Nov

20

L’Occidentale. Obama sceglie Gates perchè il mondo è un posto molto pericoloso

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Barack Obama ha cominciato a mettere gli occhi sul Pentagono e pensa di offrire la guida della Difesa all’attuale segretario Robert Gates. Obama e Gates hanno avviato i colloqui e le possibilità un accordo sono concrete. La notizia è stata rilanciata dal Financial Times e chi scrive l’aveva anticipata sull’Occidentale. Perché il presidente eletto cerca la riconferma di un repubblicano, uno dei principali collaboratori dell’amministrazione Bush? Obama è baciato dalla Storia e rincorre la Storia. Obama è sulle orme di John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Continua a leggere l’articolo su L’Occidentale.

Nov

18

I pirati e la (necessaria) supremazia navale dell’America

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Sono tornati i pirati. Un gruppo di guerriglieri somali ha assaltato con successo un tanker saudita (nella foto: la MV Sirius Star, 25 membri di equipaggio) carico di petrolio. La nave è grande come una portaerei e può trasportare circa 2 milioni di barili di petrolio. Un gigante dei mari con un preziosissimo carico in mano ai pirati. Sembrerebbe una cronaca d’altri tempi ma in realtà si tratta di un salto di qualità di un fenomeno troppo a lungo sottovalutato. Finora i gruppi armati si potevano classificare come dei semplici predoni e le prede erano pesci piccoli. Nello scorso settembre i pirati erano riusciti a catturare un cargo ucraino (Faina) carico di carri e armi da guerra. Ma da questo momento la faccenda si complica perchè il terrorismo internazionale potrebbe scoprire la via del mare per mettere in crisi il già fragile (dis)ordine internazionale.

L’Unione Europea qualche giorno fa ha dato il via libera per pattugliare la zona, l’abbordaggio della Sirius Star dimostra quanto sia difficile controllare un tratto di mare che si estende dalle coste somale e kenyote fino all’India. Pattugliare l’ingresso del Golfo di Aden infatti si dimostra non sufficiente e limitare il raggio d’azione dell’operazione potrebbe rivelarsi un errore colossale. Un po’ di pazienza e vedrete perchè.

Fictional scenarios e Twin Towers.

Il buon analista cerca di fare corrette e obiettive previsioni. Per questo i think tank e in particolare i servizi segreti si servono di “fictional scenarios”. L’attacco subito dagli Stati Uniti l’11 Settembre 2001 ha rimesso in pista “quelli che leggono e scrivono”, coloro che riescono a rimettere insieme i pezzi del puzzle fino a quel momento inimmaginabile. Dopo il crollo del Muro e il collasso dell’Impero sovietico, la classe dei cremlinologi e dei visionari era stata messa imprudentemente da parte. Poi, una mattina luminosa di settembre, gli Stati Uniti hanno scoperto di avere ancora nemici micidiali, capaci di colpire sul suolo americano usando il fattore sorpresa e il pensiero trasversale: nessuno fino a quel momento si era reso conto della possibilità di usare aerei di linea come missili teleguidati per colpire un obiettivo nel cuore pulsante dell’America, New York (vedi la foto del secondo aereo). Solo dopo il crollo delle Due Torri, dalla letteratura sono riemersi scenari che anticipavano l’operazione dei terroristi ispirati da Bin Laden. Nessuno aveva letto bene i libri e se qualcuno aveva letto, non aveva capito che la realtà a volte supera la fiction.

Così il prezioso lavoro dell’analista, archiviato maldestramente dopo il 1989, si rivelava nuovamente necessario. Ma formare una nuova classe di studiosi, dopo la Guerra Fredda, non era semplice e le difficoltà si sono viste con la guerra in Iraq dove il Pentagono ha condotto bene la campagna militare, ma la Cia - e in generale la Intelligence Community americana - ha fallito sia sulle premesse della guerra (la presenza di armi di distruzione di massa) sia nel post-guerra (il Nation Building) con aspettative completamente errate sul consenso della popolazione irachena, informazioni scarse sui gruppi armati, la sottovalutazione dei potenziali scontri etnici. Il risultato è stato un faticoso e sanguinoso percorso che è stato risolto solo dalla bravura, dal grande esprit de finesse,  del generale David H. Petraeus che ha riportato gli Stati Uniti sul terreno del realismo e riscoperto il teorema delle tre “erre” (3R’S): Rehabilitation, Reconciliation, Reconstruction.

Si è visto, ancora una volta, che la soluzione militare non può prescindere dall’elaborazione intellettuale della guerra. Si è riscoperto il ruolo fondamentale di chi legge e scrive, dei buoni analisti politici e militari. Una apparente digressione letteraria ci aiuta a capire di più. Un eccezionale film, I tre giorni del Condor, illumina sulle capacità di chi “sa leggere e vedere”. ll protagonista del film si chiama Joe Turner è un dipendente della Cia che ha il compito di leggere libri, giornali e riviste. Tutti i dipendenti del suo ufficio, un istituto di ricerche storiche che è una copertura, vengono uccisi. Turner sfugge all’agguato per caso e da quel momento va a caccia della ragione del blitz. Qual è? Grazie alla sua abilità di lettore, Joe Turner ha scoperto che in un romanzo si cela un piano cospirativo internazionale. E per questo deve essere ucciso. Non svelerò come si evolve il film - magnificamente interpretato da Robert Redford che ha al suo fianco una indimenticabile Faye Dunaway - lascio questo piacere a chi non l’ha ancora visto, ma la citazione è necessaria per capire come la fiction sia un serbatoio enorme di ispirazione per l’analisi politica.

Il mestiere di costruire fictional scenarios è fondamentale per prevenire le minacce, anticipare eventi e fare scelte importanti che riguardano il nostro futuro.

I “mostri marini” e la supremazia navale americana

Nei racconti di mare, i mostri sono una presenza costante: draghi, serpenti, piovre giganti, minacciano le navi. Il mare è minaccia e opportunità. Viaggio e rischio. Frontiera e mistero. Potenza e debolezza.

