Archive for January, 2009

Guantanamo, il terrorismo e la presidenza Obama. Intervista a John Yoo: “Per processare i terroristi servono tribunali militari”

Jan 31 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under America, Difesa e Intelligence, War on Terror

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Incontrare John Yoo significa entrare nel vasto mondo della guerra e del diritto, fare una lunga cavalcata nella storia americana e nei segreti del potere più grande (e temuto) del presidente degli Stati Uniti: quello di commander in chief, comandante in capo delle forze armate. Yoo è nato nel 1967 a Seul (Corea del Sud) e poi espatriato negli Stati Uniti. È stato il legal advisor dell’amministrazione Bush per il diritto di guerra, uno dei più stretti collaboratori del ministero della Giustizia. Portano la sua firma molti memorandum riservati per la Casa Bianca.

Oltre a essere uno degli esponenti di punta del centro studi conservatore American enterprise institute, Yoo è professore all’Università di Berkeley, uno dei santuari liberal dell’istruzione americana, non proprio un covo di neocon. Tanto che il City council di Berkeley qualche settimana fa ha chiesto di istituire un corso alternativo per gli studenti. Richiesta respinta al mittente, non solo perché contro la libertà di pensiero e parola, ma perché a Yoo vengono riconosciuti un indiscutibile magistero e una grande apertura di pensiero.

Per comprendere seriamente cosa è accaduto alla Casa Bianca dopo l’11 settembre 2001 è necessaria la lettura dei suoi libri: The Powers of war and peace (University of Chicago Press, 2005) e War by other means (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). È qui che Yoo spiega le origini giuridiche della nascita del Patriot act e del carcere di Guantanamo, i decreti di George W. Bush sulle tecniche di interrogatorio, l’impossibilità di applicare la convenzione di Ginevra ai terroristi di Al Qaeda, l’eccezionale flessibilità della costituzione scritta e adottata dai padri fondatori a Filadelfia nel 1787 pensando a un’America non ancora superpotenza ma già allora bisognosa di essere «fortezza» capace di pensare e applicare la dottrina della guerra preventiva.

È con questo eccezionale testimone della «presidenza dell’11 settembre» che Panorama commenta i primi decreti di Barack Obama. Decisioni che sono coerenti con quanto dichiarato durante la campagna elettorale e segnano, se non un’inversione di rotta nella politica antiterrorismo (tutta ancora da verificare), una dichiarazione di principio e discontinuità sulla quale negli Stati Uniti si è acceso un intenso dibattito.

Professor Yoo, il presidente Barack Obama ha chiesto ai giudici dei tribunali militari di Guantanamo di sospendere per 120 giorni tutti i procedimenti in corso. La ritiene una buona iniziativa?

Il neopresidente deve avere la possibilità di stabilire proprie linee di indirizzo politico, ma alla fine si accorgerà che per processare i terroristi servono i tribunali militari.

Non pensa che sia possibile spostare i processi nei normali tribunali, seguendo procedure che sono già ben codificate nel tempo?

No. I normali processi non contemplano la necessità di proteggere le nostre fonti di intelligence, né i metodi che ci hanno permesso di catturare gli esponenti di Al Qaeda.

L’annunciata chiusura del carcere di Guantanamo rappresenta davvero un’opportunità per restaurare la credibilità internazionale degli Stati Uniti?

Be’, gli Stati Uniti dovranno continuare a tenere da qualche parte i capi terroristi. Se non sarà a Guantanamo, sarà da qualche altra parte. Non li si può certo liberare tra la popolazione civile.

La possibilità che altri paesi si prendano in carico questi detenuti è una soluzione praticabile per l’amministrazione Obama?

Sarebbe altamente auspicabile che altri stati si prendessero alcuni di questi detenuti, ma rimarrebbe comunque il problema dei duri, i più estremisti: quelli non li prenderebbero. Ci sarebbe il rischio di esportare il problema in altri paesi e si aprirebbe il conflitto fra la detenzione di questi terroristi e i diversi sistemi giuridici, che prevedono processi pubblici, aperti.

Questi detenuti a Guantanamo continuano a rappresentare una minaccia? E perché?

Come i tribunali militari americani hanno dimostrato, molti dei detenuti di Guantanamo non smettono di essere una minaccia: se rilasciati, tornerebbero a combattere gli Stati Uniti e i loro alleati.

Si possono applicare le norme della convenzione di Ginevra ai terroristi islamici?

Non ritengo che in questo caso valgano le norme della convenzione di Ginevra. Parliamo di trattati che regolano i conflitti fra nazioni e le loro forze armate. Al Qaeda è un non stato, che non ha firmato i trattati e non ha intenzione di seguire le regole della guerra.

Le regole per gli interrogatori decise dall’amministrazione Bush sono accettabili?

Ritengo che lo fossero e che fossero necessarie per raccogliere le informazioni necessarie a fermare i terribili attacchi contro gli Stati Uniti e i suoi alleati.

Questo però solleva problemi costituzionali. Quali?

Penso che la vera preoccupazione costituzionale sia che la nuova amministrazione, il Congresso e i tribunali vanifichino la capacità dei nostri servizi di intelligence e delle nostre forze armate di combattere Al Qaeda con la giusta aggressività.

Quali sono oggi i rischi per gli Stati Uniti?

Un eccesso di fiducia e passività, dal momento che, negli ultimi sette anni, siamo riusciti a prevenire qualsiasi attacco sul nostro territorio.

Qual è la sua speranza?

