Tre morti a Sarroch. Raffineria Saras, famiglia Moratti. E’ la più grande del Mediterraneo, se lanciate lo sguardo mentre siete in fase d’atterraggio sull’aeroporto di Cagliari-Elmas potete vederla nella sua immensa potenza. E’ un groviglio di tubi e ciminiere e cisterne che avvolge la mia terra-madre come una piovra gigante. E’ un mostro che avviluppa e soffoca uno dei posti più belli del mondo.

Tre giovani morti a Sarroch. Si interrogheranno pensose le istituzioni, la destra e la sinistra, i sindacati, gli stessi cittadini di Sarroch. Si chiederanno se è ancora pos­sibile lo scambio silente tra lavoro e inquinamento, se il petrolio vale questa morte visibile e la malattia invisibile, se l’armonia dell’ambiente e la vita di una comunità che non riesce ad alzare la testa pos­sono essere cedute a una politica industriale incapace di immaginare un’alternativa per la Sardegna. C’è chi dice no a tutto e pensa a un’arcadia impos­sibile dove i sardi o sono pastori o sono camerieri.

C’è chi dice no e senza lo straccio di un’idea fa bella figura ma è il servo dello status quo. Continuate pure a bruciare petrolio e vite. Continuate pure a dire no. Il no totale e il no della realpolitik di piccolo cabotaggio senza immaginazione. Non si discute di riconversione energetica, di ricerca e investimenti e si rifiuta un ormai indispensabile dibattito sul futuro dei pros­simi trent’anni, sul nucleare — unica fonte di energia ad emis­sioni zero di Co2 — ma si lascia divampare, in fiamme altis­sime, l’avvenire. Oh, bravi, fate partire pure in velocità la vibrante protesta contro la modernità , le energie alternative e la scis­sione dell’atomo (un mix neces­sario e pos­sibile), ma lasciate che la lenta e inesorabile scis­sione dei cervelli in nome del petrolio e dei posti di lavoro tutti maledetti e subito continui senza uno sguardo profondo verso il domani. Clap clap clap. E’ l’ignoranza che avanza, insieme alla disoccupazione e al suo enorme potere di ricatto che non dà mai la pos­sibilità di riscatto.

Si interrogheranno, tutti, oh sì se lo faranno, ma solo per un attimo. Poi, tutti insieme oniricamente, automaticamente, pavlovianamente, le istituzioni, i sindacati, i cittadini di Sarroch abbandoneranno quegli strani pensieri al loro destino così simile a quello del petrolio: saranno inviati al processo di raffinazione e inesorabilmente, ancora una volta, bruciati.

Alla borsa della politica si clas­sifica come un investimento di medio-lungo termine. Alle elezioni europee conta di prendere qualche voto in più rispetto alle politiche. Pier Ferdinando Casini, azionista di maggioranza dell’Udc, guarda fiducioso l’andamento del suo titolo sui listini elettorali. E in questa intervista con Panorama svela le future strategie di collocamento.

Lei è stato pre­sidente della Camera. Oggi al suo posto c’è Gianfranco Fini che tuona contro le leggi ispirate da principi religiosi. Il cattolico Casini che ne pensa?

Penso che Fini abbia un’esigenza di visibilità, come hanno tutti i pre­sidenti della Camera, l’avevo anch’io. Nel suo caso è accentuata dal fatto che il suo partito è diventato quello di Silvio Berlusconi. Non mi scandalizzo per il fatto che intervenga spesso, non lo biasimo neanche. Mi dispiace però che affronti con una disinvoltura ecces­siva temi etici che riguardano la sensibilità molto forte di persone e gruppi pre­senti anche in Parlamento. Il suo richiamo allo Stato etico era fuori luogo e quello alle leggi costruite su pre­cetti religiosi è lunare. La laicità dello Stato èun dato di fatto, ma mi pare che Fini pensi a uno Stato laico in cui non c’è spazio nè per Dio nè per la religione. E’ un laicismo di stato che nemmeno Nicolas Sarkozy in Francia più accetta. Noi abbiamo sostenuto in campagna elettorale, contrariamente al Pdl e al Pd, che i temi eticamente sensibili non potevano restare fuori dalla campagna elettorale, sono temi che riguardano la vita e la morte delle persone. I fatti ci hanno dato ragione.

Quelle di Fini sono parole che pos­sono innescare una crisi di rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa?

Non penso che quelle parole siano prese così sul serio oltretevere, dove capiscono perfettamente chi determina oggi la politica italiana. Usare questi temi per farsi una campagna personale francamente èsbagliato. Lo dico con amicizia verso Fini, in molte occasioni condivido le sue esternazioni: quando dice, per esempio, che non si può fare la campagna elettorale sulla pelle degli immigrati. Bene, allora non si può fare neppure sulla pelle della Chiesa e dei cattolici.

Questi sono temi che fanno parte del patrimonio ideale del centrodestra. E’ un elettorato che per l’Udc è ancora un riferimento?

