Finmeccanica compra Drs Technologies Inc., uno dei più importanti fornitori del Pentagono.

Drs ha accettato l’offerta dell’azienda italiana che ha messo sul piatto un premio del 31 per cento sulla media dei prezzi azionari degli ultimi trenta giorni. Per finanziare l’operazione è previsto un aumento di capitale e una cessione di asset. La fusione amichevole tra le due aziende vale 3,4 miliardi di euro.

Drs è un’azienda che produce software e sistemi di difesa di ultima generazione, in particolare per i carri armati Abrams e per i “destroyer” muniti di Aegis combat system, navi da guerra armate con sistemi missilistici.

Quella di Finmeccanica è la più importante acquisizione italiana negli Stati Uniti.

Ecco la relazione integrale del generale David H. Petraeus al Congresso degli Stati Uniti. Sono sette pagine che contengono un’analisi molto interessante sulla situazione in Iraq. I giornali hanno presentato il report di Petraeus come uno stop al ritiro delle truppe americane in Iraq. In realtà, il documento non dice tout court che bisogna fermare il ritiro, ma suggerisce un approccio flessibile al problema della sicurezza irachena per non vanificare in un lampo i progressi compiuti nell’ultimo anno.

Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq
8-9 April 2008

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently
provided to my chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been
significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian
deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements
have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and
there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the
situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as
events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress
made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when
Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it
was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy
additional US forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made. First, of course, has
been the impact of increased numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Forces. You are well aware of the
U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000
additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its
capability to deploy and employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of Coalition and Iraqi Forces in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people,
to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local
reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi
population. Since the first Sunni “Awakening” in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq
increasingly have rejected AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These
communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate
in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis—some,
former insurgents—to contribute to local security as so-called “Sons of Iraq.” With their
assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI—while still
lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly.
The recent flare-up in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the
ceasefire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in
violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr standdown
order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role
Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and
generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the
Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress
achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this
while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.

The Nature of the Conflict

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition continues,
influenced heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term
stability in Iraq.
Various elements push Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists,
insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda’s senior
leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction,
and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria
has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to
shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly
damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient Iraqi
governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq’s problems.
These challenges and recent weeks’ violence notwithstanding, Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition
in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the
recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with temporarily, at least,
by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street
fighting.

Current Situation and Trends

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in
the security arena.
As this chart [Slide 1] illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level
not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the
violence in Basrah and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again,
though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi
civilians killed due to violence. As this chart [Slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased
over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set
off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early
2007. This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line
reflecting Coalition and Iraqi data and the bottom line reflecting Coalition-confirmed data only.
No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly,
though more work clearly needs to be done.
Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread
if left unchecked. As the box on the bottom left of this chart [Slide 3] shows, the number of
deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor
has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown
in the boxes depicting Iraq’s capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to
sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods; however, that is only a partial
explanation as countless sectarian fault lines and numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in
Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have focused along the fault lines to
reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in
their local communities.
As this next chart [Slide 4] shows, even though the number of high profile attacks increased in
March as AQI lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year
ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have
seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian
violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy’s inability to date to
re-ignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an
important development. As this chart [Slide 5] depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of
Iraq—Shia as well as Sunni—under contract to help Coalition and Iraqi Forces protect their
neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These volunteers have contributed
significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence—
not to mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the cost of their monthly
contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons
and explosives caches. As this next chart [Slide 6] shows, in fact, we have already found more
caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are
working closely with the Iraqi Government to transition them into the Iraqi Security Forces or
other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the Police or Army
or other government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will
continue to monitor it carefully.
Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements have targeted
them repeatedly. However, these attacks—in addition to AQI’s use of women, children, and the
handicapped as suicide bombers—have further alienated AQI from the Iraqi people. And the
tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI’s loss of local support in many areas, has
substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart [Slide 7]
displays the cumulative effect of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see,
we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, though
there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted that progress, AQI is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless
pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource
flows that sustain it. This chart [Slide 8] lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis,
and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you
can see, defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counter-terrorist forces,
but also major operations by Coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence
effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives,
diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and
many other actions. Related to this effort, I applaud Congress’ support for additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming Supplemental, as ISR is vital to the
success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of
instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda’s senior leaders view as a tool
to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri
have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved
in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-east region.
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These
elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese
Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of
government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring
Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their
desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian
leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods
Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We
should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the
kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian
involvement in Iraq.

Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred
responsibilities to Iraqi Forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have
permitted. Currently, as this chart [Slide 9] shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under
provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces—not just the successful provinces in the
Kurdish Regional Government area, but also a number of southern provinces—have done well.
Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process
will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah Provinces to transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi Forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve
in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in
operations, albeit with some Coalition support, has grown to well over 100 [Slide 10]. These
units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security
Force losses have recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after
action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and
leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a
result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their
footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security
institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to
grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding
training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special
Operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National
Police battalions. Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their
budgets. As this chart [Slide 11] shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq’s security ministries spent more
on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF).
We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year,
and this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund
request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security
throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basrah highlight improvements in the
ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and
replacements on very short notice; they certainly could not have deployed a division’s worth of
Army and Police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations
also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the areas of logistics, force enablers,
staff development, and command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March
2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of
American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the
organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to
support urgent wartime requirements. On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider
restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports
education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important
component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future.
Upcoming Challenges
While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of
the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a
resurgence of AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire order
and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions
by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.
Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities
for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial, and national
levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the
coming months, Iraq’s leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass
additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of
disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would
challenge any government, much less a still developing government tested by war.
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the State Department’s Quick Response
Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I
respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the
Supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the
Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced
security in local communities. Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300
million for us to manage as “Iraqi CERP” to perform projects for their people, while building
their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually
assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a Joint Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi government pledges to provide
more as they execute the budget passed two months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to
have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.

Recommendations

Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq.
During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security
gains while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized the
need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition
responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security
gains that have been made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations.
The operational considerations include recognition that:
• the military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible;
• Iraqi Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities but still must grow further;
• the provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to
resolve provincial boundary disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging;
• the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces or other pursuits will require
time and careful monitoring;
• withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year;
and
• performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces as well as
special operations forces and advisor teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that:
• the strain on the US military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable;
• a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and
global threats; and
• a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al
Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for
the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the
drawdown of the surge combat forces and that, upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade
combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end
of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the
ground and, over time, determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions.
This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as
conditions permit. This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable;
however, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile
security gains our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for
the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27
million citizens of Iraq; it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of
the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq
prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian
encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over

Iraq’s borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

Closing Comments

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation in Iraq. We have asked a great
deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal
awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my
recommendations.
The Congress, the Executive Branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to
support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more
to those in harm’s way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and
those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our Nation in Iraq
and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day.
It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.

Il destino non è solo cinico e baro, ma anche illuminante e onesto. La vicenda del Tibet ci offre uno specchio della confusione in cui è piombata la politica estera americana nel second term di Bush. L’11 marzo scorso il rapporto annuale del Dipartimento di Stato sui diritti umani toglieva Pechino dalla “black list”, ma il destino spesso gioca a dadi e pochi giorni dopo a Foggy Bottom si sono ritrovati con il Tibet di nuove in fiamme e il Dalai Lama che oggi si dice pronto a lasciare. Così gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa si sono parlati all’ora del tè e dopo lunga meditazione hanno pensato di invitare la Cina alla “moderazione”, invito che a Pechino hanno tradotto con un pragmatico “di monaci ammazzatene, ma solo un po’”. Pessima situazione. Aggravata dal fatto che spostando il proprio cannocchiale miope sui Balcani a Washington sono riusciti a illudere il Kosovo di essere uno Stato e di conseguenza alimentare il caos etnico nell’ex Jugoslavia, cosa di cui francamente non si sentiva il bisogno. Qual è la linea politica del Dipartimento di Stato in materia di libertà e democrazia? E’ quella ideale, wilsoniana che vuole estendere la democrazia - e perfino esportarla nella sua visione neoconservatrice - oppure è quella flip flop sulla Cina che prende con una mano (investimenti e finanza globale) e non restituisce con l’altra (democrazia e diritti civili) facendo finta che il Tibet sia un problema di “moderazione” e non invece un tema che - usando la stessa logica applicata al Kosovo - diventa un punto importante dell’agenda per la libertà e la democrazia? Si può tenere il tacco dello stivale sul Tibet e “liberare” il Kosovo dalla Serbia? E’ meglio l’ordine e l’ingiustizia o il disordine e la giustizia? Gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa devono riorganizzare molto in fretta le proprie idee sul mondo contemporaneo e le sfide che propone perchè un conto è avere una politica estera che si modella caso per caso, un altro è avere una linea che sta diventando un caso.

La torcia olimpica prosegue il suo viaggio verso Pechino. Un percorso accidentato - tafferugli a Londra, quattro arresti a Parigi e spegnimento della fiaccola - che non sposta di un millimetro la posizione del governo cinese sul Tibet. Non tremerà foglia neppure dopo le dichiarazioni del presidente del Comitato Olimpico Internazionale : «Facciamo appello per una soluzione rapida e pacifica della crisi in Tibet, che ha scatenato un’ondata di proteste nel mondo». Immaginiamo la preoccupazione di Pechino. Finora la sortita più coraggiosa è stata quella del presidente francese Nicolas Sarkozy - che non ha escluso il boicottaggio dei giochi olimpici - mentre dalle altre diplomazie si è sentito solo il rumore sordo della testa dello struzzo ficcata dentro la sabbia.