Spero che la nuova amministrazione manterrà la sostanza delle nostre politiche contro il terrorismo e, ora che la campagna elettorale è finita, metta da parte gli eccessi di partigianeria.

© Panorama

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Nella rete di Interceptor

Jan 31 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under Italia

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Può lo Stato essere messo sotto controllo? Eccome se può. Il ministero degli Esteri, per esempio: due utenze sottoposte a monitoraggio del traffico. Attività produttive: un’utenza. Trasporti: un’utenza. Comunicazioni: un’utenza. Difesa: due utenze. Marina mercantile: un’utenza. Presidenza del Consiglio: sei utenze. Una decina per il ministero della Giustizia. Va peggio di tutti al regno della sicurezza, il Viminale: decine di utenze controllate. Non si salvano la presidenza della Camera e quella del Senato. La Guardia di finanza è auscultata in tutta Italia. Non sono sicuri i telefoni di Margherita, Udc, Ds, Forza Italia.

L’elenco bipartisan dei parlamentari senza privacy, presenti e passati, va da Clemente Mastella (Udeur) a Gianni Pittelli (Forza Italia), da Giovanni Kessler e Marco Minniti (Pd) a Beppe Pisanu (Forza Italia). Neppure i servizi segreti sfuggono al Grande fratello: sei utenze del Sismi osservate speciali, tra cui quelle del direttore Nicolò Pollari, del responsabile dei centri Sismi del Nord Italia Marco Mancini e del generale dei carabinieri (ora defunto) Gustavo Pignero.

Non sfugge alla rete la Direzione nazionale antimafia: controllato il numero del procuratore nazionale Piero Grasso, come quelli dei magistrati Alberto Cisterna, Nicola Gratteri ed Emilio Ledonne. Tenuto d’occhio il sostituto procuratore Francesco Mollace. Ispezionato telefonicamente il capo degli ispettori del ministero della Giustizia, Arcibaldo Miller.

Nella categoria avvocati troviamo Massimo Dinoia. Naturalmente in questa galleria non può mancare l’Autorità del garante della privacy rappresentata dal vicepresidente Giuseppe Chiaravalloti. Ciliegina sulla torta di «Interceptor», ecco spuntare il nome di Giuliano Tavaroli, ex capo della sicurezza Telecom, e i numeri telefonici della Pirelli.

«Il più grande scandalo della storia della Repubblica» l’ha definito Silvio Berlusconi. Scorrendo l’elenco dei nomi e delle istituzioni sotto controllo, di cui Panorama rivela alcuni dettagli, il presidente del Consiglio non ha tutti i torti.

Anche Francesco Rutelli, presidente del Copasir (il comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della Repubblica), è preoccupato. Le istituzioni scoprono di essere vulnerabili: politici, magistrati, alte cariche dello Stato, uomini dei servizi e della Guardia di finanza sono monitorati nei loro contatti telefonici, nei loro scambi per via elettronica e nei loro spostamenti.

Al centro di tutta questa attività ci sono un uomo, Gioacchino Genchi, un magistrato, Luigi De Magistris, e un metodo investigativo che è dilagato al punto da assumere la forma sinistra di una ragnatela nella quale perfino lo Stato è impigliato.

Da Castelbuono alla Rete

Genchi Gioacchino da Castelbuono (Palermo) non è un investigatore di paese. Vicequestore in aspettativa sindacale alla questura di Palermo, 49 anni, uomo di grande sicurezza ed ego smisurato, è probabilmente il più abile e intelligente detective informatico d’Italia. Il suo pensiero è sofisticato, la sua conoscenza del software e dell’hardware sorprendente. Il suo talento micidiale ha cominciato a rivelarsi fin dagli anni Ottanta, quando «smanettava» sui primi pc in commercio. Nel 1985 entra in polizia e già dopo tre anni il capo della Polizia di Stato, Vincenzo Parisi, lo mette alla testa della direzione telecomunicazioni del ministero dell’Interno per la Sicilia occidentale. Carriera fulminante.

Nel 1996 diventa consulente tecnico dell’autorità giudiziaria. Su incarico del Csm tiene corsi di formazione e aggiornamento per magistrati e uditori giudiziari. In breve, Genchi diventa un punto di riferimento: «I risultati del mio lavoro sono consacrati in centinaia di ordinanze, di sentenze e di pronunce alla Corte di cassazione» si vanta sul suo sito web. È vero, ma la sua attività vista in controluce ha più di una zona oscura. Tanto che già nel 1993 Ilda Boccassini, allora sostituto procuratore di Caltanissetta, drizza le antenne e si scontra con Genchi, che all’epoca è il tecnico del pool investigativo sulla strage di Capaci e vuole allargare l’indagine ai contatti telefonici privati e alle carte di credito di Giovanni Falcone. O me o lui, dice «Ilda la rossa». E la spunta.

Questione di metodo

De Magistris, sostituto procuratore a Catanzaro, non si pone tutti questi dubbi e ricorre al «metodo Genchi» per le sue inchieste Why not e Poseidon. Così il lavoro dell’uomo venuto da Castelbuono esce dal cono d’ombra. Le indagini partono da presunti casi di malaffare locale e si allargano a macchia di leopardo fino a toccare le più alte istituzioni dello Stato.