Più che un elettorato di centrodestra, c’è un elettorato ampio di centro che guarda pre­valentemente a destra. Tutti hanno capito che le ragioni che ci hanno portato a dire no all’omologazione nel partito unico di Berlusconi sono valide e non pre­testuose. La stessa metodologia con cui è nato e vive il Pdl è emblematica: non è un partito, è Berlusconi. Faccio due esempi. Uno, il rapporto con la Lega. Ho sempre detto che questa formula di governo avrebbe di fatto dato alla Lega la golden share della maggioranza. E non ci siamo sbagliati: dal federalismo alle quote latte, all’immigrazione, èla Lega che detta i temi della politica italiana. Secondo, il Pdl ha proposto di levare le pre­ferenze al Parlamento europeo, noi siamo dall’altra parte. Noi vogliamo le pre­ferenze e le vogliamo anche nella legge elettorale nazionale. Restituire la politica al cittadino significa fargli scegliere i parlamentari.

Lei si è allontanato da Berlusconi ma si sente ancora vicino all’elettorato di centrodestra?

Ho un’idea diversa della politica rispetto a quella di Berlusconi. Non mi sono personalmente nè allontanato nè avvicinato. Con Silvio ho sempre un buon rapporto personale, però io ho un’idea diversa del futuro del Paese: non vedo bene il bipartitismo, nè l’uomo solo al comando, e ho un’idea diversa del Parlamento. Mi interes­sano tutti i moderati, ovunque si collochino. Il Paese deve essere guidato, non solo eccitato negli istinti e negli umori. Con il popolo del centrodestra c’è un dialogo oggi e ci sarà anche domani.

Facciamo un gioco: lei è Berlusconi e il Pdl è la nuova Dc?

No, per me non…

E’ un gioco di ruolo: applicherebbe la teoria democristiana del doppio forno al Pdl? Metto il pane in cottura non solo nel forno della Lega ma anche in quello dell’Udc?

Per il Pdl sarebbe più conveniente, per l’Udc non ho uno ma 100 dubbi. Saremmo utilizzati come tappabuchi e questa oggi non può essere la nostra strategia.

Una condizione per tornare a collaborare in futuro con Berlusconi?

Il futuro lo scopriremo solo vivendo. Credo che il Pdl dovrebbe valorizzare molti nostri atteggiamenti di responsabilità: sul lodo Alfano ci siamo astenuti, abbiamo votato sì per i rifiuti di Napoli, rifiutiamo il giustizialismo e sui temi del nucleare abbiamo votato a favore del governo. E adesso lanceremo altre palle: quoziente familiare, liberalizzazioni dei servizi pubblici locali. L’Udc ha pagato il prezzo della perdita del potere, ma oggi non siamo delle vedove, non cerchiamo il potere, cerchiamo di dare un nuovo assetto alla politica italiana.

Quanto tempo avete?

Abbiamo tempo, c’è una legislatura, siamo all’opposizione. Con il Pdl il discorso più serio ora èsolo uno: cercare di costruire da posizioni diverse un equilibrio, una risposta chiara sui temi della politica italiana. Così rispettiamo i nostri elettori e anche quelli del Pdl.

Non volete governare, nè cogovernare, ma volete contribuire alle scelte del governo.

Vogliamo che il governo capisca che nell’opposizione non ci sono solo sfascisti o l’opposizione che fa Dario Franceschini con il sì al referendum, ma un’opposizione responsabile che quando si tratta di lavorare al bene del Paese lo fa senza cercare posti di potere.

Dopo le europee arrivano le regionali. Con chi vi alleate?

Valuteremo caso per caso. Lo schema delle alleanze esclusive è finito. E non facciamo scelte di convenienza: andiamo nell’85 per cento delle province da soli. Stiamo scalando l’Everest senza gli scarponi.

I sondaggi dicono che Lega e Idv faranno il pieno di voti. Entrerà in crisi lo schema politico?

No, perchè c’è uno sbarramento serio che consente la pre­senza di cinque, sei partiti al mas­simo. Ma le elezioni bocceranno il bipartitismo perchè la crescita della Lega, di Di Pietro e, spero, dell’Udc determinerà il fatto che palesemente il bipartitismo in Italia non c’è. Così verrà bocciata non solo l’idea del Pdl, ma anche l’idea di un Pd che porta solamente a essere l’opposizione di comodo di Berlusconi. Infine, la Lega si gonfierà come una rana. E’ la conseguenza della politica di Berlusconi: il voto di protesta prima o poi si estingue (pensi al fenomeno Le Pen in Francia), ma la Lega è stata messa in condizione di essere di lotta e di governo, contesta il sistema ma nello stesso tempo ci sta dentro. E’ una posizione troppo comoda.

Qualche anno fa si parlava del patto dei cinquantenni. C’è Casini, c’è Fini, c’è Giulio Tremonti, non c’è più Walter Veltroni. Lei ha un partito, Fini non lo ha più e Tremonti difficilmente lo avrà. Si sente in prima fila per la leadership futura del Paese o no?

Io cerco di fare una politica seria e spero che il Paese prima o poi mi dia ragione. Detto questo, non èche uno si sveglia al mattino e dice voglio fare il leader. Devono crearsi le condizioni e per fortuna non sono un uomo accecato dalle mie ambizioni.