Un saggio di Carl Schmitt, intitolato Terra e Mare, affronta con una lucidità impressionante i vantaggi di essere potenza marittima, il dominio del mare è la premessa necessaria per essere una potenza globale. Dominare i cieli non basta, occorre solcare e sorvegliare le grandi distese d’acqua. La guerra in tre dimensioni è possibile solo se hai la supremazia negli oceani. Il trattato di Schmitt è abbagliante per la sua chiarezza, un vero gioiello di geopolitica scritto nel 1942. E’ un’essenziale lettura per chi vuole comprendere l’importanza della (necessaria) supremazia navale americana. Questa supremazia ci appare necessaria se tiriamo fuori due citazioni letterarie che riguardano l’elemento del mare.

Un film che in molti avranno visto, Syriana - tratto dal libro “See no Evil”, scritto dall’ex agente della Cia Robert Baer - ha in parallelo la storia della formazione di un kamikaze che porta a termine la sua missione suicida con l’assalto a una gasiera (nella foto, l’immagine dell’assalto).

Un altro romanzo molto interessante per le analisi geopolitiche che contiene è “The Scorpion’s Gate”, scritto da Richard A. Clarke. Anche qui viene raccontato l’assalto e il tentativo di far esplodere in porto una gasiera.

Sono soltanto due episodi, ma si possono fare ipotesi tutt’altro che remote e ognuno di voi, cari lettori, può produrne di plausibili se esce dalla debole logica del quotidiano per fare un po’ di esercizio mentale e pensiero trasversale.

Cosa succederebbe se una petroliera delle dimensioni della Sirius Star venisse assaltata, dirottata vicino alle coste e fatta colare a picco? Un disastro naturale di enormi proporzioni. Cosa accadrebbe se la stessa nave fosse improvvisamente fatta esplodere in prossimità di un porto? Chi può escludere che un piano come quello descritto da Clarke in Scorpion’s Gate non sia stato già progettato?

Siamo nel campo dei giochi e degli scenari, finora il terrorismo jihadista e i pirati sono rimasti due entità separate, ma tutti sanno che il corno d’Africa è stato uno degli incubatori di al Qaeda e la storia ci insegna che l’immaginazione è sempre inferiore alla fantasia di chi vuol seminare il terrore.

Uno studio della Rand Corporation dà interessanti dettagli sul fenomeno, ma appare troppo ottimista su un per ora improbabile link tra pirateria e terrorismo. Le operazioni via terra sono meno costose, ma quelle via mare hanno una percentuale di successo potenziale più alta proprio perchè finora la sicurezza in questo settore dell’attività commerciale è stata sottovalutata. L’80 per cento dei traffici mondiali è via mare,  basterebbe un grande attentato a uno degli snodi chiave del sistema portuale per produrre danni incalcolabili.

Al Qaeda dopo aver perso la guerra in Iraq e in vista di un rafforzamento della campagna militare della Nato in Afghanistan potrebbe riprendere la via del mare che aveva già sperimentato nel 2000 con l’attacco alla USS Cole nel porto di Aden (nella foto) e nel 2002 alla petroliera Limburg al largo delle coste dello Yemen.

Negli ultimi mesi l’escalation degli episodi di pirateria e l’abilità crescente nel metodo e nella conduzione degli abbordaggi non aiutano affatto ad essere ottimisti. Non solo si diffondono le armi, ma anche la conoscenza delle tecniche marinare, perfino un sub che trasporta dell’esplosivo ad alto potenziale potrebbe essere minaccia concreta.

Il cacciatorpediniere italiano Durand de la Penne, proprio nelle acque dove si concentra di più il fenomeno, ha appena sventato un assalto di pirati contro una nave battente bandiera panamense. Il fatto non ha provocato alcun serio dibattito politico - nessuna sorpresa - sulla missione Allied Provider e sulla recente decisione dell’Unione Europea di autorizzare una missione navale al largo della Somalia.

Di fronte a questo scenario in rapida evoluzione, la supremazia della forza navale americana è fondamentale per garantire la sicurezza dei traffici commerciali globali. Nessuna potenza è in grado di controllare gli oceani. Il 70 per cento del globo è mare, l’80 per cento delle popolazioni vive in prossimità delle coste. La marina militare americana però dal 1980 ad oggi, nonostante il budget crescente del Pentagono, ha tagliato metà della flotta: da 594 navi alle 280 di oggi, solo durante l’amministrazione Bush sono state dismesse 60 navi. Senza il controllo dei mari, senza la potenza marittima un impero è destinato al declino e anche questo è un fictional scenario sul quale riflettere.

Nov

18

GEOPOLITICAL WEEKLY/On G-20 and GM: Economics, Politics and social stability

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By George Friedman

The G-20 met last Saturday. Afterward, the group issued a meaningless statement and decided to meet again in March 2009, or perhaps later. Clearly, the urgency of October is gone. First, the perception of imminent collapse is past. Politicians are superb seismographs for detecting impending disaster, and these politicians did not act as if they were running out of time. Second, the United States will have a new president in March, and nothing can be done until he defines his policy.

Given the sense in Europe that this financial crisis marked the end of U.S. economic supremacy, it is ironic that the Europeans are waiting on the Americans. One would think they would be using their newfound ascendancy to define the new international system. But the fact is that for all the shouting, little has changed in the international order. The crisis has receded sufficiently that nothing more needs to be done immediately beyond “cooperation,” and nothing can be done until the United States defines what will be done. We feel that our view that the international system received fatal blows Aug. 8, when Russia and Georgia went to war, and Oct. 11, when the G-7 meeting ended without a single integrated solution, remains unchallenged. Now, it is every country for itself.

From Financial Crisis to Cyclical Recession

The financial crisis has been mitigated, if not solved. The problem now is that we are in a cyclical recession, and that every country is trying to figure out how to cope with the recession. Unlike the past two recessions, this one is more global than local. But unlike the 1970s, when recession was global, this one is not accompanied by soaring inflation and interest rates.

All recessions have different dynamics, but all have one thing in common: They impose punishment and discipline on economies run wild. This is happening around the world.

China, for example, faces a serious problem. China is an export-oriented economy whose primary market is the United States. As the United States goes into recession, demand for Chinese goods declines. Chinese businesses have always operated on very tight — sometimes invisible — profit margins designed to emphasize cash flow and to pay off debts to banks. As U.S. demand contracts, many Chinese firms find themselves in untenable positions, without room to decrease prices, lacking operating reserves and insufficiently capitalized. Recessions are designed to cull the weak from the herd, and a huge swath of the Chinese economy is ripe for the culling.