Nel 2005 l’inchiesta Poseidon, nata su un uso illecito dei fondi europei, accende i fari su Walter Cretella-Lombardo, ufficiale della Guardia di finanza, consigliere dell’allora commissario europeo Franco Frattini, e tocca Lorenzo Cesa (segretario Udc) e Giuseppe Chiaravalloti, presidente della Regione Calabria e oggi commissario del garante della privacy. Nel 2007 l’inchiesta Why not ha il colpo d’ala quando De Magistris, seguendo le tracce (informatiche e telefoniche) di Antonio Saladino, presidente della Compagnia delle opere in Calabria, arriva fino a Romano Prodi e Clemente Mastella (per entrambi è giunta l’archiviazione).

La pesca a strascico

È durante queste indagini che Genchi dispiega il suo metodo: la pesca a strascico per via elettronica. Una gigantesca rete che intrappola tutti i pesci, grandi e piccoli, che nuotano nel suo raggio d’azione. Genchi, su autorizzazione del magistrato, chiede ai gestori della telefonia italiana i dati anagrafici di migliaia di utenze e i tabulati del traffico in entrata e in uscita. Organizza il monitoraggio dei numeri sospetti e ricostruisce, attraverso un’analisi incrociata delle telefonate, i rapporti fra i titolari. Usa le connessioni telefoniche per consentire alla magistratura di fare connessioni investigative: perché Genchi è più che un mero fornitore di tabulati: è l’eminenza grigia delle indagini.

Su autorizzazione del solo De Magistris, Genchi accumula 578 mila schede anagrafiche e 1.042 tabulati, controlla 390 mila persone e 1 milione di contatti telefonici. Non sappiamo quali dati abbia archiviato attraverso altre consulenze e soprattutto chi conservi oggi questi dati.

Genchi sostiene che non ci sono intercettazioni, soltanto analisi dei tabulati telefonici. Il problema è che i dati del traffico sono come un pedinamento: attraverso il sistema delle celle si è in grado di controllare non solo le chiamate in entrata e in uscita, ma gli spostamenti del titolare del telefonino e ovviamente gli sms e la posta elettronica. Lecito e illecito, mogli, mariti ed eventuali amanti, amici, affari, passioni, odi, gioia e dolore. Tutto finisce nel calderone elettronico.

L’Italia, vale la pena di ricordarlo, è uno dei paesi con la massima diffusione di telefonini nel mondo. Ma c’è un orwelliano Grande fratello che tutto vede e tutto sa. Genchi non è il solo a svolgere quest’attività di pesca: i consulenti delle procure sono centinaia e a questi bisogna aggiungere i detective privati e i responsabili della sicurezza delle aziende in stile Tavaroli.

Chi controlla Interceptor?

Perfino i dati raccolti lecitamente sono a rischio. «Un consulente dell’autorità giudiziaria, secondo la legge, è equiparabile a un pubblico ufficiale e quindi è tenuto a rispettare gli stessi obblighi che vigono in un ufficio giudiziario» ricorda l’avvocato Giovanni Guerra, 43 anni, otto anni di lavoro all’Autorità sulla privacy, uno dei massimi esperti di nuove tecnologie, diritti della persona e comunicazioni elettroniche. Perfetto, ma, chiuso il rapporto di consulenza con i magistrati, siamo certi che i dati vengano conservati secondo quanto dispone la legge? O la tentazione di farsi un backup (salvataggio dei dati) illecito su un server delle Isole Cayman è troppo forte? Siamo certi che le informazioni delicate non finiscano nelle mani di qualche ricattatore o vengano utilizzate per fini illeciti?

Guerra spiega che «per finalità di giustizia penale i dati devono essere conservati in strutture di massima sicurezza. Anche gli accessi ai dati da parte degli amministratori di sistema devono essere tracciati. In America c’è stato un adeguamento dopo l’11 settembre». E in Italia? Le norme ci sono, ma sui controlli il dubbio è più che lecito.

Si è disquisito sulla differenza sostanziale tra intercettazioni e il semplice tracciamento dei dati. In realtà un tabulato senza conversazioni può fornire un sacco di notizie private e per niente neutre, soprattutto se consideriamo l’intestatario delle utenze, i suoi contatti e i suoi spostamenti. Secondo Guerra, intercettazioni e traffico dati «in sostanza sono equiparati: c’è una lesività maggiore nell’intercettazione, ma un’altrettanto grave lesione c’è quando si pongono sotto monitoraggio gli spostamenti telefonici. Esistono software in grado di ricostruire la tua posizione geografica mentre sei al telefono».

È sicuro un paese dove i membri della Direzione nazionale antimafia possono essere localizzati quando e come si vuole? È sicuro un paese dove il Parlamento e il governo sono sotto scacco telefonico? È sicuro un paese dove il direttore del servizio segreto non ha più un segreto? Semplicemente: è un paese?

© Panorama

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Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the War Against Al Qaeda

Jan 27 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under America, Medio Oriente, War on Terror

By George Friedman

Washington’s attention is now zeroing in on Afghanistan. There is talk of doubling U.S. forces there, and preparations are being made for another supply line into Afghanistan — this one running through the former Soviet Union — as an alternative or a supplement to the current Pakistani route. To free up more resources for Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq probably will be accelerated. And there is discussion about whether the Karzai government serves the purposes of the war in Afghanistan. In short, U.S. President Barack Obama’s campaign promise to focus on Afghanistan seems to be taking shape.

We have discussed many aspects of the Afghan war in the past; it is now time to focus on the central issue. What are the strategic goals of the United States in Afghanistan? What resources will be devoted to this mission? What are the intentions and capabilities of the Taliban and others fighting the United States and its NATO allies? Most important, what is the relationship between the war against the Taliban and the war against al Qaeda? If the United States encounters difficulties in the war against the Taliban, will it still be able to contain not only al Qaeda but other terrorist groups? Does the United States need to succeed against the Taliban to be successful against transnational Islamist terrorists? And assuming that U.S. forces are built up in Afghanistan and that the supply problem through Pakistan is solved, are the defeat of Taliban and the disruption of al Qaeda likely?