Voterebbe Berlusconi al Quirinale?

Oggi come oggi no.

Perchè?

Al Quirinale c’è Giorgio Napolitano e ci vuole una persona con un identikit super partes. E, francamente, tutto si può dire tranne che Berlusconi sia super partes.

Il giorno in cui Berlusconi dovesse uscire dall’arena politica, l’establishment tornerebbe a giocare un ruolo chiave nella politica. Qual èil suo rapporto con i poteri forti?

I poteri forti non ci sono più, sono tutti deboli. Sarà la gente a decidere. E l’establishment va con chi vince.

Pas­sata la crisi le banche torneranno a giocare il risiko politico?

I banchieri vanno a votare alle primarie del Pd e poi scodinzolano dietro a Tremonti. Hanno uno stomaco con notevoli capacità di adattamento.

Lei pensa ancora a un sistema elettorale alla tedesca?

No, oggi è una pia illusione. Finiremo per votare con la stessa legge elettorale con cui si èvotato nel pas­sato, non considero il Porcellum nefasto, spero di vincere la battaglia per introdurre le preferenze.

Lei mi sembra il gatto che gioca con il topo.

Perchè?

Non pensa più a un centro mobile, non pensa sia pos­sibile una riforma elettorale, mi pare che lei stia puntando a un’opa futura sul centrodestra.

Non addentriamoci nel gos­sip della politica.

Cerco di dare una prospettiva logica alle sue risposte.

E allora è chiaro che stiamo investendo sul futuro. Consiglio a tutti di comprare azioni dell’Udc al fixing della politica perchè siamo destinati a crescere.

© Panorama

http://www.vimeo.com/3637653

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton

Rey Guerra, the former sheriff of Starr County, Texas, pleaded guilty May 1 to a narco­tics conspiracy charge in federal district court in McAllen, Texas. Guerra admitted to using information obtained in his official capacity to help a friend (a Mexican drug trafficker allegedly associated with Los Zetas) evade U.S. counternarcotics efforts. On at least one occasion, Guerra also attempted to learn the identity of a confidential informant who had provided authorities with information regarding cartel operations so he could pass it to his cartel contact.

In addition to providing intelligence to Los Zetas, Guerra also reportedly helped steer investigations away from people and facilities associated with Los Zetas. He also sought to block progress on investigations into arrested individuals associated with Los Zetas to protect other members associated with the organization. Guerra is scheduled for sentencing July 29; he faces 10 years to life imprisonment, fines of up to $4 million and five years of supervised release.

Guerra is just one of a growing number of officials on the U.S. side of the border who have been recruited as agents for Mexico’s powerful and sophisticated drug cartels. Indeed, when one examines the reach and scope of the Mexican cartels’ efforts to recruit agents inside the United States to provide intelligence and act on the cartels’ behalf, it becomes apparent that the cartels have demonstrated the ability to operate more like a foreign intelligence service than a traditional criminal organization.

Fluidity and Flexibility

For many years now, STRATFOR has followed developments along the U.S.-Mexican border and has studied the dynamics of the cross-border illicit flow of people, drugs, weapons and cash.

One of the most notable characteristics about this flow of contraband is its flexibility. When smugglers encounter an obstacle to the flow of their product, they find ways to avoid it. For example, as we’ve pre­viously discus­sed in the case of the extensive border fence in the San Diego sector, drug traffickers and human smugglers diverted a good portion of their volume around the wall to the Tucson sector; they even created an extensive network of tunnels under the fence to keep their contraband (and profits) flowing.

Likewise, as maritime and air interdiction efforts between South America and Mexico have become more succes­sful, Central America has become increasingly important to the flow of narco­tics from South America to the United States. This reflects how the drug-trafficking organizations have adjusted their method of shipment and their trafficking routes to avoid interdiction efforts and maintain the northward flow of narcotics.

Over the past few years, a great deal of public and government attention has focused on the U.S.-Mexican border. In response to this attention, the federal and border state governments in the United States have erected more barriers, installed an array of cameras and sensors and increased the manpower committed to securing the border. While these efforts certainly have not hermetically sealed the border, they do appear to be having some impact — an impact magnified by the effectiveness of interdiction efforts elsewhere along the narco­tics supply chain.

According to the most recent statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration, from January 2007 through September 2008 the price per pure gram of cocaine increased 89.1 percent, or from $96.61 to $182.73, while the purity of cocaine seized on the street decreased 31.3 percent, dropping from 67 percent pure cocaine to 46 percent pure cocaine. Recent anecdotal reports from law enforcement sources indicate that cocaine prices have remained high, and that the purity of cocaine on the street has remained poor.

Overcoming Human Obstacles

In another interesting trend that has emerged over the past few years, as border security has tightened and as the flow of narco­tics has been impeded, the number of U.S. border enforcement officers arrested on charges of corruption has increased notably. This increased corruption represents a logical outcome of the fluidity of the flow of contraband. As the obstacles posed by border enforcement have become more daunting, people have become the weak link in the enforcement system. In some ways, people are like tunnels under the border wall — i.e., channels employed by the traffickers to help their goods get to market.

