO member but has been effectively blocked from entry into the EU. It is doing relatively well in the economic crisis, and has a substantial military capability as well. The United States needs Turkey to extend its influence in Iraq to block Iranian ambitions, and north in the Caucasus to block Rus­sian ambitions. Turkey is thus a prime candidate for an enhanced relationship with the United States. Excluded from Europe out of fears of Turkish immigration, economically able to stand on its own two feet, and able to use its military force in its own interest, it doesn’t take a contortionist to align U.S. and Turkish policies — they flow naturally.

However planned, Obama’s visit to Turkey will represent a warning to the Germans and others in its orbit that their relationship with the United States is based, as Merkel put it, on national interest, and that Germany’s interests and American interests are diverging somewhat. It also drives home that the United States has options in how to configure its alliance system, and that in many ways, Turkey is more important to the United States than Germany is.

Obama has made the case for multilateralism. Whatever that means, it does not have to mean continued alignment with all the traditional allies the United States had. There are potential new relationships and potential new arrangements. The inability of the Europeans to support key aspects of U.S. policy is understandable. But it will inevitably create a counter pres­sure on Obama to trans­fer the concept of multilateralism away from the post-World War II system of alliances toward a new system more appropriate to American national interests.

From our point of view, the talks in Europe are locked into place. A fine gloss will be put on the failure to collaborate. The talks in Turkey, on the other hand, have a very different sense about them.

© Stratfor

Ecco l’audio del dibattito organizzato dal Vicino Oriente e da Radio Radicale.

By George Friedman

While the Munich Security Conference brought together senior leaders from most major countries and many minor ones last weekend, none was more significant than U.S. Vice Pre­sident Joe Biden. This is because Biden provided the first glimpse of U.S. foreign policy under Pre­sident Barack Obama. Most conference attendees were looking forward to a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. What was interesting about Biden’s speech was how little change there has been in the U.S. position and how much the attendees and the media were cheered by it.

After Biden’s speech, there was much talk about a change in the tone of U.S. policy. But it is not clear to us whether this was because the tone has changed, or because the attendees’ hearing has. They seemed delighted to be addres­sed by Biden rather than by former Vice Pre­sident Dick Cheney — delighted to the extent that this itself represented a change in policy. Thus, in everything Biden said, the conference attendees saw rays of a new policy.

Policy Continuity: Iran and Russia

Consider Iran. The Obama administration’s position, as staked out by Biden, is that the United States is pre­pared to speak directly to Iran provided that the Iranians do two things. First, Tehran must end its nuclear weapons program. Second, Tehran must stop supporting terrorists, by which Biden meant Hamas and Hezbollah. Once the Iranians do that, the Americans will talk to them. The Bush administration was equally pre­pared to talk to Iran given those pre­conditions. The Iranians make the point that such conces­sions come after talks, not before, and that the United States must change its attitude toward Iran before there can be talks, something Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani emphasized after the meeting. Apart from the emphasis on a willing­ness to talk, the terms Biden laid out for such talks are identical to the terms under the Bush administration.

Now consider Rus­sia. Officially, the Rus­sians were delighted to hear that the United States was pre­pared to hit the “reset button” on U.S.-Russian relations. But Moscow cannot have been pleased when it turned out that hitting the reset button did not involve ruling out NATO expansion, ending American mis­sile defense system efforts in Central Europe or publicly acknowledging the existence of a Rus­sian sphere of influence. Biden said, “It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances.” In trans­lation, this means the United States has the right to enter any relationship it wants with independent states, and that independent states have the right to enter any relationship they want. In other words, the Bush administratio n’s commitment to the principle of NATO expansion has not changed.

Nor could the Rus­sians have been pleased with the announcement just prior to the conference that the United States would continue developing a ballistic mis­sile defense (BMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The BMD program has been an issue of tremendous importance for Rus­sians, and it is something Obama indicated he would end, or change in some way that might please the Rus­sians. But not only was there no commitment to end the program, there also was no backing away from long-standing U.S. interest in it, or even any indication of the terms under which it might end.

Given that the United States has asked Rus­sia for a supply route through the former Soviet Union to Afghanistan, and that the Rus­sians have agreed to this in principle, it would seem that that there might be an opening for a deal with the Rus­sians. But just before the Munich conference opened, Kyrgyzstan announced that Manas Air Base, the last air base open to the United States in Central Asia, would no longer be available to American aircraft. This was a tidy little victory for the Rus­sians, who had used political and financial levers to pres­sure Kyrgyzstan to eject the Americans. The Rus­sians, of course, deny that any such pres­sure was ever brought to be ar, and that the closure of the base one day before Munich could have been anything more than coincidence.

But the mes­sage to the United States was clear: While Rus­sia agrees in principle to the U.S. supply line, the Americans will have to pay a price for it. In case Washington was under the impres­sion it could get other countries in the former Soviet Union to provide pas­sage, the Rus­sians let the Americans know how much leverage Moscow has in these situations. The U.S. assertion of a right to bilateral relations won’t happen in Russia’s near abroad without Rus­sian help, and that help won’t come without strategic conces­sions from the United States. In short, the American position on Rus­sia hasn’t changed, and neither has the Rus­sian position.

The Europeans

The most interesting — and for us, the most anti­cipated — part of Biden’s speech had to do with the Europeans, of whom the French and Germans were the most enthusiastic about Bush’s departure and Obama’s arrival. Biden’s speech addres­sed the core question of the U.S.-European relationship.