If the world were all about economics, culling is what the Chinese would do. But the world is more complex than that. A culling would lead to massive unemployment. Many Chinese employees live on Third World wages; indeed, the vast majority of Chinese have incomes of less than $1,000 a year. To them, unemployment doesn’t mean problems with their 401k. It means malnutrition and desperation — neither of which is unknown in 20th century Chinese history, including the Communist period. The Chinese government is rightly worried about the social and political consequences of rational economic policies: They might work in the long run, but only if you live that long.

Economic Restructuring vs. Stability

The Chinese have therefore prepared a massive stimulus package that is more of a development program to make up for declining U.S. demand. It aims to keep businesses from failing and spilling millions of angry and hungry workers into the street. For the Chinese, the economic problem creates a much larger and more serious issue. It is also an issue that must be solved quickly, and the amount of time needed outstrips the amount of time available.

This is not only a Chinese problem. Wherever there is an economic downturn, politicians must decide whether society — and their own political futures — can withstand the rigors recessions impose. Recessions occur when, as is inevitable, inefficiencies and irrationalities build up in the financial and economic system. The resulting economic downturn imposes a harsh discipline that destroys the inefficient, encourages everyone to become more efficient, and opens the doors to new businesses using new technologies and business models. The year 2001 smashed the technology sector in the United States, opening the door for Google Inc.

The business cycle works well, but the human costs can be daunting. The collapse of inefficient businesses leaves workers without jobs, investors without money and society less stable than before. The pain needed to rectify China’s economy would be enormous, with devastating consequences for hundreds of millions of Chinese, and probably would lead to social chaos. Beijing is prepared to accept a high degree of economic inefficiency to avoid, or at least postpone, the reckoning. The reckoning always comes, but for most of us, later is better than sooner. Economic rationality takes a back seat to social necessity and political common sense.

Every country in the world is looking inward at the impact of the recession on its economy and measuring its resources. Countries are deciding whether they have the ability to prop up business that should fail, what the social consequences of business failure would be, and whether they should try to use their resources to avoid the immediate pain of recession. This is why the G-20 ended in meaningless platitudes.

Each country is also trying to answer the question of how much pain it — and its regime — can endure. The more pain imposed, the healthier countries will emerge economically — unless of course the pain kills them. Ultimately, the rationality of economics and the reality of society frequently diverge.

Recession and the U.S. Auto Industry

For the United States, this choice has been posed in stark terms with regard to the dilemma of whether the U.S. government should use its resources to rescue the American auto industry. The American auto industry was once the centerpiece of the U.S. economy. That hasn’t been true for a generation, as other industries and services have supplanted it and other countries’ auto industries have surpassed it. Nevertheless, the U.S. auto industry remains important. It might drain the U.S. economy by losing vast amounts of money and destroying the equity held by its investors, but it employs large numbers of people. Perhaps more important, it purchases supplies from literally thousands of U.S. companies.

There can be endless discussions of why the U.S. auto industry is in such trouble. The answer lies not in one place but in many, from the decisions and makeup of management to the unions that control much of the workforce, and from the cost structure inherent in producing cars in the American economy to a simple systemic inability to produce outstanding vehicles. There might be varying degrees of truth to all or some of this, but the fact remains that each of the U.S. carmakers is on the verge of financial collapse.

This is what recessions are supposed to do. As in China and everywhere else, recessions reveal weak businesses and destroy them, freeing up resources for new enterprises. This recession has hit the auto industry hard, and it is unlikely that it is going to survive. The ultimate reason is the same one that destroyed the U.S. steel industry a generation ago: Given U.S. cost structures, producing commodity products is best left to countries with lower wage rates, while more expensive U.S. labor is deployed in more specialized products requiring greater expertise. Thus, there is still steel production in the United States, but it is specialty steel production, not commodity steel. Similarly, there will be specialty auto production in the United States, but commodity auto production will come from other countries.

That sounds easy, but the transition actually will be a bloodletting. Current employees of both the automakers and suppliers will be devastated. Institutions that have lent money to the automakers will suffer massive or total losses. Pensioners might lose pensions and health care benefits, and an entire region of the United States — the industrial Midwest — will be devastated. Something stronger will grow eventually, but not in time for many of the current employees, shareholders and creditors.

Here the economic answer, cull, meets the social answer, stabilize. Policymakers have a decision to make. If the automakers fail now, their drain on the economy will end; the pain will be shorter, if more intense; and new industries would emerge more quickly. But though their drain on the economy would end, the impact of the automakers’ failure on the economy would be seismic. Unemployment would surge, as would bankruptcies of many auto suppliers. Defaults on loans would hit the credit markets. In the Midwest, home prices would plummet and foreclosures would skyrocket. And heaven only knows what the impact on equity markets would be.

In the U.S. case, the healthful purgative of a recession could potentially put the patient in a coma. Few if any believe the U.S. auto industry can survive in its current form. But there is an emerging consensus in Washington that the auto industry must not be allowed to fail now. The argument for spending money on the auto industry is not to save it, but to postpone its failure until a less devastating and inconvenient time. In other words, fearing the social and political consequences of a recession working itself through to its logical conclusion, Washington — like Beijing — wants to spend money it probably won’t recover to postpone the failure. Indeed, governments around the world are considering what failures to tolerate, what failures to postpone, and how much to spend on the latter. General Motors is merely the American case in point.

The Recession in Context

The people arguing for postponement aren’t foolish. The financial system is still working its way through a massive crisis that had little to do with the auto industry. Some traction appears to be occurring; certainly there was no crisis atmosphere at the G-20 meeting. The economy is in recession, but in spite of the inevitable claims that we have never seen anything like this one before, we have. There is always some variable that swings to an extreme — this time, it is consumer spending — but we are still well within the framework of recent recessions.

Consider the equity markets, which we regard as a long-term measure of the market’s evaluation of the state of the economy. In January 2000, the S&P 500 peaked at 1,455. This was the top of the market. In July 2002, 18 months later, the S&P bottomed out at 935. Over the next five years it rose to 1,519 in July 2007, the height for this cycle. It fell from this point until Nov. 12, 2008, when it closed at 852.30. This past Friday, it was at 873.29.