From the Mexican cartels’ point of view, it is cheaper to pay an official several thousand dollars to allow a load of narco­tics to pass by than it is to risk having the shipment seized. Such bribes are simply part of the cost of doing business — and in the big picture, even a low-level local agent can be an incredible bargain.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 21 CBP officers were arrested on corruption charges during the fiscal year that ended in September 2008, as opposed to only 4 in the pre­ceding fiscal year. In the current fiscal year (since Oct. 1), 14 have been arrested. And the problem with corruption extends further than just customs or border patrol officers. In recent years, police officers, state troopers, county sheriffs, National Guard members, judges, prosecutors, deputy U.S. marshals and even the FBI special agent in charge of the El Paso office have been linked to Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Significantly, the cases being prosecuted against these public officials of all stripes are just the tip of the iceberg. The underly­ing problem of corruption is much greater.

A major challenge to addres­sing the issue of border corruption is the large number of jurisdictions along the border, along with the reality that corruption occurs at the local, state and federal levels across those jurisdictions. Though this makes it very difficult to gather data relating to the total number of corruption investigations conducted, sources tell us that while corruption has always been a problem along the border, the problem has ballooned in recent years — and the number of corruption cases has increased dramatically.

In addition to the complexity brought about by the multiple jurisdictions, agencies and levels of government involved, there simply is not one single agency that can be tasked with taking care of the corruption problem. It is just too big and too wide. Even the FBI, which has national jurisdiction and a mandate to investigate public corruption cases, cannot step in and clean up all the corruption. The FBI already is being stretched thin with its other responsibilities, like counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, financial fraud and bank robbery. The FBI thus does not even have the capacity to investigate every allegation of corruption at the federal level, much less at the state and local levels. Limited resources require the agency to be very selective about the cases it decides to investigate. Given that there is no real central clearinghouse for corruption cases, most allegations of corruption are investigated by a wide array of internal affairs units and other agencies at the federal, state and local levels.

Any time there is such a mixture of agencies involved in the investigation of a specific type of crime, there is often bureaucratic friction, and there are almost always problems with information sharing. This means that pieces of information and investigative leads developed in the investigation of some of these cases are not shared with the appropriate agencies. To overcome this information sharing problem, the FBI has established six Border Corruption Task Forces designed to bring local, state and federal officers together to focus on corruption tied to the U.S.-Mexican border, but these task forces have not yet been able to solve the complex problem of coordination.

Sophisticated Spotting

Efforts to corrupt officials along the U.S.-Mexican border are very organized and very focused, something that is critical to understanding the public corruption issue along the border. Some of the Mexican cartels have a long history of succes­sfully corrupting public officials on both sides of the border. Groups like the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) have succes­sfully recruited scores of intelligence assets and agents of influence at the local, state and even federal levels of the Mexican government. They even have enjoyed significant success in recruiting agents in elite units such as the anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) of the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR). The BLO also has recruited Mexican employees working for the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and even allegedly owned Mexico’s former drug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano, who reportedly was receiving $450,00 a month from the organization.

In fact, the sophistication of these groups means they use methods more akin to the intelligence recruitment proces­ses used by foreign intelligence services than those normally associated with a criminal organization. The cartels are known to conduct extensive surveillance and background checks on potential targets to determine how to best pitch to them. Like the spotting methods used by intelligence agencies, the surveillance conducted by the cartels on potential targets is designed to glean as many details about the target as pos­sible, including where they live, what vehicles they drive, who their family members are, their financial needs and their peccadilloes.

Historically, many foreign intelligence services are known to use ethnicity in their favor, heavily targeting persons sharing an ethnic background found in the foreign country. Foreign services also are known to use relatives of the target living in the foreign country to their advantage. Mexican cartels use these same tools. They tend to target Hispanic officers and often use family members living in Mexico as recruiting levers. For example, Luis Francisco Alarid, who had been a CBP officer at the Otay Mesa, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 84 months in federal prison in February for his participation in a conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens and marijuana into the United States. One of the people Alarid admitted to conspiring with was his uncle, who drove a van loaded with marijuana and illegal aliens through a border checkpoint manned by Alarid.

Like family spy rings (such as the Cold War spy ring run by John Walker), there also have been family border corruption rings. Raul Villarreal and his brother, Fidel, both former CBP agents in San Diego, were arraigned March 16 after fleeing the United States in 2006 after learning they were being investigated for corruption. The pair was captured in Mexico in October 2008 and extradited back to the United States.

‘Plata o Sexo’

When discus­sing human intelligence recruiting, it is not uncommon to refer to the old cold war acronym MICE (money, ideology, compromise and ego) to explain the approach used to recruit an agent. When discus­sing corruption in Mexico, people often repeat the phrase “plata o plomo,” Spanish for “money or lead” — meaning “take the money or we’ll kill you.” However, in most border corruption cases involving American officials, the threat of plomo is not as powerful as it is inside Mexico. Although some officials charged with corruption have claimed as a defense that they were intimidated into behaving corruptly, juries have rejected these arguments. This dynamic could change if the Mexican cartels begin to target officers in the United States for assas­sination as they have in Mexico.