Al Qaeda and U.S. Goals Post-9/11

The overarching goal of the United States since Sept. 11, 2001, has been to prevent further attacks by al Qaeda in the United States. Washington has used two means toward this end. One was defensive, aimed at increasing the difficulty of al Qaeda operatives to penetrate and operate within the United States. The second was to attack and destroy al Qaeda prime, the group around Osama bin Laden that organized and executed 9/11 and other attacks in Europe. It is this group — not other groups that call themselves al Qaeda but only are able to operate in the countries where they were formed — that was the target of the United States, because this was the group that had demonstrated the ability to launch intercontinental strikes.

Al Qaeda prime had its main headquarters in Afghanistan. It was not an Afghan group, but one drawn from multiple Islamic countries. It was in alliance with an Afghan group, the Taliban. The Taliban had won a civil war in Afghanistan, creating a coalition of support among tribes that had given the group control, direct or indirect, over most of the country. It is important to remember that al Qaeda was separate from the Taliban; the former was a multinational force, while the Taliban were an internal Afghan political power.

The United States has two strategic goals in Afghanistan. The first is to destroy the remnants of al Qaeda prime — the central command of al Qaeda — in Afghanistan. The second is to use Afghanistan as a base for destroying al Qaeda in Pakistan and to prevent the return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan.

To achieve these goals, Washington has sought to make Afghanistan inhospitable to al Qaeda. The United States forced the Taliban from Afghanistan’s main cities and into the countryside, and established a new, anti-Taliban government in Kabul under President Hamid Karzai. Washington intended to deny al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan by unseating the Taliban government, creating a new pro-American government and then using Afghanistan as a base against al Qaeda in Pakistan.

The United States succeeded in forcing the Taliban from power in the sense that in giving up the cities, the Taliban lost formal control of the country. To be more precise, early in the U.S. attack in 2001, the Taliban realized that the massed defense of Afghan cities was impossible in the face of American air power. The ability of U.S. B-52s to devastate any concentration of forces meant that the Taliban could not defend the cities, but had to withdraw, disperse and reform its units for combat on more favorable terms.

At this point, we must separate the fates of al Qaeda and the Taliban. During the Taliban retreat, al Qaeda had to retreat as well. Since the United States lacked sufficient force to destroy al Qaeda at Tora Bora, al Qaeda was able to retreat into northwestern Pakistan. There, it enjoys the advantages of terrain, superior tactical intelligence and support networks.

Even so, in nearly eight years of war, U.S. intelligence and special operations forces have maintained pressure on al Qaeda in Pakistan. The United States has imposed attrition on al Qaeda, disrupting its command, control and communications and isolating it. In the process, the United States used one of al Qaeda’s operational principles against it. To avoid penetration by hostile intelligence services, al Qaeda has not recruited new cadres for its primary unit. This makes it very difficult to develop intelligence on al Qaeda, but it also makes it impossible for al Qaeda to replace its losses. Thus, in a long war of attrition, every loss imposed on al Qaeda has been irreplaceable, and over time, al Qaeda prime declined dramatically in effectiveness — meaning it has been years since it has carried out an effective operation.

The situation was very different with the Taliban. The Taliban, it is essential to recall, won the Afghan civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal despite Russian and Iranian support for its opponents. That means the Taliban have a great deal of support and a strong infrastructure, and, above all, they are resilient. After the group withdrew from Afghanistan’s cities and lost formal power post-9/11, it still retained a great deal of informal influence — if not control — over large regions of Afghanistan and in areas across the border in Pakistan. Over the years since the U.S. invasion, the Taliban have regrouped, rearmed and increased their operations in Afghanistan. And the conflict with the Taliban has now become a conventional guerrilla war.

The Taliban and the Guerrilla Warfare Challenge

The Taliban have forged relationships among many Afghan (and Pakistani) tribes. These tribes have been alienated by Karzai and the Americans, and far more important, they do not perceive the Americans and Karzai as potential winners in the Afghan conflict. They recall the Russian and British defeats. The tribes have long memories, and they know that foreigners don’t stay very long. Betting on the United States and Karzai — when the United States has sent only 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, and is struggling with the idea of sending another 30,000 troops — does not strike them as prudent. The United States is behaving like a power not planning to win; and, in any event, they would not be much impressed if the Americans were planning to win.

The tribes therefore do not want to get on the wrong side of the Taliban. That means they aid and shelter Taliban forces, and provide them intelligence on enemy movement and intentions. With its base camps and supply lines running from Pakistan, the Taliban are thus in a position to recruit, train and arm an increasingly large force.

The Taliban have the classic advantage of guerrillas operating in known terrain with a network of supporters: superior intelligence. They know where the Americans are, what the Americans are doing and when the Americans are going to strike. The Taliban declines combat on unfavorable terms and strikes when the Americans are weakest. The Americans, on the other hand, have the classic problem of counterinsurgency: They enjoy superior force and firepower, and can defeat anyone they can locate and pin down, but they lack intelligence. As much as technical intelligence from unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites is useful, human intelligence is the only effective long-term solution to defeating an insurgency. In this, the Taliban have the advantage: They have been there longer, they are in more places and they are not going anywhere.