We do not know what the market will do in the future. There are people much smarter than we are who claim to know that. What we do know is what it has done. And what it has done this time — so far — is almost exactly what it did last time, except that in 2000-2002 it took 18 months to do it, while this time it was done in about 16 and a half months (assuming it bottomed out Nov. 12). But even if the market didn’t bottom out then, and it falls to 775, for example, it will have lost 50 percent of its value from the peak. This would be more than in 2000-2002, but not unprecedented.

The point we are making here is that if we regard the equity markets as a long-term seismograph of the economy, then so far, despite all the storm and stress, the markets — and therefore the economy — remain within the general pattern of the 2000-2002 market at the 2001 recession. That recession certainly was unpleasant, what with the devastation of the tech sector, but the economy survived. At the same time, however, it is clear that things are balanced on a knife’s edge. Another hundred points’ fall on the S&P, and the markets will be telling us that the world is in a very different place indeed.

A massive bankruptcy in the automotive sector could certainly set the stage for an economic renaissance in the next generation. But at this particular moment in time (it’s no coincidence that the crisis in the U.S. automotive industry comes as we enter a recession), a wave of bankruptcies would dramatically deepen the recession. This probably would be reflected by the destruction of trillions more in net worth in the equity markets.

There is a powerful counterargument to bailing out the U.S. auto industry. This argument holds that the auto industry is a drain on the U.S. economy, that it will never be globally competitive, and that if it is dragged back from the edge, no one will then say it is time to push it to the edge and over. The next time it will be on the brink will be during the next recession, and the same argument to save it will be used. In due course, the United States, like China, will be so terrified of the social and political consequences of business failure that it will maintain Chinese-like state owned enterprises, full of employees and generation-old plants and business models. Clearly, short-run solutions can easily become long-term albatrosses.

The only possible solution would be a bailout followed by a Washington-administered restructuring of the auto industry. This causes us to imagine a collaboration between the auto industry’s current management and Washington administrators that would finally put Detroit on a path to where it can compete with Toyota. Frankly, the mind boggles at this. But boggle though we might, hitting the economy with another massive financial default, a wave of bankruptcies, massive unemployment surges and another blow to housing prices boggles our mind even more.

The geopolitical problem confronting the world at the moment is that it has been forced to offer massive support to the global financial system with sovereign wealth — e.g., via taxes and currency printing presses. The world might just have squeaked through that crisis. Now, the world is in an inevitable recession and businesses are on the brink of failure. A wave of massive business failures on top of the financial crisis might well move the global system to a very different place. Therefore, each nation, by itself and indifferent to others, is in the process of figuring out how to postpone these failures to a more opportune time — or to never. This will build in long-term inefficiencies to the global economy, but right now everyone will be quite content with that.

Thus the financial crisis became a recession, and the recession triggered bankruptcies. And because no one wants bankruptcies right now, everyone who can is using taxpayer dollars to protect the taxpayer from the consequences of mismanagement. And the last thing any one cared about was the G-20 concept for the future of the economic system.

Copyright 2008 Stratfor

Nov

17

Il New New Deal di Obama e…la guerra

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Appena arrivato in redazione stamattina ho cominciato la mia liturgica lettura dei quotidiani, ma l’ho subito interrotta per passare a Time, che in tutte le sue quattro edizioni (America, Europa, Asia, Sud Pacifico) ha la stessa copertina: un Barack Obama in versione Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Si tratta di un gioco divertente, è la rielaborazione di una nota immagine di FDR, eccola:

Il colpo d’occhio è assicurato, ma al di là dell’abilità grafica in cui Time eccelle sempre, ciò che ha destato la mia attenzione è il parallelismo con il New Deal di FDR e il supposto New New Deal di Obama. Paragone ardito? Direi spericolato, perchè è vero che gli Stati Uniti sono in bad times, ma il “nuovo contratto” di Roosevelt, figlio del grande crollo del 1929, di una crescita reale del paese che faceva a pugni con la speculazione di borsa, è un’altra cosa rispetto a quello che comincia a intravedersi nella nascente amministrazione Obama.

Roosevelt poteva contare sul genio di John Maynard Keynes, Obama francamente questo talento non ce l’ha a disposizione. Qualche settimana fa, durante un viaggio a Washington, qualcuno che frequenta la stanza dei bottoni, mi ha detto che il Keynes del Ventunesimo secolo sarebbe il Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Il mio ottimismo a quel punto è stato temperato da un sano e realista scetticismo. E’ vero che il Fmi resta il miglior punto di osservazione e analisi dell’economia mondiale, ma le sue ricette non sono mai state risolutive (chiedere per esempio all’Argentina per ulteriori delucidazioni).

Dunque Obama non può giocare la carta di Keynes sul tavolo e forse neppure una dottrina neokeynesiana, quella per intenderci che è saltata fuori dal cilindro del vertice del G20 a Washington. Un vasto piano di interventi pubblici, salvataggi e infrastrutture, forse può dare sollievo ed evitare drammatiche conseguenze (per esempio il fallimento di General Motors che è alle porte), ma se prendiamo come un’icona il New Deal rooseveltiano, allora dobbiamo essere prudenti. Certamente FDR fu un uomo coraggioso e pragmatico e Keynes un genio assoluto, ma i risultati furono ben al di sotto delle aspettative e della vulgata che continua a diffondersi.

La lettura storica di quel periodo però è tutt’altro che luminosa. Gli economisti della Scuola Austriaca, guidati da Murray N. Rothbard, furono i primi a rileggere la storia del New Deal in una chiave tutta nuova. Il piano di FDR nel 1937 era già fallito, gli Stati Uniti dopo un balzo dell’occupazione (circa tre milioni di posti i più) nel 1939 ripiombarono nella depressione e oltre 10 milioni di americani in quel periodo erano di nuovo senza lavoro.

Il New Deal e gli Stati Uniti in realtà furono salvati dalla guerra.

Credere che con la presidenza Obama i conflitti del presente siano in via di soluzione e quelli del futuro meno di un presagio è un sogno, una pericolosa utopia. La guerra purtroppo è un dato persistente della storia dell’umanità e basta dare un’occhiata all’andamento della spesa militare e dei conflitti per rendersene conto.