With plomo an empty threat north of the border, plata has become the primary motivation for corruption along the Mexican border. In fact, good old greed — the M in MICE — has always been the most common motivation for Americans recruited by foreign intelligence services. The runner-up, which supplants plomo in the recruitment equation inside the United Sates, is “sexo,” aka “sex.” Sex, an age-old espionage recruitment tool that fits under the compromise section of MICE, has been seen in high-profile espionage cases, including the one involving the Marine security guards at the U.S Embassy in Moscow. Using sex to recruit an agent is often referred to as setting a “honey trap.” Sex can be used in two ways. First, it can be used as a simple payment for services rendered. Second, it can be used as a means to blackmail the agent. (The two techniques can be used in tandem.)

It is not at all uncommon for border officials to be offered sex in return for allowing illegal aliens or drugs to enter the country, or for drug-trafficking organizations to use attractive agents to seduce and then recruit officers. Several officials have been convicted in such cases. For example, in March 2007, CBP inspection officer Richard Elizalda, who had worked at the San Ysidro, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 57 months in prison for conspiring with his lover, alien smuggler Raquel Arin, to let the organization she worked for bring illegal aliens through his inspection lane. Elizalda also accepted cash for his efforts — much of which he allegedly spent on gifts for Arin — so in reality, Elizalda was a case of “plata y sexo” rather than an either-or deal.

Corruption Cases Handled Differently

When the U.S. government hires an employee who has family members living in a place like Beijing or Moscow, the background investigation for that employee is pursued with far more interest than if the employee has relatives in Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana. Mexico traditionally has not been seen as a foreign counterintelligence threat, even though it has long been recognized that many countries, like Rus­sia, are very active in their efforts to target the United States from Mexico. Indeed, during the Cold War, the KGB’s largest rezidentura (the equivalent of a CIA station) was located in Mexico City.

Employees with connections to Mexico frequently have not been that well vetted, period. In one well-publicized incident, the Border Patrol hired an illegal immigrant who was later arrested for alien smuggling. In July 2006, U.S. Border Patrol agent Oscar Ortiz was sentenced to 60 months in prison after admitting to smuggling more than 100 illegal immigrants into the United States. After his arrest, investigators learned that Ortiz was an illegal immigrant himself who had used a counterfeit birth certificate when he was hired. Ironically, Ortiz also had been arrested for attempting to smuggle two illegal immigrants into the United States shortly before being hired by the Border Patrol. (He was never charged for that attempt.)

From an investigative perspective, corruption cases tend to be handled more as one-off cases, and they do not normally receive the same sort of extensive investigation into the suspect’s friends and associates that would be conducted in a foreign counterintelligence case. In other words, if a U.S. government employee is recruited by the Chinese or Rus­sian intelligence service, the investigation receives far more energy — and the suspect’s circle of friends, relatives and associates receives far more scrutiny — than if he is recruited by a Mexican cartel.

In espionage cases, there is also an extensive damage assess­ment investigation conducted to ensure that all the information the suspect could have divulged is identified, along with the identities of any other people the suspect could have helped his handler recruit. Additionally, after-action reviews are conducted to determine how the suspect was recruited, how he was handled and how he could have been uncovered earlier. The results of these reviews are then used to help shape future counterintelligence investigative efforts. They are also used in the pre­paration of defensive counterintelligence briefings to educate other employees and help protect them from being recruited.

This differences in urgency and scope between the two types of investigations is driven by the perception that the damage to national security is greater if an official is recruited by a foreign intelligence agency than if he is recruited by a criminal organization. That assess­ment may need to be re-examined, given that the Mexican cartels are criminal organizations with the proven sophistication to recruit U.S. officials at all levels of government — and that this has allowed them to move whomever and whatever they wish into the United States.

The problem of public corruption is very widespread, and to approach corruption cases in a manner similar to foreign counterintelligence cases would require a large commitment of investigative, prosecutorial and defensive resources. But the threat posed by the Mexican cartels is different than that posed by traditional criminal organizations, meaning that countering it will require a nontraditional approach.

Stratfor

By Kamran Bokhari

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia historically has played a major role in the development of jihadism. Key pillars of the Saudi state — oil, Wahhabism (a conservative form of Sunni Islam) and the strength of tribal norms — were instrumental in facilitating the rise of Islamist extremism and terrorism around the world prior to 9/11. These same pillars allowed Riyadh to contain al Qaeda within Saudi Arabia in the wake of the insurgency that kicked off in the kingdom in 2003–2004. After this success on the home front, Riyadh is still using these pillars to play an international role in counterjihadist efforts — a role welcomed by the United States.

During a visit to the kingdom last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the Saudi rehabilitation program for former militants impres­sed him, prompting him to consider sending Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo Bay to Saudi Arabia as part of Washington’s efforts to close down the detention center. The Saudis probably have done “as good, if not a better, job of that than almost anybody,” Gates said of the Saudi program. In separate comments, Gates called on Riyadh to assist Pakistan in the latter’s efforts to combat its rapidly expanding Taliban insurgency — and Saudi Arabia in fact has been play­ing a role in efforts to contain the Taliban insurgency in both Pakistan and Afghanistan for some time.