There is no conceivable force the United States can deploy to pacify Afghanistan. A possible alternative is moving into Pakistan to cut the supply lines and destroy the Taliban’s base camps. The problem is that if the Americans lack the troops to successfully operate in Afghanistan, it is even less likely they have the troops to operate in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States could use the Korean War example, taking responsibility for cutting the Taliban off from supplies and reinforcements from Pakistan, but that assumes that the Afghan government has an effective force motivated to engage and defeat the Taliban. The Afghan government doesn’t.

The obvious American solution — or at least the best available solution — is to retreat to strategic Afghan points and cities and protect the Karzai regime. The problem here is that in Afghanistan, holding the cities doesn’t give the key to the country; rather, holding the countryside gives the key to the cities. Moreover, a purely defensive posture opens the United States up to the Dien Bien Phu/Khe Sanh counterstrategy, in which guerrillas shift to positional warfare, isolate a base and try to overrun in it.

A purely defensive posture could create a stalemate, but nothing more. That stalemate could create the foundations for political negotiations, but if there is no threat to the enemy, the enemy has little reason to negotiate. Therefore, there must be strikes against Taliban concentrations. The problem is that the Taliban know that concentration is suicide, and so they work to deny the Americans valuable targets. The United States can exhaust itself attacking minor targets based on poor intelligence. It won’t get anywhere.

U.S. Strategy in Light of al Qaeda’s Diminution

From the beginning, the Karzai government has failed to take control of the countryside. Therefore, al Qaeda has had the option to redeploy into Afghanistan if it chose. It didn’t because it is risk-averse. That may seem like a strange thing to say about a group that flies planes into buildings, but what it means is that the group’s members are relatively few, so al Qaeda cannot risk operational failures. It thus keeps its powder dry and stays in hiding.

This then frames the U.S. strategic question. The United States has no intrinsic interest in the nature of the Afghan government. The United States is interested in making certain the Taliban do not provide sanctuary to al Qaeda prime. But it is not clear that al Qaeda prime is operational anymore. Some members remain, putting out videos now and then and trying to appear fearsome, but it would seem that U.S. operations have crippled al Qaeda.

So if the primary reason for fighting the Taliban is to keep al Qaeda prime from having a base of operations in Afghanistan, that reason might be moot now as al Qaeda appears to be wrecked. This is not to say that another Islamist terrorist group could not arise and develop the sophisticated methods and training of al Qaeda prime. But such a group could deploy many places, and in any case, obtaining the needed skills in moving money, holding covert meetings and the like is much harder than it looks — and with many intelligence services, including those in the Islamic world, on the lookout for this, recruitment would be hard.

It is therefore no longer clear that resisting the Taliban is essential for blocking al Qaeda: al Qaeda may simply no longer be there. (At this point, the burden of proof is on those who think al Qaeda remains operational.)

Two things emerge from this. First, the search for al Qaeda and other Islamist groups is an intelligence matter best left to the covert capabilities of U.S. intelligence and Special Operations Command. Defeating al Qaeda does not require tens of thousands of troops — it requires excellent intelligence and a special operations capability. That is true whether al Qaeda is in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Intelligence, covert forces and airstrikes are what is needed in this fight, and of the three, intelligence is the key.

Second, the current strategy in Afghanistan cannot secure Afghanistan, nor does it materially contribute to shutting down al Qaeda. Trying to hold some cities and strategic points with the number of troops currently under consideration is not an effective strategy to this end; the United States is already ceding large areas of Afghanistan to the Taliban that could serve as sanctuary for al Qaeda. Protecting the Karzai government and key cities is therefore not significantly contributing to the al Qaeda-suppression strategy.

In sum, the United States does not control enough of Afghanistan to deny al Qaeda sanctuary, can’t control the border with Pakistan and lacks effective intelligence and troops for defeating the Taliban.

Logic argues, therefore, for the creation of a political process for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan coupled with a recommitment to intelligence operations against al Qaeda. Ultimately, the United States must protect itself from radical Islamists, but cannot create a united, pro-American Afghanistan. That would not happen even if the United States sent 500,000 troops there, which it doesn’t have anyway.

A Tale of Two Surges

The U.S. strategy now appears to involve trying a surge, or sending in more troops and negotiating with the Taliban, mirroring the strategy used in Iraq. But the problem with that strategy is that the Taliban don’t seem inclined to make concessions to the United States. The Taliban don’t think the United States can win, and they know the United States won’t stay. The Petraeus strategy is to inflict enough pain on the Taliban to cause them to rethink their position, which worked in Iraq. But it did not work in Vietnam. So long as the Taliban have resources flowing and can survive American attacks, they will calculate that they can outlast the Americans. This has been Afghan strategy for centuries, and it worked against the British and Russians.

If it works against the Americans, too, splitting the al Qaeda strategy from the Taliban strategy will be the inevitable outcome for the United States. In that case, the CIA will become the critical war fighter in the theater, while conventional forces will be withdrawn. It follows that Obama will need to think carefully about his approach to intelligence.

This is not an argument that al Qaeda is no longer a threat, although the threat appears diminished. Nor is it an argument that dealing with terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not a priority. Instead, it is an argument that the defeat of the Taliban under rationally anticipated circumstances is unlikely and that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan will be much more difficult and unlikely than the settlement was in Iraq — but that even so, a robust effort against Islamist terror groups must continue regardless of the outcome of the war with the Taliban.