Il bilancio del Pentagono a cui Obama vuol metter mano, per esempio, è di quasi 650 miliardi dollari annui e difficilmente il nuovo presidente potrà tagliarne un quarto come annunciato dal democratico Barney Frank. Potrà forse ridurlo di qualche decina di miliardi, ma mettendo in gioco la supremazia americana nel settore della ricerca e dello sviluppo nonchè della sicurezza internazionale che attende, prima che sia troppo tardi, un altro tipo di New Deal: quello sul controllo della proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa.

I conflitti regionali si stanno frammentando ulteriormente e i gruppi armati in realtà si stanno moltiplicando. Secondo i dati del Sipri di Stoccolma nel 2007 ci sono stati 14 conflitti in 13 paesi e la diminuzione della violenza nel 2002 e nel 2004 ha avuto un’impennata nel 2005.

La spesa militare secondo il Sipri Yearbook del 2008 è cresciuta in termini reali di oltre il 6 per cento rispetto al 2006 e del 45 per cento dal 1998. La regione dove l’aumento della spesa dal 1998 al 2007 è cresciuta di più è l’Europa dell’Est con un balzo record del 162 per cento. E’ la Russia a guidare l’ondata del riarmo nella regione con l’86 per cento della spesa complessiva e un incremento del 13 per cento nel 2007.

Come spiega Robert Kagan nel suo ultimo libro, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, il vecchio mondo, quello reale, è tornato e lo scenario in cui si trova la presidenza Obama è sul piano della stabilità internazionale fragilissimo e le analogie con la presidenza di FDR non riguardano tanto l’economia (che rispetto agli inizi del Novecento è più globalizzata, finanziarizzata e flessibile), quanto il ritorno del nazionalismo, delle dottrine delle sfere d’influenza, e la moltiplicazione degli arsenali convenzionali e non.

Anche il New New Deal di Obama sarà salvato (o sconfitto) dalla guerra?

Nov

11

Geopolitical Weekly. Iran returns to the global stage

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By George Friedman

After a three-month hiatus, Iran seems set to re-emerge near the top of the U.S. agenda. Last week, the Iranian government congratulated U.S. President-elect Barack Obama on his Nov. 4 electoral victory. This marks the first time since the Iranian Revolution that such greetings have been sent.

While it seems trivial, the gesture is quite significant. It represents a diplomatic way for the Iranians to announce that they regard Obama’s election as offering a potential breakthrough in 30 years of U.S. relations with Iran. At his press conference, Obama said he does not yet have a response to the congratulatory message, and reiterated that he opposes Iran’s nuclear program and its support for terrorism. The Iranians returned to criticizing Obama after this, but without their usual passion.

The Warming of U.S.-Iranian Relations

The warming of U.S.-Iranian relations did not begin with Obama’s election; it began with the Russo-Georgian War. In the weeks and months prior to the August war, the United States had steadily increased tensions with Iran. This process proceeded along two tracks.

On one track, the United States pressed its fellow permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and Germany to join Washington in imposing additional sanctions on Iran. U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns joined a July 19 meeting between EU foreign policy adviser Javier Solana and Iranian national security chief Saeed Jalili, which was read as a thaw in the American position on Iran. The Iranian response was ambiguous, which is a polite way of saying that Tehran wouldn’t commit to anything. The Iranians were given two weeks after the meeting to provide an answer or face new sanctions.

A second track consisted of intensified signals of potential U.S. military action. Recall the carefully leaked report published in The New York Times on June 20 regarding Israeli preparations for airstrikes against Iran. According to U.S. — not Israeli — sources, the Israeli air force rehearsed for an attack on Iran by carrying out a simulated attack over Greece and the eastern Mediterranean Sea involving more than 100 aircraft.

At the same time, reports circulated about Israeli planes using U.S. airfields in Iraq in preparation for an attack on Iran. The markets and oil prices — at a high in late July and early August — were twitching with reports of a potential blockade of Iranian ports, while the Internet was filled with lurid reports of a fleet of American and French ships on its way to carry out the blockade.

The temperature in U.S.-Iranian relations was surging, at least publicly. Then Russia and Georgia went to war, and Iran suddenly dropped off the U.S. radar screen. Washington went quiet on the entire Iranian matter, and the Israelis declared that Iran was two to five years from developing a nuclear device (as opposed to a deliverable weapon), reducing the probability of an Israeli airstrike. From Washington’s point of view, the bottom fell out of U.S. policy on Iran when the Russians and Georgians opened fire on each other.

The Georgian Connection

There were two reasons for this.

First, Washington had no intention of actually carrying out airstrikes against Iran. The United States was far too tied down in other areas to do that. Nor did the Israelis intend to attack. The military obstacles to what promised to be a multiday conventional strike against Iranian targets more than a thousand miles away were more than a little daunting. Nevertheless, generating that threat of such a strike suited U.S. diplomacy. Washington wanted not only to make Iran feel threatened, but also to increase Tehran’s isolation by forging the U.N. Security Council members and Germany into a solid bloc imposing increasingly painful sanctions on Iran.

Once the Russo-Georgian War broke out, however, and the United States sided publicly and vigorously with Georgia, the chances of the Russians participating in such sanctions against Iran dissolved. As the Russians rejected the idea of increased sanctions, so did the Chinese. If the Russians and Chinese weren’t prepared to participate in sanctions, no sanctions were possible, because the Iranians could get whatever they needed from these two countries.

The second reason was more important. As U.S.-Russian relations deteriorated, each side looked for levers to control the other. For the Russians, one of the best levers with the Americans was the threat of selling weapons to Iran. From the U.S. point of view, not only would weapon sales to Iran make it more difficult to attack Iran, but the weapons would find their way to Hezbollah and other undesirable players. The United States did not want the Russians selling weapons, but the Russians were being unpredictable. Therefore, while the Russians had the potential to offer Iran weapons, the United States wanted to reduce Iran’s incentive for accepting those weapons.

The Iranians have a long history with the Russians, including the occupation of northern Iran by Russia during World War II. The Russians are close to Iran, and the Americans are far away. Tehran’s desire to get closer to the Russians is therefore limited, although under pressure Iran would certainly purchase weapons from Russia, just as it has purchased nuclear technology in the past. With the purchase of advanced weapons would come Russian advisers — something that might not be to Iran’s liking unless it were absolutely necessary.