Clearly, Saudi Arabia is taking a lead role in anti-extremism, counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts. Understanding what the Saudis are doing and how it has permitted them to succeed in this regard will shed light on Riyadh’s domestic succes­ses, and it will indicate what can be expected from its efforts abroad.

Saudi Domestic Counterjihadist Successes

The Saudis have had ample experience in dealing with religious extremists and militants since long before their struggle with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of 9/11. The kingdom’s founder, King Abdel-Aziz, faced a situation similar to that now faced by Pakistan before he defeated the Ikhwan in the 1920s. The Ikhwan (not to be confused with the Egyptian group Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, which is Arabic for “Muslim Brotherhood”) was a tribal religious militia of extremist Wahhabis. Whereas the Pakistanis have nurtured jihadist groups as tools of foreign policy in their dealings with India and Afghanistan, the Ikhwan helped Abdel-Aziz conquer most of present-day Saudi Arabia.

While Abdel-Aziz was not interested in conquering additional territories, the Ikhwan had larger regional ambitions. The group wanted to expand its jihad into places like Iraq, which the British then controlled. Just as Pakistan has found itself caught between its Islamist militant assets and the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, the nascent kingdom had to decide between the Ikhwan and its first Great Power ally, the United Kingdom. Exigencies forced Abdel-Aziz to choose the British, and he put down a subsequent Ikhwan rebellion.

Petrodollars

Notably, this all occurred before the discovery of oil and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent emergence as a petrodollar-rich monarchy (and for that matter, even before the state was known as the “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”). While the Saudis did not have their pre­sent financial resources, they did have one very important tool they wielded succes­sfully against the Ikhwan threat. That tool was religion, which had become a key part of the fabric of the Saudi state since its first incarnation in the mid-1700s. Religion mixed in with a culture based on strong elements of tribalism and familism provided for a strong social contract involving the Saudi royal family, the family of Muhammad bin Abdel-Wahhab (founder of the Wahhabi school of thought) and the masses.

This historic Saudi-Wahhabi alliance has long provided the state with religious legitimacy, which the royal family has used to put down religious dis­sent on a number of occasions since the Ikhwan uprising. Key among them were the 1979 incident in which a group of Wahhabi militants took over the Kaaba, the dis­sent within the religious establishment in the aftermath of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and the 2003–2004 al Qaeda insurgency. The use of religion to consolidate national power has led to a significant blowback, as evident from the global emergence of violent Islamism. But unlike other states, Saudi Arabia has been able to mobilize the tribal, religious, security and commercial spheres of the country against Islamist rebels.

Religion and Tribalism

The secret to the Saudis’ success was turning the rebels’ strongest weapon, religion, back against them. This was pos­sible because the state enjoyed a monopoly over religious discourse thanks to the vast religious establishment that Riyadh had cultivated over the years. Para­doxically, while this religious establishment has been the source of much radicalism in Saudi Arabia and worldwide, it also has served the Saudis well in terms of giving the state a powerful tool with which to quell dis­sent and pre­serve the regime.

The tribal nature of Saudi society, with its norms of obedience to those in authority, complemented the state’s religious tools. The Saudi ulema supported by the tribes have laid great emphasis on Quranic notions of obedience to rulers as long as the rulers do not clearly defy Islam. Another important tribal and religious concept is abhorrence of social chaos, which also helped the Saudis isolate the Islamist rebels from the rest of society by arguing that jihadist activity would lead to anarchy.

Tribal social structure imposes a hierarchy that forms a strong bulwark against rebellions by forcing conformity upon the tribes, clans and families. This limits the social space available for rebels to operate in. Tribes cooperate with the authorities in taking action against belligerents, and then they also take responsibility for the “good behavior” of repentant militants.

The power of the tribal norm is such that it is very unlikely that militants could influence enough tribes to mount a succes­sful uprising. The Saudis have had some two-and-a-half centuries’ worth of experience at skill­fully managing tribal politics. The rise and fall of the first (1744–1818) and second (1824–1891) Saudi states and the establishment of the modern kingdom in the early 1900s were to a great degree a function of the ruling al-Saud family’s ability to forge tribal alliances.

Prior to 9/11, one Saudi strategy for dealing with products of the Wahhabi establishment who exhibited levels of extremism deemed intolerable involved directing the radicals to fight in war zones like Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. This maintained order and security while the rebels were away (and in many cases the radicals died in the fighting). Even after 9/11 — and particularly in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq — the Saudis employed this approach to defuse domestic tensions and to try to contain increasing Iranian influence in Iraq and the rise of Tehran’s Iraqi Shiite allies.

But U.S.-Saudi tensions in the aftermath of 9/11 reached a point where Riyadh knew this was no longer an option. Consequently, under the guidance of King Abdullah, the kingdom embarked upon a strategy of permanently dealing with the issue through reforms at the governmental and societal levels, a process that is still very much a work in progress. The aim was to curb further extremism, as well as to address existing radicalism.