If the Europeans were not pre­pared to increase their participation in American foreign policy initiatives during the Bush administration, it was assumed that they would be during the Obama administration. The first issue on the table under the new U.S. administration is the plan to increase forces in Afghanistan. Biden called for more NATO involvement in that conflict, which would mean an increase in European forces deployed to Afghanistan. Some countries, along with the head of NATO, support this. But German Chancellor Angela Merkel made it clear that Germany is not pre­pared to send more troops.

Over the past year or so, Germany has become somewhat estranged from the United States. Dependent on Rus­sian energy, Germany has been unwilling to confront Rus­sia on issues of concern to Washington. Merkel has made it particularly clear that while she does not oppose NATO expansion in principle, she certainly opposes expansion to states that Rus­sian considers deeply within its sphere of influence (primarily Georgia and Ukraine). The Germans have made it abundantly clear that they do not want to see European-Russian relations deteriorate under U.S. prodding. Moreover, Germany has no appetite for continuing its pre­sence in Afghanistan, let alone increasing it.

NATO faces a substantial split, conditioned partly by Germany’s dependence on Rus­sian energy, but also by deep German unease about any pos­sible resumption of a Cold War with Rus­sia, however mild. The foundation of NATO during the Cold War was the U.S.-German-British relationship. With the Germans unwilling to align with the United States and other NATO members over Rus­sia or Afghanistan, it is unclear whether NATO can continue to function. (Certainly, Merkel cannot be pleased that the United States has not laid the BMD issue in Poland and the Czech Republic to rest.)

The More Things Change …

Most interesting here is the continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations in regard to foreign policy. It is certainly reasonable to argue that after only three weeks in office, no major initiatives should be expected of the new pre­sident. But major initiatives were implied — such as ending the BMD deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic — and declaring the intention to withdraw BMD would not have required much pre­paration. But Biden offered no new initiatives beyond expres­sing a willing­ness to talk, without indicating any policy shifts regarding the things that have blocked talks. Willing­ness to talk with the Iranians, the Rus­sians, the Europeans and others shifts the atmospherics — allowing the listener to think things have changed — but does not address the question of what is to be discus­sed and what is to be offered and accepted.

Ultimately, the issues dividing the world are not, in our view, subject to personalities, nor does goodwill (or bad will, for that matter) address the fundamental questions. Iran has strategic and ideological reasons for behaving the way it does. So does Rus­sia. So does Germany, and so on. The tensions that exist between those countries and the United States might be mildly exacerbated by personalities, but nations are driven by interest, not personality.

Biden’s position did not materially shift the Obama administration away from Bush’s foreign policy, because Bush was the prisoner of that policy, not its creator. The Iranians will not make conces­sions on nuclear weapons prior to holding talks, and they do not regard their support for Hamas or Hezbollah as aiding terrorism. Being willing to talk to the Iranians provided they abandon these things is the same as being unwilling to talk to them.

There has been no misunderstanding between the United States and Rus­sia that more open dialogue will cure. The Rus­sians see no reason for NATO expansion unless NATO is planning to encircle Rus­sia. It is pos­sible for the West to have relations with Ukraine and Georgia without expanding NATO; Moscow sees the insistence on expansion as imply­ing sinister motives. For its part, the United States refuses to concede that Rus­sia has any interest in the decisions of the former Soviet Union states, something Biden reiterated. Therefore, either the Rus­sians must accept NATO expansion, or the Americans must accept that Rus­sia has an overriding interest in limiting American relations in the former Soviet Union. This is a fundamental issue that any U.S. administration would have to deal with — particularly an administr ation seeking Rus­sian cooperation in Afghanistan.

As for Germany, NATO was an instrument of rehabilitation and stability after World War II. But Germany now has a complex relationship with Rus­sia, as well as internal issues. It does not want NATO drawing it into adventures that are not in Germany’s primary interest, much less into a confrontation with Rus­sia. No amount of charm, openness or dialogue is going to change this fundamental reality.

Dialogue does offer certain pos­sibilities. The United States could choose to talk to Iran without pre­conditions. It could abandon NATO expansion and quietly reduce its influence in the former Soviet Union, or perhaps convince the Rus­sians that they could benefit from this influence. The United States could abandon the BMD system (though this has been complicated by Iran’s recent succes­sful satellite launch), or perhaps get the Rus­sians to participate in the program. The United States could certainly get the Germans to send a small force to Afghanistan above and beyond the pre­sent German contingent. All of this is possible.

What can’t be achieved is a fundamental transformation of the geopolitical realities of the world. No matter how Obama campaigned, it is clear he knows that. Apart from his pre­occupation with economic matters, Obama understands that foreign policy is governed by impersonal forces and is not amenable to rhetoric, although rhetoric might make things somewhat easier. No nation gives up its fundamental interests because someone is willing to talk.

Willing­ness to talk is important, but what is said is much more important. Obama’s first foray into foreign policy via Biden indicates that, generally speaking, he understands the constraints and pres­sures that drive American foreign policy, and he understands the limits of pre­sidential power. Atmospherics aside, Biden’s positions — as opposed to his rhetoric — were strikingly similar to Cheney’s foreign policy positions.

We argued long ago that pre­sidents don’t make history, but that history makes pre­sidents. We see Biden’s speech as a clas­sic example of this principle.

© Stratfor