The United States did not want to give Iran a motive for closing an arms deal with Russia, leaving aside the question of whether the Russian threat to sell weapons was anything more than a bargaining chip with the Americans. With Washington rhetorically pounding Russia, pounding Iran at the same time made no sense. For one thing, the Iranians, like the Russians, knew the Americans were spread too thin. Also, the United States suddenly had to reverse its position on Iran. Prior to Aug. 8, Washington wanted the Iranians to feel embattled; after Aug. 8, the last thing the United States wanted was for the Iranians to feel under threat. In a flash, Iran went from being the most important issue on the table to being barely mentioned.

Iran and a Formal U.S. Opening

Different leaks about Iran started to emerge. The Bush administration posed the idea of opening a U.S. interest section in Iran, the lowest form of diplomatic recognition (but diplomatic recognition nonetheless). This idea had been floated June 23, but now it was being floated after the Russo-Georgian War. The initial discussion of the interest section seemed to calm the atmosphere, but the idea went away.

Then, just before U.S. presidential elections in November, the reports re-emerged, this time in the context of a new administration. According to the leaks, U.S. President George W. Bush intended to open diplomatic relations with Iran after the election regardless of who won, in order to free the next president from the burden of opening relations with Iran. In other words, if Obama won, Bush was prepared to provide cover with the American right on an opening to Iran.

If we take these leaks seriously — and we do — this means Bush has concluded that a formal opening to Iran is necessary. Indeed, the Bush administration has been operating on this premise ever since the U.S. troop surge in Iraq. Two things were clear to the Bush administration in 2007: first, that the United States had to make a deal with the Iraqi Sunni nationalist insurgents; and second, that while the Iranians might not be able to impose a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, Tehran had enough leverage with enough Iraq Shiite factions to disrupt Iraq, and thus disrupt the peace process. Therefore, without an understanding with Iran, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be difficult and full of potentially unpleasant consequences, regardless of who is in the White House.

The issue of Iran’s nuclear program was part of this negotiation. The Iranians were less interested in building a nuclear weapon than in having the United States believe they were building one. As Tehran learned by observing the U.S. reaction to North Korea, Washington has a nuclear phobia. Tehran thus hoped it could use the threat of a nuclear program to force the United States to be more forthcoming on Iranian interests in Iraq, a matter of fundamental importance to Iran. At the same time, the United States had no appetite for bombing Iran, but used the threat of attacks as leverage to get the Iranians to be more tractable.

The Iranians in 2007 withdrew their support from destabilizing elements in Iraq like Muqtada al-Sadr, contributing to a dramatic decline in violence in Iraq. In return, Iran wanted to see an American commitment to withdraw from Iraq on a set timetable. Washington was unprepared to make that commitment. Current talks over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Washington and Baghdad revolve around just this issue. The Iraqi Shia are demanding a fixed timetable, while the Kurds and Sunnis — not to mention foreign governments like Saudi Arabia — seem to be more comfortable with a residual U.S. force in place to guarantee political agreements.

The Shia are clearly being influenced by Iran on the SOFA issue, as their interests align. The Sunnis and Kurds, however, fear this agreement. In their view, the withdrawal of U.S. forces on a fixed timetable will create a vacuum in Iraq that the Iranians eventually will fill, at the very least by having a government in Baghdad that Tehran can influence. The Kurds and Sunnis are deeply concerned about their own security in such an event. Therefore, the SOFA is not moving toward fruition.

The Iraqi Stumbling Block

There is a fundamental issue blocking the agreement. The United States has agreed to an Iraqi government that is neutral between Washington and Tehran. That is a major defeat for the United States, but an unavoidable one under the circumstances. But a U.S. withdrawal without a residual force means that the Iranians will be the dominant force in the region, and this is not something United States — along with the Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis, the Saudis and Israelis — wants. Therefore the SOFA remains in gridlock, with the specter of Russian-Iranian ties complicating the situation.

Obama’s position during the election was that he favored a timed U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but he was ambiguous about whether he would want a residual force kept there. Clearly, the Shia and Iranians are more favorably inclined toward Obama than Bush because of Obama’s views on a general withdrawal by a certain date and the possibility of a complete withdrawal. This means that Obama must be extremely careful politically. The American political right is wounded but far from dead, and it would strike hard if it appeared Obama was preparing to give Iran a free hand in Iraq.

One possible way for Obama to proceed would be to keep Russia and Iran from moving closer together. Last week, Obama’s advisers insisted their camp has made no firm commitments on ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, repudiating claims by Polish President Lech Kaczynski that the new U.S. president-elect had assured him of firm support during a Nov. 8 phone conversation. This is an enormous issue for the Russians.

It is not clear in how broad of a context the idea of avoiding firm commitments on BMD was mentioned, but it might go a long way toward keeping Russia happy and therefore making Moscow less likely to provide aid — material or psychological — to the Iranians. Making Iran feel as isolated as possible, without forcing it into dependence on Russia, is critical to a satisfactory solution for the United States in Iraq.

Complicating this are what appear to be serious political issues in Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been attacked for his handling of the economy. He has seen an ally forced from the Interior Ministry and the head of the Iranian central bank replaced. Ahmadinejad has even come under criticism for his views on Israel, with critics saying that he has achieved nothing and lost much through his statements. He therefore appears to be on the defensive.

The gridlock in Baghdad is not over a tedious diplomatic point, but over the future of Iraq and its relation to Iran. At the same time, there appears to be a debate going on in Iran over whether Ahmadinejad’s policies have improved the outlook for Iran’s role in Iraq. Finally, any serious thoughts the Iranians might have had about cozying up to the Russians have dissipated since August, and Obama might have made them even more distant. Still, Obama’s apparent commitment to a timed, complete withdrawal of U.S. forces poses complexities. His advisers have already hinted at flexibility on these issues.

We think that Bush will — after all his leaks — smooth the way for Obama by opening diplomatic relations with Iran. From a political point of view, this will allow Bush to take some credit for any breakthrough. But from the point of view of U.S. national interest, going public with conversations that have taken place privately over the past couple of years (along with some formal, public meetings in Baghdad) makes a great deal of sense. It could possibly create an internal dynamic in Iran that would force Ahmadinejad out, or at least weaken him. It could potentially break the logjam over the SOFA in Baghdad, and it could even stabilize the region.