High oil prices, which lasted until July 2008, gave the country the financial wherewithal to invest in such a major anti-jihadist initiative. But without a powerful religious establishment at its side, the money alone would not have permitted the Saudis to succeed. This religious establishment has played a key role in the country’s rehabilitation program, which is designed to integrate militants who have surrendered or been captured back into society. While financial resources have played a critical role in efforts to bring pre­viously radicalized youths back into the mainstream, the scholars have provided the theological gravitas to counter the jihadist ideology and wean the youths from jihadism.

As mentioned, the process is still in its infancy, and incidents of recidivism have occurred. For example, Said Ali al-Shihri emerged in Yemen as a key leader of the jihadist node on the Arabian Peninsula after undergoing the rehab program. Still, the Saudis’ ability to put a major dent in the capabilities of jihadists in the kingdom and to avoid major backlash to the reform process highlights Riyadh’s succes­sful use of religion to curb extremism.

The jihadist threat within the kingdom remains, but a combination of unique circum­stances enabled Saudi Arabia to make considerable progress on the home front. Fears still exist that because of the ultraconservative religious nature of the state, the monarchy might fall and be replaced by a radical regime — especially as the kingdom enters an extended period of transition. But for now, the Saudi situation is stable to the point where the Saudis can look beyond their borders and offer help to other jihadist trouble spots.

Replicating Saudi Counterjihadist Successes

Saudi Arabia’s counterjihadist succes­ses and position as a religious and financial leader of the Islamic world have prompted the United States and countries like Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan to seek Riyadh’s help with jihadist problems.

Yemen

The first such place to do so is just south of the Saudi border. Yemen has become a jihadist hub where Saudi jihadists have regrouped along with their counterparts from Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere under new management. The country also faces other forms of unrest and insecurity that are weakening the state and raising fears of regional instability among Yemen’s wealthier Arab neighbors. For example, Yemen’s north-south divide is re-emerging, meaning that there are two competing nationalisms in the country. As a result, Sanaa and Riyadh have moved toward greater cooperation, especially on the issue of the jihadists; the Saudis can offer financial assistance and advice to the cash-strapped Yemenis regarding the Saudi rehabilitation program.

But unlike Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis have the upper hand in the relationship with the religious establishment, the Yemeni state is dependent upon its religious leaders and upon the Salafist-jihadists who dominate the country’s security establishment. Moreover, Yemen is not as religiously homogenous as Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, the religious establishment was strong enough to claim the mantle of Wahhabism and isolate the jihadists as “deviants,” Yemen would have to develop an alternative religious discourse to succes­sfully counter the theological challenge posed by the jihadists. Engendering a mainstream national religious identity takes a long time even for those states endowed with resources, which means there are serious limitations on how far Yemen can expect to succeed in anti-extremism and counterterrorism efforts.

Like Saudi Arabia, Yemeni society is also tribal, but it is much more fragmented than that of its richer, larger neighbor. Unlike Saudi Arabia, where the House of al-Saud sits at the top of the tribal hierarchy, Yemeni tribes are neither as strong nor as organized. Moreover, the Yemeni state is dependent upon the tribes for support — explaining why Saana’s bid to win tribal assistance in dealing with militants has not attained the desired results.

The huge differences in economic conditions, religious hierarchy and tribal structures between Saudi Arabia and Yemen accordingly will make it difficult for Riyadh to reproduce in its southern neighbor the succes­sful results it has enjoyed at home.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Saudi Arabia enjoys a disproportionate amount of influence over both Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin has recently been involved in efforts to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. Likewise, the Pakistani interior minister and the two most senior generals of the Pakistani military have made trips in recent months to the kingdom — most likely not just for monetary assistance, but also to benefit from the Saudi experience in dealing with the Taliban problem.

Ground realities in Afghanistan and Pakistan make these states much more difficult nuts to crack than even Yemen, which shares some basic social similarities with Saudi Arabia. The security situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in advanced stages of deterioration (though to different degrees). Both South Asian neighbors face full-blown insurgencies, making it difficult for the respective states to maintain their writ in the affected areas. This is quite different from anything Saudi Arabia has ever faced, and it also is different from Yemen, where the jihadists have not transformed themselves into a guerrilla movement.

On the religious front, Afghanistan and Pakistan lack religious establishments. Instead, they both have highly fragmented religious landscapes consisting of rival Islamist groups, competing Sunni sects and networks of madras­sas. Even the two countries’ more mainstream ulema are divided into various groups. Unlike in Saudi Arabia and (to a les­ser degree) Yemen, only a tiny minority adheres to Salafist/Wahhabi Islam in Southwest Asia. Even so, the Deobandis (the sect of the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups) are a growing movement, posing a challenge to the Shia and the majority Barelvis (a South Asian form of Sufi Islam).

On the social level, while tribes exist in both South Asian states, they are very weak compared to the Arab states in question. In Afghanistan, the tribal hierarchy is almost nonexistent in terms of being able to project power because of the rise of the mullahs and militia commanders. In Pakistan, the tribes are limited to Pashtun areas, and even there the mullahs and militiamen have significantly degraded the power of the tribal maliks.