Therefore, we expect that the United States will separate the two conflicts in response to these realities. This will mean that containing terrorists will not be dependent on defeating or holding out against the Taliban, holding Afghanistan’s cities, or preserving the Karzai regime. We expect the United States to surge troops into Afghanistan, but in due course, the counterterrorist portion will diverge from the counter-Taliban portion. The counterterrorist portion will be maintained as an intense covert operation, while the overt operation will wind down over time. The Taliban ruling Afghanistan is not a threat to the United States, so long as intense counterterrorist operations continue there.

The cost of failure in Afghanistan is simply too high and the connection to counterterrorist activities too tenuous for the two strategies to be linked. And since the counterterror war is already distinct from conventional operations in much of Afghanistan and Pakistan, our forecast is not really that radical.

© Stratfor

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PDL/Il matrimonio s’ha da fare

Jan 24 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under Italia

«Gennaio è volato, siamo già in campagna elettorale». La frase colta al volo tra i corridoi di Palazzo Madama è la fotografia del momento politico. La maggioranza vede già all’orizzonte le elezioni europee di giugno e nella vasta prateria sulla quale galoppava il Cavaliere sono cominciati a spuntare un po’ di ostacoli. Risultato: per la prima volta i sondaggi hanno segnato quattro punti in meno per il governo.

La competizione con l’opposizione almeno per ora non esiste (tanto che il Pd continua a perdere colpi), ma all’interno del centrodestra si è aperto un confronto che andrà avanti con stop and go, che a Silvio Berlusconi non sono mai piaciuti. Qualcuno dice che si tratta di normale dialettica (e in parte lo è), ma nella progettazione del Pdl sono apparsi problemi strutturali e le assemblee di condominio con la Lega si sono fatte rumorose. Sia chiaro: la casa non brucia, però per la prima volta s’ode il rumore dei piatti.

Buon partito cercasi, scopo matrimonio

Il Pdl per ora è un gruppo parlamentare che alla Camera e al Senato, dopo le prime incertezze, ha cominciato a funzionare. Maurizio Gasparri e Gaetano Quagliariello a Palazzo Madama giocano bene il proprio ruolo, Fabrizio Cicchitto e Italo Bocchino a Montecitorio dopo un periodo di rodaggio un po’ rumoroso si sono ripresi. La macchina parlamentare va, i gruppi dirigenti si stanno amalgamando, ma hanno bisogno di costruire al più presto un buon partito. Prima si celebrano le nozze tra Forza Italia e An e meglio sarà per tutti.

I punti di frizione tra i promessi sposi e la Lega si sono moltiplicati: il caso Malpensa, la riforma della giustizia, quella dell’immigrazione, il patto di stabilità per i comuni e la riforma del codice delle autonomie, il federalismo fiscale, il referendum sulla legge elettorale nazionale, la riforma della legge elettorale per le elezioni europee sono solo baruffe se trovano una stanza di compensazione in un partito che ne fa la sintesi. In caso contrario sono scosse che prima o poi generano uno tsunami politico. Con le dovute differenze, numeriche e di natura della coalizione, per questo il governo di Romano Prodi ebbe vita brevissima.

Quadro, cornice e chiodo

Silvio Berlusconi ha ripreso il dialogo con Gianfranco Fini. Il presidente della Camera ha attovagliato un tavolo per «il pranzo delle due portate», nel senso che il lunch era iniziato peggio e per fortuna dei commensali è finito meglio.

L’accordo matrimoniale proposto dal coordinatore nazionale di Fi, Denis Verdini, per An era indigesto. Un menù fisso al quale Fini aveva risposto minacciando lo slittamento del congresso a data da destinarsi. A quel punto il Cavaliere s’è messo l’abito diplomatico e al caffè si è concordato sul rifacimento delle partecipazioni di nozze.

Fini ha incaricato il reggente di An Ignazio La Russa di preparare un quadro e una cornice in attesa che Berlusconi ci metta un robusto chiodo. La bozza del possibile accordo prevede norme transitorie per questa legislatura e si basa su cinque punti.

1) Viene riconosciuto il principio del leader carismatico. È un fatto molto importante perché mette fine all’eterna discussione sul delfinato, il cesarismo, la monarchia e il termidoro. La cosa è talmente rilevante che Fini rinuncia (è una prova di fiducia da parte sua) a qualsiasi ruolo formale all’interno del partito. Non potrebbe, essendo la terza carica dello Stato, occupare la poltrona di vicepresidente (attualmente in Forza Italia condivisa da Giulio Tremonti e Roberto Formigoni) e in fondo questa scelta gli consente di avere mano libera sul piano istituzionale e politico.

2) Il leader vedrà riconosciuto il suo potere ma le sue azioni non saranno quelle di un monarca assoluto. Il carisma verrà democratizzato e al suo fianco ci sarà un «consiglio della corona», una sorta di comitato esecutivo composto da 18-20 persone che lo affiancherà nelle decisioni collegiali. Del comitato faranno parte da due a quattro coordinatori. Anche questo è un principio basilare: stabilisce una divisione dei ruoli, mette fine all’era del coordinatore unico e consente al gruppo dirigente che proviene da An di avere un uomo forte nella stanza dei bottoni. Per il partito di Fini il candidato favorito sembra essere La Russa.

3) Eredità dei partiti del Novecento, non può mancare la direzione. Un centinaio di persone che discute i documenti strategici e la linea politica.

4) Immancabile, il collegamento con il territorio e, oplà, ecco spuntare l’assemblea degli eletti, vasta comunione che parte dagli enti locali e arriva fino ai parlamentari europei. Al di là delle competenze che avrà l’organismo, quest’ultimo punto mette in chiaro quel che sarà il Pdl almeno in questa prima fase: un partito degli eletti che, in attesa di un vero regolamento sulle elezioni primarie, aspira al modello americano.