The critical question will not be the timing of the U.S. withdrawal. It will be the residual force — whether an American force of 20,000 to 40,000 troops will remain to guarantee that Iran does not have undue influence in Iraq, and that Sunni and Kurdish interests are protected. Obama promised to end the war in Iraq, and he promised to withdraw all U.S. troops. He might have to deal with the fact that he can have the former only if he compromises on the latter. But he has left himself enough room for maneuver that he can do just that.

It seems clear that Iran will now return to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. If Bush re-establishes formal diplomatic relations with Iran at some level, and if Obama responds to Iranian congratulations in a positive way, then an interesting dynamic will be in place well before Inauguration Day. The key will be the Nov. 10 meeting between Bush and Obama.

Bush wants to make a move that saves some of his legacy; Obama knows he will have to deal with Iran and even make concessions. Obama also knows the political price he will have to pay if he does. If Bush makes the first move, it will make things politically easier for Obama. Obama can afford to let Bush take the first step if it makes the subsequent steps easier for the Obama administration. But first, there must be an understanding between Bush and Obama. Then can there be an understanding between the United States and Iran, and then there can be an understanding among Iraqi Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. And then history can move on.

There are many understandings in the way of history.

© Stratfor

Nov

8

L’Iran attacca Obama. Welcome back to the Real World…

Filed Under America, Medio Oriente | 3 Comments

Il presidente in pectore Barack Obama ieri ha tenuto la sua prima vera conferenza stampa. A dire il vero, una semplice chiacchierata senza nessuna indicazione precisa, tranne una: Obama ha ammonito l’Iran invitandolo a non proseguire il suo programma nucleare. I sognatori avranno pensato di essere capitati sul canale sbagliato, in realtà a parlare era proprio lui, Barack. Il quale a stretto giro di posta ha fatto il primo test con il regime di Teheran. Via Isna, l’agenzia di stampa degli studenti iraniani, apprendiamo che il presidente del Parlamento Iraniano non ha gradito la prima esternazione di Obama.

Ecco il passaggio chiave di Larijani sull’agenzia Isna:

Obama knows that superficial changes won’t bear fruit, changes must have strategic basis

Mi pare abbastanza. I sogni sono già finiti, ricomincia il duro confronto tra potenze. Welcome back to the Real World…

Nov

7

Obama and the Presidential Security Challenge

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By Fred Burton and Ben West

The U.S. presidential campaign trail presents a host of challenges for the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protective detail assigned to cover the presidential candidates, something we’ve discussed previously. Major presidential candidates have been afforded USSS protection since the 1968 assassination of Robert Kennedy at a campaign event. Due to the nature of modern presidential campaigns, the candidates’ schedules are packed with events that often start at breakfast and continue long after dinner. Candidates also hopscotch across the country, often visiting several cities in a day and sometimes visiting multiple venues in the same city.

The Security Challenge of Campaign Season

In the last weeks before the Nov. 4 election, the campaign of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama hit several different cities in one day, meaning that several teams of advance agents were deployed around the country at any given time. For example, on Nov. 3, Obama visited Jacksonville, Fla.; Charlotte, N.C.; and Manassas Park, Va. Campaign managers often adjust itineraries on the fly to meet the needs of the campaign.

This tempo constantly forces protection agents into new environments with very little time to plan and implement security measures. Wherever Obama traveled during the campaign, USSS agents would send advance teams to scout airports and motorcade routes, plan security for campaign sites, conduct liaison with local police and keep tabs on any persons of interest during the visit. The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support.

Due to the nature of political campaigns, once a candidate like Obama lands and safely arrives at an event location, there is frequently tremendous exposure to the public. This is true not just on stage behind a podium but also as the candidate works the crowd, shaking hands, kissing babies and talking to voters. As seen during the May 1972 attempted assassination of George Wallace and the later attempts against presidents Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, it is during these times of close interaction with the public that a VIP is at the highest risk. Would-be assassins can use the crowd for camouflage and quickly get a close shot at the VIP, leaving little time for agents to respond to the threat. Because of this, working the crowd is a difficult task and one protection agents hate. Fortunately for the Obama protective detail, with the election period over they will find themselves in these kinds of situations less frequently.

Finally, there is the issue of the USSS being stretched very thin due to the nature of an election season. The USSS is charged with protecting former presidents and first ladies as well as, of course, the first family and the vice president. But during an election season, the presidential and vice presidential candidates are also assigned a security detail. Due to the perceived threat against Obama, a detail equivalent to a full presidential protection team was assigned to him. Such a high level of protection is unprecedented for a presidential candidate, and it helped stretch the USSS very thin.

Now that the election is over, Obama’s schedule will be greatly simplified, and it will take far less manpower to cover him. Obama will certainly have some travel, but the majority of this time probably will be spent between Chicago and Washington. This will allow the USSS agents protecting him to catch a breather and to establish a more secure, stable perimeter around the president-elect. Sen. John McCain’s protective detail also will be eliminated, freeing up even more bodies. The relative calm of the transition period will end with the January 2009 inauguration ceremony and festivities, the next serious headache the USSS will face.

Past Threats to U.S. Presidents

U.S. presidents always face an array of threats. Four U.S. presidents have been assassinated: Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William McKinley and John F. Kennedy. Assassination attempts have frequently occurred, with every president since Richard Nixon having been targeted for assassination, with some threats more credible than others.

The tremendous amount of power and symbolism of the office makes U.S. presidents prime targets for assassination. Obama will be no exception. But in addition to bearing the title of president, Obama also will be the first black president — something that introduces a whole new and more serious threat matrix. Obama uniquely faces a threat from white supremacist groups, some of which believe a black president should be killed.

Two plots to assassinate Obama were broken up during the campaign season, and several more remain under investigation. During his campaign, Obama was the target of a few threats that attracted considerable press coverage but in the end didn’t amount to much. Press portrayals aside, reviewing the facts establishes that these incidents were certainly not viable threats to Obama.