La linea politica flip flop della Casa Bianca sul Tibet, sul Kosovo e il Medio Oriente ci suggerisce una serie di brevi considerazioni. Gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero essere il paese guida di una campagna massiccia per la libertà del Tibet (sarebbe una campagna non solo “giusta” ma redditizia dal punto di vista dell’immagine nel mondo), ma al Dipartimento di Stato ci sono troppe incertezze e laddove non c’è guerra (e dunque il Pentagono non dispiega la sua forza di persuasione e i suoi migliori thinkers) l’azione della Casa Bianca è senza efficacia. Il second term di Bush infatti - assai più che il primo - ha puntato sull’abilità del segretario alla Difesa Robert Gates e la nuova generazione di strateghi “four-stars” (il generale David H. Petraeus e i suoi allievi) per influenzare l’agenda globale. E’ vero che Foggy Bottom e Condoleezza Rice hanno potuto contare su meno risorse, ma in realtà il problema della diplomazia americana è tutto nella inefficacia della cosiddetta nuova “public diplomacy” ¹. Se la spesa complessiva cala, questa andrebbe quantomeno riqualificata. Alla fine degli anni Novanta, i fondi destinati alla “public diplomacy” furono ridotti drasticamente dopo l’approvazione dello United States Broadcasting Act del 1994 e la poco felice soppressione dell’Usia, la United State Information Agency nel 1999. Da allora, si è assistito a un declino costante dell’azione di comunicazione e, di conseguenza, dell’immagine e del prestigio degli Stati Uniti nel mondo. La tabella qui sopra illustra il declino dei fondi destinati alla public diplomacy dal 1980 al 2005. Il long term della politica estera ne ha subito pesanti conseguenze e il trend di fatto non è stato invertito, nonostante le raccomandazioni di vari gruppi di studio, la recessione che incombe sugli Stati Uniti, inoltre, ha effetti immediati sulla qualità dei programmi e del personale diplomatico. Secondo il Government Accountability Office, il 30 per cento dei diplomatici americani in Medio Oriente avrebbe difficoltà linguistiche. Un diplomatico che non capisce o nonsi fa capire è un paradosso che la politica non può permettersi.

Nel mondo post 9/11 la diplomazia ha un ruolo fondamentale, ma i suoi sforzi per far comprendere quanto sia importante sconfiggere il fondamentalismo islamico, con la diplomazia e quando serve con le armi, finora non sono stati efficaci. Questa tabella del Transatlantic Trends 2007 sull’Afghanistan è illuminante: Solo il 30 per cento della popolazione dei Paesi europei è favorevole a operazioni di combattimento in Afghanistan. Il problema è che i talebani sparano, rapiscono e attaccano i convogli che riforniscono gli uomini impegnati nella ricostruzione afghana, quest’ultima approvata dal 64 per cento degli intervistati. E’ un altro paradosso che la “public diplomacy” del Dipartimento di Stato non riesce a risolvere. In linea generale, solo il 36 per cento degli europei pensa che gli Stati Uniti debbano avere la leadership nel mondo globale. Quello del Tibet è dunque un banco di prova da non sottovalutare per la politica estera americana, perchè Tibet si legge Cina. E gli occhi del mondo sono puntati sulle Olimpiadi. Non si tratta di un fatto puramente sportivo, ma politico. La Cina in fatti non è percepita solo come un’opportunità economica, visto che per il 57 per cento dei francesi (ecco spiegata la mossa di Sarkozy), il 51 per cento dei tedeschi e il 40 per cento dei britannici pensano che in realtà sia una minaccia. L’impero più che celeste è rosso e gli Stati Uniti hanno bisogno di una strategia di comunicazione per spiegare al mondo perchè il Kosovo deve essere indipendente e il Tibet invece può essere schiacciato dallo stivale di Pechino.

Cosa sta succedendo a Bassora? Se cercate un resoconto serio sulla guerra in corso, dovete armarvi di un faro perchè siamo nel buio quasi totale. Nella classifica dell’oscurità svetta il New York Times che sulla guerra in Iraq d’altronde può vantare un record: ha fatto più errori della Casa Bianca.

Al Times si sono accorti per buoni ultimi - e quando l’hanno scritto sembrava di vederne i contorcimenti - che il generale Petraeus aveva cambiato strategia e sorti della guerra contro i terroristi. Ora continuano a perseverare nell’errore e a non capire qual è la posta in gioco nella battaglia tra sciiti nell’unico sbocco al mare che ha l’Iraq. Per farsi un’idea chiara del pregiudizio del Nyt - e la scarsa conoscenza della strategia militare - date un’occhiata a cosa scrive Mike McNally su Pajamas Media.

Una donna italiana che fa cose davvero importanti ed è più apprezzata all’estero che in patria è Loretta Napoleoni. La Napoleoni ha scritto una serie di libri sul terrorismo internazionale con la cura del saggista e il gusto per la notizia del giornalista. Il suo ultimo volume si intitola “Rogue Economics“, pubblicato negli Stati Uniti dalla Seven Stories Press e in Italia dal Saggiatore (titolato “Economia canaglia”), sarà presentato al Center for International and Strategic Studies di Washington il 3 aprile prossimo. Starebbe bene nello scaffale del prossimo ministro dell’Interno e tra i tomi della libreria della Farnesina, ma francamente non speriamo in una riconversione della politica dal peggio al meglio.

Dith Pran è morto. Insieme a Sydney H. Schanberg è stato un pezzo importante di giornalismo. Chi ha visto il film “The Killing Fields” sa di cosa scriviamo. L’orrore cambogiano senza il lavoro di Pran e Schanberg avrebbe un pezzo di verità in meno nella memoria collettiva. Per conoscere e non dimenticare: leggere il New York Times e noleggiare The Killing Fields.