5) Domanda: chi nomina i coordinatori? In omaggio al principio che c’è un leader carismatico, e tenendo presenti le regole di distribuzione dei pesi, è il presidente che decide. Con quali percentuali tra Fi e An? Finora si è andati avanti con la formula del 70-30 e a oggi pare resistere. Anche perché c’è chi fa notare che il potenziale elettorale di An in realtà oggi sarebbe inferiore rispetto a quello delle elezioni politiche del 2006 in cui il partito di Fini si presentò con il suo simbolo.

E il soggetto del dipinto?

Trattandosi di politica, non sarà né arcadico né romantico, piuttosto intriso di realismo. D’altronde se Walter Veltroni fa un partito «liquido» (con il rischio di esser liquidato) è chiaro che dall’altra parte si prova a seguire la via del partito solido. Pochi fronzoli, molto Berlusconi, niente retorica sulla società civile e sintonia tra azione di governo e linea politica.

I consiglieri del Cavaliere non hanno dubbi, con la Lega occorre varare una politica di «leale concorrenza» che ha già due appuntamenti ineluttabili: le elezioni europee 2009 per contarsi e l’apice delle regionali del 2010 con in ballo le poltrone ad alta velocità della locomotiva nordista, Lombardia e Veneto. Per far questo il Pdl dovrà riorganizzarsi sul territorio.

Un elemento molto importante però riguarda la presenza in tutto il Paese. L’Italia non è solo il Settentrione e il Pdl in realtà è ormai l’unico partito che può vantare di essere presente in tutto lo Stivale, isole comprese. Con il Pd ridotto allo status di «forza appenninica» (copyright: Giulio Tremonti), cioè rilevante solo nel Centro Italia, il Pdl può varare una strategia sullo stato-nazione come nessun altro e affrontare in modo moderno e senza accuse di particolarismo la questione meridionale. Né il partito del Nord né quello del Mezzogiorno, ma partito nazionale.

© Panorama

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President Obama’s Inaugural Address

Jan 20 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under America

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My fellow citizens:

I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors. I thank President Bush for his service to our nation, as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition.

Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath. The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans.

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age. Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly; our schools fail too many; and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable but no less profound is a sapping of confidence across our land – a nagging fear that America’s decline is inevitable, and that the next generation must lower its sights.

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real. They are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this, America – they will be met.

On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn out dogmas, that for far too long have strangled our politics.

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted – for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things – some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life.

For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.

For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn.

Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction.

This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions – that time has surely passed. Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.

For everywhere we look, there is work to be done. The state of the economy calls for action, bold and swift, and we will act – not only to create new jobs, but to lay a new foundation for growth. We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together. We will restore science to its rightful place, and wield technology’s wonders to raise health care’s quality and lower its cost. We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age. All this we can do. And all this we will do.

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions – who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short. For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage.

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them – that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works – whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account – to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day – because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.

Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control – and that a nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our Gross Domestic Product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on our ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart – not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake. And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

We are the keepers of this legacy. Guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort – even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus – and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society’s ills on the West – know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world’s resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us today, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment – a moment that will define a generation – it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies. It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break, the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours. It is the firefighter’s courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent’s willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.

Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends – hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility – a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.

This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

This is the source of our confidence – the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.

This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed – why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

“Let it be told to the future world…that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive…that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet [it].”

America. In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.

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Obama enters the Great Game

Jan 20 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under America, Geopolitica, Libri, War on Terror

By George Friedman

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama also is now in the great game of global competition — and in that game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.

The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is not involvement — it is the alternative to involvement, and the reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza crisis, and he will do so.

Obama’s Two Unavoidable Crises

The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama therefore comes into office with three interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single issue — and it is not one that will wait.

Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus’ lead in Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the likely strategy in Afghanistan.

But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several days, citing government operations against radical Islamist forces.

Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops already has been shifted.

Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies — petroleum, ammunition, etc. — must come in via surface transit, either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can’t predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.

When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed — or even meaningfully degraded — the only other viable routes would be through the former Soviet Union.

One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently transported, crosses the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is ferried across the Caspian to Turkmenistan (where a small amount of fuel is also refined), then shipped across Turkmenistan directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land in Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the Black Sea through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey (though the additional use of Turkey would require a rail gauge switch). It is also not clear that transports native to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.

Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the Caspian and the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian territory above the Caspian. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) would connect the route to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to the Black Sea or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.

Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between Tehran and Washington would have to improve dramatically before such discussions could even begin — and time is short.

Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are largely variations on the two main themes of either crossing the Caspian or transiting Russian territory above it.

Though the first route is already partially established for fuel, it is not clear how much additional capacity exists. To complicate matters further, Turkmen acquiescence is unlikely without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains strongly loyal to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government might leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive one for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan and the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route across Georgia.) The second option would require crossing Russian territory itself, with a number of options — from connecting to the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or Belarus to Europe, or connecting to the Baltic states.

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Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where Moscow has influence, regardless of whether those countries are friendly to it. This would give Russia ample opportunity to scuttle any such supply line at multiple points for reasons wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.

If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost certainly would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to cooperate, and Turkey would find itself in a position it doesn’t want to be in — namely, caught between the United States and Russia. The diplomatic complexities of developing these routes not only involve the individual countries included, they also inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations.

Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options require Russian cooperation. The United States must develop the option of an alternative supply route to Pakistan, and in doing so, it must define its relationship with Russia. Seeking to work without Russian approval of a route crossing its “near abroad” will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.