In one instance, authorities announced in late August that three Colorado men had been arrested after police found illegal weapons and methamphetamines on the men. During interrogation, federal agents learned that the group of methamphetamine users had discussed harming Obama. One of the men wore a swastika ring, indicating a possible link to the neo-Nazi movement. In the end, though, the three men were indicted on drugs and weapons charges alone, as the U.S. attorney overseeing the case said the evidence was insufficient to charge the men with conspiring to do bodily harm to a presidential candidate. While the group had discussed the topic, it apparently had made no overt acts in furtherance of an attempt, an element required to bring conspiracy charges.

In another instance, two young men from Tennessee and Arkansas who had conspired to go on a crime spree that would end with an attempt on Obama’s life were arrested Oct. 22. Their scheme was outlandish from the start, and included robbing a gun store, killing 88 blacks and beheading 14 (both significant numbers to the white supremacist movement) and then performing their coup de grace on the presidential candidate while dressed in white tuxedos and top hats. As it was, the two managed only to be scared off by dogs during an attempted home burglary, shoot out a window of a nearby African-American church and draw neo-Nazi symbols on their car in sidewalk chalk. The two had met to discuss their plans on a Web site associated with white supremacists and skinheads. While their plan hardly got off of the ground, the two did show a high level of enthusiasm for their mission that certainly could be replicated within the white supremacist movement.

White Supremacists and an African-American President

The Obama presidency occurs against the unfortunate backdrop of a history of assassinations of prominent African-American leaders in the United States. These have included Medgar Evers, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. (Evers’ assassin was a Ku Klux Klan member, while King’s assassin, James Earl Ray, at the very least harbored racist sentiments.)

Broadly, there are three schools of thought among white supremacist groups on how to view Obama’s election.

The first school of thought is that someone should (or will) threaten Obama because of his race since his election has outraged white supremacists. While publicly making such a call is grounds for arrest, plenty of white supremacist blogs and Web message boards talk of the inevitability of an attack on Obama in a very suggestive way. This school of thought believes that such an attack would inflame racial tensions, sparking riots along the lines of those that followed the 1968 King assassination. Such violence would be viewed as positive in this thinking, as open combat between whites and blacks would bring their ideology to the forefront.

The second school, reflecting perhaps the most widely echoed dogma within the white supremacist movement, believes that an Obama presidency benefits their movement since it will serve as a wake-up call to white America. Once Americans of European descent realize how far they have fallen now that a black man has been elected to the most powerful office in the country, goes the argument, they will flock to join white supremacist groups to reassert their power. An Obama presidency, this school argues, is thereby good for the white supremacists since it would swell their membership rolls and give them more influence and publicity. Former Louisiana state representative and Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke supports this line as does fellow white supremacist leader Tom Metzger.

This second school of thought is bolstered by the argument that the other candidates weren’t going to be any better, as they were all under the influence of the even more despised Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). Adherents of this anti-Semitic conspiracy theory believe that Jews pull the strings behind a puppet U.S. government. Obama, in their opinion, is at least not under the heavy influence of Jewish interests. This line of reasoning is in no way an endorsement of Obama, but more of an instance of them making the best of a situation they see as terrible for whites in the United States.

The third and last school of thought holds that the U.S. government, which is secretly controlled by the ZOG, is plotting to attack Obama itself. This group believes ZOG will blame white supremacists for the killing, which they will use as an excuse to clamp down on white supremacist hate speech as well as gun ownership.

Conspiracies and Lone Wolves

The USSS is much more adept at countering group conspiracies than lone wolf actors. Lone wolves are very, very difficult to uncover, especially if they remain isolated and tell no one of their plans. Groups are much easier to track, as their movements are more noticeable and their operational security weaker, as all members must remain silent to keep the plot clandestine. The money trail is also a dead giveaway for groups, as outside organizations will often fund their operations, helping them buy equipment and supplies in preparation for an attack.

Considering this, white supremacist groups are under very tight surveillance by U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, and scrutiny of their activities will only increase as Obama takes office. As seen in the Tennessee case, online discussions and postings can come back to haunt Internet collaborators. It would be very difficult for even a small group to operate below the radar of not just the USSS but also the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the FBI, the CIA and the National Security Agency, all of which will have their proverbial ear to the ground to protect the president — one of the most important national security missions these groups have.

The lone wolf, in the end, poses the most likely threat to Obama, and to any target for that matter. The lone wolf’s ability to act alone, keeping his intentions, activities and whereabouts to himself, makes it very difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify a threat before it is too late. But the lone wolf also must be very smart and have some access to resources such as weapons and vehicles — characteristics severely lacking in the two cases above that targeted Obama.

The real threat emerges when intent and capability are joined. White supremacists have the intent, but so far have not exhibited capability. We would expect federal authorities to uncover many more plots to attack the president that have been hatched by white supremacist ideologues. So long as they remain amateurish like those in Denver and Tennessee, the president remains secure from the white supremacist threat. But if a combination of ideology and ability to act as a lone wolf comes along, the threat level rises.

Given the ties that figures within the white supremacist movement like Duke have with hostile foreign countries such as Russia and Iran, a scenario comes to mind in which a foreign country could secretly fund and train a low-level member or simply a sympathizer of the white supremacist movement to carry out an assassination. Duke has praised Russia’s nationalist movement and has traveled there several times. He also attended a 2006 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran, Iran, where he was in general agreement with the Iranian regime.

Indications of such foreign connections have come up during investigations of past assassinations. Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to obtain Cuban and Soviet visas in Mexico City before he assassinated JFK. Recently, declassifications have tied Oswald to known KGB assassin Valery Kostikov. While these circumstances alone are not enough to conclusively link outside meddling with the JFK assassination, they certainly do raise questions. Additionally, Ray fled to Europe on a fake Canadian passport after killing King. He was arrested at London’s Heathrow Airport two months after the King assassination with large amounts of cash, indicating Ray had outside help in the killing.

Presidential security is a serious national security matter. A successful (or even unsuccessful) attack on a president causes instability in the United States and in the wider world. And given the especially delicate balance that the United States, Russia and countries of the Middle East are striking right now, an attack on the president would destabilize U.S. foreign policy and have a heightened impact on national security. Domestically, the assassination of the country’s first black president would run the risk of devastating race relations — and white supremacist movements see themselves as substantially benefiting from racial strife.

© Stratfor

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