These factors place significant limits on how much the Saudis can assist Islamabad or Kabul in their respective counterinsurgency efforts and anti-extremism drives.

For these reasons, the Saudis have focused on try­ing to broker talks between the Taliban and the Western-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Even on this issue, Riyadh is not having much luck, because the Taliban elements it has been dealing with thus far have been former leaders of the movement, while current Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar and his associates have rejected the idea of talks because they feel they have the upper hand in the insurgency and do not see the West as “stay­ing the course” in their country.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan the Saudis have been focused on efforts to create a consensus among various stakeholders on how to deal with the militancy. Riyadh maintains strong ties with Pakistan, especially with the military establishment and right-of-center forces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with several of the country’s Islamist political parties. As a result, the Saudis may be able to use their financial and energy clout to get the religiously and socially conservative forces in Pakistan to agree to support a major state initiative to contain the violence. But in sharp contrast to the way Riyadh took a focused approach to its own Islamist rebels, Islamabad lacks coherence.

Therefore, given the social fragmentation and complexities of the two South Asian states, the Saudis will not be able to help either Afghanistan or Pakistan much in terms of bringing down the violence those countries face. It can, however, assist in curbing religious extremism by undermining jihadists, given the ideological proximity of the Deobandis and the Wahhabis. But since the Saudis are still working on the ideological front through rehabilitation at home, it will be awhile before they can help others.

Saudi Arabia’s succes­ses in rolling back religious radicalism at home are the result of the confluence of certain unique circum­stances that simply do not exist in more troubling jihadist hot spots like Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Saudi example thus offers few les­sons for Sanaa, Kabul and Islamabad in dealing with their own situations. Ultimately, while the Saudis will be able to play an important role in providing financial assistance and some help in ideologically undermining Islamist extremism and radicalism, they will be able to do less on the physical battlefield.

Stratfor

Un grande libro-inchiesta dell’amico Gianluigi Nuzzi. L’anticipazione di Vaticano Spa su Panorama domani in edicola. Il libro, edito da Chiarelettere, racconta gli intrecci finanziari e politici della Santa Sede grazie ai documenti conservati in un archivio segreto custodito da un monsignore.

Molti di voi ricorderanno l’immagine di John Anderton (Tom Cruise) braccato dalla polizia della pre­crime di Washington. Il protagonista del romanzo fantascientifico di Philip K. Dick Minority Report e del film diretto dal genio di Steven Spielberg è in fuga, sale sulla metropolitana di una Washington pro­iettata nel 2054. E’ la vittima di un complotto e scappa dall’implacabile controllo totale della società immaginata dal visionario Dick.

Le sue immagini vengono pro­iettate su tutti gli schermi sparsi per la città. Nel vagone della metropolitana crede di essere più protetto dal grande occhio elettronico, ma improvvisamente la sua foto compare sul giornale elettronico di un cittadino qualunque. E’ una pagina di USA Today che muta aspetto grazie all’inchiostro elettronico.

Le visioni di Dick si van facendo realtà. La diffusione del pervasive computing aumenta le pos­sibilità di controllo sociale, la tecnologia rende pos­sibile la realizzazione del pensiero fantascientifico e l’e-paper comincia ad essere una realtà. La potenza della letteratura si dispiega non solo nella lettura e rilettura del pas­sato e del pre­sente, ma anche nella pro­iezione del futuro, dei suoi mondi (im)possibili.

Prendete la storia dell’e-book: comincia nel 1971 quando prende il via il progetto Gutemberg, prosegue nel 1987 quando viene pubblicato il primo romanzo in ipertesto e prosegue fino ad oggi con l’approdo sul mass market di lettori di libri elettronici che promettono di rivoluzionare stili e consumi dell’entertainment letterario, del consumo di informazione: tablet pc, smartphone e lettori dedicati sono una realtà non una visione del domani.

Amazon sta concentrando i suoi sforzi nella ricerca sull’e-book. Il suo lettore Kindle è già alla seconda versione:

Il suo utilizzo non è limitato solo ai libri, ma si sta espandendo ai giornali, blog, riviste. Il New York Times offre già ai suoi lettori il servizio su Kindle.

L’industria dell’informazione e della cultura non sta morendo, si sta (tras)formando. La domanda di notizie e analisi crescerà ancora, nuovi lettori emergeranno da Paesi che stanno colmando il loro gap economico e culturale. E i giornali si leggeranno così.

Chi vuole immaginare il futuro, non ha altro da fare che salire a bordo del magnifico vascello della letteratura e incominciare a viaggiare. Non temete di lasciarvi trasportare dal vento della fantasia. Jules Verne a 11 anni scappò di casa per imbarcarsi come clandestino. Voleva prendere il mare e scoprire nuovi mondi. Il suo sogno fu interrotto dai genitori che lo scoprirono. Ma la sua navigazione proseguì, cominciò la sua carriera di scrittore nel 1863 e due anni più tardi con Dalla Terra alla Luna anti­cipò lo sbarco di Neil Armstrong con la mis­sione Apollo 11. Verne divenne il padre della fantascienza, il futuro immaginato da Dick sarà realtà.