The Russian Natural Gas Connection

One of Obama’s core arguments against the Bush administration was that it acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically, Obama meant that the Bush administration alienated the Europeans, therefore failing to build a sustainable coalition for the war. By this logic, it follows that one of Obama’s first steps should be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has said he intends to ask the Europeans for more help there.

The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a serious crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is involved in trying to manage that crisis. This problem relates to natural gas. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for about two-thirds of the natural gas it uses. The Russians traditionally have provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such as Belarus or Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural gas, too, until the 2004 Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. At that point, the Russians began demanding full payment. Given the subsequent rises in global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible situation — which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.

The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in January 2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving Ukraine desperate, the cutoff immediately affected the rest of Europe, because the natural gas that goes to Europe flows through Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a dangerous position, particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 2008-2009.

The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they pressured Ukraine directly. Second, they forced many European states to deal with Moscow directly rather than through the European Union. Third, they created a situation in which European countries had to choose between supporting Ukraine and heating their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular — since Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on Russian natural gas — into the position of working with the Russians to get Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Germany last week to discuss this directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.)

The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding NATO to Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the Russians, the Germans are not going to be supporting the United States if Washington decides to challenge Russia over the supply route issue. In fact, the Germans — and many of the Europeans — are in no position to challenge Russia on anything, least of all on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves as having limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are planning to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons.

It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the Europeans in any useful manner for a confrontation with Russia over access for American supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an issue he will have to address immediately.

The Price of Russian Cooperation

The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however — and it is clear what they will want in return.

At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian periphery — specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. At this point, such a declaration would be symbolic, since Germany and other European countries would block expansion anyway.

The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO and the United States not place any large military formations or build any major military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters already patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week, the stability of these countries is in question. The Russians would certainly want to topple the pro-Western Baltic governments. And anything approaching a formal agreement between Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the NATO alliance.

Another demand the Russians probably will make — because they have in the past — is that the United States guarantee eventual withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for Russian support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign. (At present, the United States runs air logistics operations out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to see Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of an American military presence.

Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.

We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to Afghanistan. Simply put, the Russians will demand that the United States acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Americans will not want to concede this — or at least will want to make it implicit rather than explicit. But the Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee will create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever to draw these countries into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence on the point potentially would have ripple effects in the rest of Europe, too.

Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has an immediate problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops fighting there, and they must be supplied. The Pakistani supply line is no longer a sure thing. The only other options either directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) or require Russian help. Russia’s price will be high, particularly because Washington’s European allies will not back a challenge to Russia in Georgia, and all options require Russian cooperation anyway. Obama’s plan to recruit the Europeans on behalf of American initiatives won’t work in this case. Obama does not want to start his administration with making a massive concession to Russia, but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in Afghanistan without supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, but that is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone else — and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea.

Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this problem fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are no good solutions. But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama can’t solve this by sending a special envoy who appears to be doing something. He will have to make a very tough decision. Between the economy and this crisis, we will find out what kind of president Obama is.

And we will find out very soon.

© Stratfor

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A Gaza una guerra piena di target che ha mancato il bersaglio finale

Jan 19 2009 Published by Mario Sechi under Difesa e Intelligence, Medio Oriente

I bravi giocatori di biliardo quando prendono in mano la stecca tengono ben presente una massima: “Calma e gesso”. E’ la stessa cautela e freddezza d’animo con la quale bisogna guardare alla politica quando decide di muoversi sull’impervio terreno della guerra. Su questo blog fin dall’inizio dell’operazione Cast  Lead nella Striscia di Gaza abbiamo espresso dubbi e cercato di fornire analisi prive di pregiudizio morale per l’una o l’altra parte.

Abbiamo puntato la lente sull’obiettivo politico dell’attacco a Gaza, sui costi-benifici dell’operazione, sui troppi stop and go che hanno contrassegnato la campagna militare, sulle divisioni nel governo israeliano.

Abbiamo letto numerosi articoli dove si elencavano gli obiettivi raggiunti dal governo israeliano: la deterrenza nei confronti dell’Iran, un messaggio di forza destinato a Hezbollah, la fine del lancio dei razzi dalla Striscia verso Israele, la distruzione del braccio militare di Hamas, un nuovo equilibrio di potere a Gaza. Non abbiamo le stesse granitiche certezze espresse da altri e continuiamo a coltivare il dubbio. Non sulla legittimità dell’azione, non sulla natura violenta di Hamas, non sulla sua abilità nell’usare l’informazione come arma asimmetrica, non sul diritto di Israele di difendersi, ma sulla pianificazione dell’operazione e sugli obiettivi di medio e lungo termine che si prefiggeva.

Qui registriamo solo che la tregua è fragilissima (e i razzi sempre in caldo), che Hamas punta a continuare a mantenere il potere a Gaza, che le forze di Hamas non sono state completamente distrutte, che le milizie si preparano a una resa dei conti con al Fatah, che la tregua è giunta a 48 ore dall’insediamento del nuovo presidente degli Stati Uniti, Barack Obama, e non crediamo sia casuale.

Sono pensieri privi di retorica, esenti da cerchiobottismo o vizio ideologico. Li condividiamo con altri e tra questi c’è Ethan Bronner del New York Times che ha scritto un’analisi da leggere e conservare a futura memoria. Israele ha condotto una guerra piena di target militari, ma senza inquadrare mai nell’obiettivo il bersaglio finale.

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